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SUMMARY 
This dissertation is concerned with class actions within the context of South African civil 
procedural law. There is currently no South African statute or court rule that provides a 
procedural framework for the institution and regulation of class actions. Our courts have 
been required to develop the appropriate class action procedural rules using their inherent 
jurisdiction as entrenched in section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. This was done in Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource 
Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 
All SA 648 (SCA), which effectively details key aspects of the law relating to class actions 
in South Africa.  
However, various ambiguities, inconsistencies and problems remain. In this regard, South 
African case law on class action procedure has not yet been subjected to a 
comprehensive and critical analysis in order to provide answers to a number of vital 
questions. These include the following: 
i) when is a class action, as opposed to joinder, the appropriate procedural device to be
utilised to adjudicate a claim and when is it appropriate to use the opt-in, as opposed
to the opt-out, class action regime?;
ii) when, if ever, should notice of a class action be given to class members and when
would individual notice to each class member be required, or would some form of
general notice to the class suffice?;
iii) what is the approach that our courts should follow and what are the devices that they
could utilise to determine damages in personal injury class actions?; and,
iv) how should a class action be managed and what should the role of the courts be in
this regard?
Ultimately, the purpose of the dissertation is to assist in developing a structure that could 
facilitate the adjudication of class actions in South Africa. This inevitably entails 
interpreting the South African class action procedure as expounded by our courts and, 
given the novelty of the procedure, constantly seeking guidance from the class action 
regimes of prominent foreign jurisdictions, most notably Australia, Ontario and the United 
States.   
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die verhandeling bespreek groepsgedinge in die konteks van die Suid-Afrikaanse siviele 
prosesreg. Daar bestaan tans geen Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing of hofreëls wat 
voorsiening maak vir ‗n prosedure wat die instel en regulering van groepsgedinge 
aanspreek nie. Die verantwoordelikheid om toepaslike prosedurele reëls te ontwikkel ten 
einde effek te gee aan groepsgedinge berus, in wese, tans by die howe op grond van hul 
inherente jurisdiksie, soos vervat in artikel 173 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van 
Suid Afrika, 1996. Hierdie verantwoordelikheid is deels nagekom in Trustees for the time 
being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources 
Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA), wat sleutelaspekte van die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg rakende groepsgedinge uiteensit.  
 
Oorblywende dubbelsinnighede, inkonsekwenthede en probleme is egter steeds nie 
aangespreek nie. Kortom, Suid Afrikaanse regspraak oor groepsgedinge is nog nie 
onderworpe gestel aan ‗n omvattende en kritiese ontleding ten einde antwoorde te vind ten 
opsigte van ‗n aantal sleutelvrae nie. Hierdie vrae sluit die volgende in: 
 
i) wanneer is ‗n groepsgeding, in plaas van voeging, die toepaslike prosedurele 
meganisme om eise te bereg en wanneer is dit toepaslik om die intree, eerder as 
die uittree, groepsgeding-prosedure te gebruik?; 
ii) wanneer, indien ooit, moet kennis van ‗n groepsgeding aan groepslede gegee word 
en wanneer word individuele kennisgewing aan elke groepslid vereis, of onder 
watter omstandighede sal algemene kennis aan die klas as ‗n geheel voldoende 
wees?; 
iii) wat is die benadering wat ons howe behoort te volg en wat is die meganismes wat 
aangewend kan word om skadevergoeding te bepaal in geval van persoonlike 
besering groepsgedinge?; 
iv) hoe moet ‗n groepsgeding bestuur word en wat behoort die howe se rol te wees in 
hierdie verband? 
 
In hoofsaak is die doel van die verhandeling om by te dra tot die ontwikkeling van ‗n 
struktuur wat die beregtiging van groepsgedinge in Suid-Afrika kan fasiliteer. Dit behels 
onvermydelik dat die Suid-Afrikaanse groepsgeding-prosedure, soos uiteengesit deur ons 
howe, geïnterpreteer word en, gegewe die nuutheid van die prosedure, om deurlopend te 
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steun op die groepsgeding-stelsels van prominente buitelandse jurisdiksies, veral die van 
Australië, Ontario en die Verenigde State van Amerika.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Historical and comparative overview and the development of class actions 
 
Although class actions were first recognised in South Africa more than 20 years ago in the 
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (―Interim Constitution‖),1 it is an 
area of South African law that still remains largely unregulated by statute or court rules. 
Legislative inaction has compelled the judiciary to step in and, through case law, to 
develop a structure for the adjudication of class actions. Our courts should be commended 
for developing the existing framework within which class actions operate and for giving 
substance to what could otherwise conceivably have been perceived as an illusory dispute 
resolution mechanism. The role that our courts have played in this regard is significant 
given the increase in recent times in the incidence of class actions. Most recently, the 
South Gauteng Division of the High Court of South Africa certified the first South African 
mass personal injury class action of Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited,2 a 
watershed case insofar as our class action landscape is concerned. Our class action law is 
therefore currently in a state of flux; it is trying to shape and position itself within our civil 
justice system. As part of this developmental process, our courts have not been able to 
address all the problems, contradictions and inconsistencies associated with the 
introduction and development of a South African class action mechanism. This study aims 
to address some of them.   
 
This chapter commences with providing a definition of class actions and briefly 
mentioning the overarching goals of class actions. The class action goals constitute 
prominent considerations throughout the dissertation. Thereafter, the chapter provides 
an historical overview of the origin of class actions. The position in selected foreign 
jurisdictions is then considered and, for the most part, consideration is given to the 
American federal class action, the Canadian provincial model of Ontario and the 
Australian federal regime. The class action regimes in the aforementioned jurisdictions 
are generally regarded as the leaders in the field of class action litigation.3 The chapter 
                                                          
1
 Section 7(4)(b)(iv). 
2
 (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016). 
3
 According to D L Bassett ―The Future of International Class Actions‖ (2011) 18 Sw J Int’l L 21 22-24, more 
than a decade ago the only countries outside the United States with class action procedures were Australia 
and Canada and, despite the frequently articulated desire to avoid the potential pitfalls of the American class 
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further considers the origin and historical development of class actions in South Africa 
before concluding with a brief exposition of the problems that this study aims to address.  
 
1 1 1 General overview and the position in selected foreign jurisdictions  
 
The following definition of a ‗class action‘ was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) in Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer 
Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae)4 (―Children’s Resource Centre 
Trust‖): 
 
―A class action is a legal procedure which enables the claims (or parts of the claims) of a 
number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class 
action, one or more persons (‗representative plaintiff‘) may sue on his or her own behalf and on 
behalf of a number of other persons (‗the class‘) who have a claim to a remedy for the same or 
a similar alleged wrong to that alleged by the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that 
share questions of law or fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff (‗common 
issues‘). Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class members are not 
usually identified as individual parties but are merely described. The class members are bound 
by the outcome of the litigation on the common issues, whether favourable or adverse to the 
class, although they do not, for the most part, take any active part in that litigation.‖5 
 
Class actions, as defined above, are aimed at improving access to justice and judicial 
economy as well as modifying behaviour6 by deterring similar future wrongdoing.7 Access 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
action, the class action or class-action-like procedures adopted in other countries often tend to include 
components of the American class action. 
4
 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA). 
5
 R Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (2004) 3, 
quoted with approval in Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food 
(Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 16. The South African 
Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law Report 
Project 88 (1998) para 5.2.7 proposes the following definition of a ―class action‖: ―an action instituted by a 
representative on behalf of a class of persons in respect of whom the relief claimed and the issues involved 
are substantially similar in respect of all members of the class, and which action is certified as a class action 
in terms of the Act‖. 
6
 In Western Canadian Shopping Centres v Dutton (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534 para 29, the Supreme Court of 
Canada described the class action goal of behaviour modification as follows: ―[C]lass actions serve efficiency 
and justice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers do not ignore their obligations to the 
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to justice is generally regarded as the most important as many potentially meritorious 
claims of middle and low-income individuals are never brought to court because of the 
high costs of litigation.8 Essentially, the class action device enables the adjudication of 
such claims and thus promotes access to justice.  
 
With the above in mind, the origin and historical development of the class action 
mechanism will now be considered. The origin of the class action in common-law systems 
can be traced to the ‗bill of peace‘ that originated in seventeenth-century English Chancery 
Courts.9 The English Chancery Courts developed the ‗bill of peace‘ as a procedural device 
to enable representative parties to petition the courts to aggregate multiple claims in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
public.  Without class actions, those who cause widespread but individually minimal harm might not take into 
account the full costs of their conduct, because for any one plaintiff the expense of bringing suit would far 
exceed the likely recovery. Cost-sharing decreases the expense of pursuing legal recourse and accordingly 
deters potential defendants who might otherwise assume that minor wrongs would not result in litigation‖. 
7
 These purposes are well-established in foreign law. For example, in Western Canadian Shopping Centres v 
Dutton (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534 paras 27-29, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the legitimate ends 
achieved by collective redress are access to justice, judicial economy and deterrence of antisocial behaviour. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court Report No 46 (1988) 
para 2 essentially provides that the objectives of the class action procedure in Australia are to improve 
access to justice, court efficiency and the efficiency of the legal system and to reduce the cost of legal 
proceedings. 
8
 V Morabito ―Ideological Plaintiffs and Class Actions – an Australian Perspective‖ (2000-2001) 34 U Brit 
Colum L Rev 459 502. See also G M Zakaib & J M Martin ―International Class Actions in the Canadian 
Context: Standing, Funding, Enforceability and Trial‖ (2012) 79 Def Counsel J 296 300-301. 
9
 G C Lilly ―Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool‖ (2014) 81 Neb L Rev 1008 
1013. See also Z Chafee Some Problems of Equity (1950) 157-164; W de Vos ―Is a Class Action a ‗Classy 
Act‘ to Implement Outside the Ambit of the Constitution?‖ (2012) 4 TSAR 737 738; E Hurter ―Some Thoughts 
on Current Developments relating to Class Actions in South African Law as viewed against Leading Foreign 
Jurisdictions‖ (2006) CILSA 39(3) 485 fn 5. According to Professor Yeazell, however, the origin of the class 
action can be traced to twelfth century ‗medieval group litigation‘. In this regard, see S C Yeazell From 
Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action (1987). See also N M Pastor ―Equity and Settlement 
Class Actions: Can There Be Justice For All in Ortiz v. Fibreboard‖ (2000) 49(3) American University Law 
Review 773 781 where, referring to Yeazell, Pastor states ―[m]anorial, royal and ecclesiastical courts used 
group litigation to meet varying social needs of the medieval culture that were primarily political or religious in 
nature and often involved multiple litigants. For example, courts used group litigation to address issues 
arising from social obligations or privileges accorded to different rural groups, parishes, and guilds within the 
hierarchical-structured medieval community‖. 
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single equity proceeding, with the ‗class‘ being bound by the court‘s judgment.10 The bill of 
peace was used when the parties to a dispute were so numerous that it would create 
manageability problems11 and when all the parties shared a common interest in the issues. 
This type of representative action was believed to be more efficient than trying each case 
individually,12 and more consistent with equity‘s goal of doing complete justice.13 Initially, 
the bill of peace was available only in equity; however, in 1873 when law and equity in 
England combined, class actions for damages were permitted.14  Pastor states the 
following regarding the bill of peace:  
 
―The English Courts of Chancery, as courts of equity, used the ‗bill of peace‘ to permit 
representative parties of larger groups of litigants with a joint interest to aggregate their claims 
and bring a collective action before the court. The ‗bill of peace‘ served two primary and 
equitable goals: (1) to reduce multiple, and sometimes unnecessary, litigation, and (2) to enable 
individuals to litigate claims as a group that would be too difficult to litigate individually. 
Eventually, due process issues relating to group litigation emerged. This emergence paralleled 
the shift in society ‗from a rural, customary, agricultural world to one that is urban, individualistic, 
entrepreneurial-capitalistic.‘ To address such concerns, Chancellors scrutinized the 
representation of a group of litigants more closely. In particular, they required litigants to tender 
an explanation for litigating jointly rather than separately. Despite these due process issues, 
Chancellors continued to grant permission for group litigation, often justifying the aggregation of 
claims because of its suitability and efficiency. Thus, the face of group litigation changed and 
evolved into the current form of the modern-day class action. Along with this evolution, however, 
came increasing concerns over adequate representation and notice that often conflicted with 
the goals of expediency and equity.‖15 
 
Class actions were therefore essentially adopted by equity courts to avoid the technical 
requirements of the law courts that all persons who may be affected by a judgment be 
                                                          
10
 M D Hausfeld, G C Rausser, G J Macartney, M P Lehmann & S S Gosselin ―Antitrust Class Proceedings – 
Then and Now‖ in J Langenfeld (ed) The Law and Economics of Class Actions (2014) 77 80. 
11
 Chapters five and six below will consider in more detail the manageability of class actions. 
12
 Chapter four below will inter alia consider whether damages in mass personal injury class actions should 
be determined individually. 
13
 K L Hall, J W Ely & J B Grossman (eds) The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 
2 ed (2005) 182. 
14
 J S Allee, T V H Mayer and R W Patryk Product Liability (2005) §17.02. 
15
 Pastor (2000) American University Law Review 784-785. 
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named as parties and be given notice.16 In Ortiz v Fibreboard Corporation17 (―Ortiz‖), the 
United States Supreme Court referred to the necessary parties rule in equity and stated 
the following regarding the origin of the class action and the development of rule 23 of the 
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rules‖):   
 
―Although representative suits have been recognized in various forms since the earliest days of 
English law, class actions as we recognize them today developed as an exception to the formal 
rigidity of the necessary parties rule in equity, as well as from the bill of peace, an equitable 
device for combining multiple suits. The necessary parties rule in equity mandated that ‗all 
persons materially interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the subject matter of the bill 
ought to be made parties to the suit, however numerous they may be‘ but because that rule 
would at times unfairly deny recovery to the party before the court, equity developed exceptions, 
among them one to cover situations ‗where the parties are very numerous, and the court 
perceives, that it would be almost impossible to bring them all before the court; or where the 
question is of general interest, and a few may sue for the benefit of the whole; or where the 
parties form a part of a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and may be fairly 
supposed to represent the rights and interests of the whole…‘ From these roots, modern class 
action practice emerged...‖ 
  
As mentioned, this dissertation will consider the class action regimes of Australia, Ontario 
and the United States. Apart from being regarded as the leaders in the field of class action 
litigation,18 their systems of civil procedure are also of common law origin and the 
adversary system of litigation is a characteristic of all of them. The basic principles that 
underlie these systems are similar.19 These jurisdictions all trace their origins to the 
unwritten practices of English Chancery. Today, however, class actions in these 
jurisdictions are largely creatures of statute and rule.20  
 
                                                          
16
 L J Tornquist ―Roadmap to Illinois Class Actions‖ (1974) 5 Loy U Chi L J 45 45. Chapter three below will 
consider notice of class actions. 
17
 527 US 815 832 (1999). 
18
 Bassett (2011) Sw J Int’l L 22-24. 
19
 W de Vos ―‘n Groepsgeding in Suid-Afrika‖ (1985) 3 TSAR 296 304. E Hurter ―Class Action: Failure to 
Comply with Guidelines by Courts Ruled Fatal‖ (2010) 2 TSAR 409 413 states that the class action is 
effectively an American phenomenon and that other Anglo-America jurisdictions that have opted for formal 
class action devices have been influenced by the American class action. According to Hurter, it is clear that 
South African class action developments mirror this trend. 
20
 R B Marcin ―Searching for the Origin of Class Action‖ (1974) 23 Cath U L Rev 515 517. 
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The American class action is regulated by a comprehensive court rule that deals with class 
actions at a federal level.21 In Canada, the Ontario Class Proceedings Act of 1992 
(―Ontario Act‖), which is based largely on a comprehensive report delivered by the Ontario 
Law Reform Commission in 1982 and the recommendations contained therein, deals 
comprehensively with all aspects relating to class actions in Ontario.22  The Ontario Act 
provides for a general class action and it regulates similar matters as provided for in rule 
23 of the Federal Rules, but it does so in much more detail. The United States and Ontario 
regarded the common law rule on representative actions as inadequate to deal with the 
current complex nature of class actions.23   
 
Class action reform at federal level in Australia followed a similar path compared to 
Ontario. The Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (―Federal Court Act‖) regulates 
Australian class proceedings in detail.24 An important difference between the Australian 
class action regime and the class action procedures of America and Ontario is that the 
Australian ‗representative proceeding‘25 does not contain a certification process, which is 
one of the striking features of class action proceedings in the United States and Ontario.26 
                                                          
21
 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 govern class 
actions in federal courts. Rule 23 makes provision for three categories of class actions: rule 23(b)(1) provides 
for two types of so-called ‗prejudice‘ class actions; rule 23(b)(2) provides for declaratory and injunctive relief; 
and rule 23(b)(3) provides for the opt-out damage class action. The most important of these categories are 
class actions to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief and actions for damages. According to R H Klonoff 
Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 4 ed (2012) 75, most class actions are brought 
and certified under rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(1) is used less frequently. Further, according to C 
Hodges The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: a New Framework for 
Collective Redress in Europe (2008) 135, the majority of the rules that regulate class actions in America are 
based on an opt-out rather than an opt-in mechanism. Appendix A contains rule 23 of the Federal Rules.  
22
 According to Y Martineau & A Lang ―Canada‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to 
Group and Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 56 57, with the exception of the province of 
Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction, all Canadian provinces and territories are common law jurisdictions. 
Appendix C contains the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992.  
23
 De Vos (2012) TSAR 744.  
24
 Appendix B contains the relevant provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976. 
25
 According to S S Clark, J Kellam & L Cook ―Australia‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A 
Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 392 406, ‗class action‘ sometimes 
refers to a more general procedure than the ‗representative action‘ procedure that had existed previously, 
but the two terms are often used interchangeably.  
26
 De Vos (2012) TSAR 744-745. See also Clark et al ―Australia‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe 411. 
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A further technical difference is the Federal Court Act‘s requirement of a group of ‗7 or 
more persons‘ compared to the requirement in the Ontario Act of ‗a class of two or more 
persons‘.27 Apart from these differences, the general features of the two systems show 
many similarities; for example, both follow the American model by allowing class actions 
for damages.28 
 
1 1 2 The development of a South African class action 
 
The representative action of the common law was never received into South African law. 
This is because the distinction drawn in English law between ‗law‘ (administered in the 
common law courts) and ‗equity‘ (administered in the Chancery Courts),29 was never 
accepted into South African law. Roman-Dutch substantive law did not suffer the same 
fate at the hands of the British reformers as procedural law and, accordingly, there was no 
need to incorporate this distinction or to establish a court of law and a court of equity, 
respectively.30 Instead, a single court was established in the Cape, following the 
introduction of the First and Second Charters of Justice of 1827 and 1834 respectively.31 
 
As stated earlier, the first time class actions were recognised in South African law was in 
the Interim Constitution. It enabled the utilisation of a class action as a means to enforce 
rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.32 The Interim Constitution was followed, in 1995, by 
a Working Paper on class actions prepared by the South African Law Commission 
(―SALC‖).33 The Working Paper contained various recommendations, including the 
                                                          
27
 Section 33C(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 and section 5(1)(b) of the Class 
Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. 
28
 De Vos (2012) TSAR 737 745. 
29
 S C Yeazell ―From Group Litigation to Class Action‖ (1980) 27 UCLA Law Review 514 522, 1067. 
30
 H J Erasmus ―Historical foundations of the South African law of Civil Procedure‖ (1991) 108 SALJ 265 
269; See also H J Erasmus ―The Interaction of Substantive Law and Procedure‖ in R Zimmermann & D 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 141 147.    
31
 De Vos (2012) TSAR 738.  
32
 Section 7(4) of the Interim Constitution became section 38 of the (final) Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
33
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 
Project 88 (1995). At the time it was known as the South African Law Commission. It became the South 
African Law Reform Commission in 2002.  
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proposed introduction of a class action over the whole spectrum of civil litigation.34 In 1998, 
with reference to the recommendations contained in the Working Paper, the SALC 
published its final report, which inter alia recommended that the principles underlying class 
actions should be introduced by an Act of Parliament and the necessary procedures by 
rules of court.35  
 
Section 38(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―Constitution‖) 
provides as follows: 
 
―38.  Enforcement of rights - Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent 
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court 
may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are- …(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons…;‖  
 
Section 38(c) clearly makes provision for class actions within the confines of the 
Constitution.36 This means that class action proceedings instituted in terms of section 38 
may only be used to enforce rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. This is the case even in 
the absence of legislation and court rules that regulate class actions in South Africa. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v 
Ngxuza37 (―Ngxuza‖) confirmed that, notwithstanding the absence of class action 
legislation and court rules, it is possible to use class proceedings to enforce constitutional 
rights.  
 
Section 38(c) cannot be utilised in the absence of an allegation that a right contained in the 
Bill of Rights has been threatened or infringed. However, South African law at present also 
allows class actions to enforce non-constitutional rights. In other words, it is also possible 
to institute a class action to enforce rights not contained in the Constitution, such as a 
                                                          
34
 See summary of recommendations at iv – v. In preparing the Working Paper, the SALC primarily used the 
American class action model as a guiding principle but also gave consideration to the class action model of 
Ontario. 
35
 The South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South 
African Law Report Project 88 (1998) para 5.6.5.   
36
 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA). Unlike rule 23 of the Federal Rules, section 38 of the Constitution does not set out 
a procedural framework in terms of which a class action is to be conducted.  
37
 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA).  
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claim for damages where no constitutional right was infringed.38 As De Vos indicates, the 
distinction between class actions to enforce constitutional rights and class actions to 
enforce non-constitutional rights is not always clear. The cases often do not all fall neatly 
into either of these two categories simply because the plaintiffs sometimes rely on the 
infringement of both constitutional and non-constitutional rights.39 
 
The Children’s Resource Centre Trust case is authority for the recognition of a class action 
outside the ambit of the Constitution.40 The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the 
circumstances when a class action may be instituted and the procedural requirements that 
must be satisfied before such proceedings may be instituted. In this regard, Wallis JA held 
that the first procedural step prior to the issuing of summons is to apply to court to certify 
the process as a class action.41 In other words, in class action proceedings, a court must 
first be approached to grant leave for the matter to proceed as a class action.42 Should 
leave be granted for the matter to proceed as a class action, the court, as the judicial 
manager of the proceedings, would issue appropriate directives as to how the class action 
will proceed. The class action trial then follows.43 However, until a potential action is 
certified, it is not a class action. 
 
Wallis JA laid down the following elements, commonly referred to as the certification 
requirements, which should guide a court in making its decision regarding the certification 
of a class action: 
 
                                                          
38
 W de Vos ―Judicial Activism Gives Recognition to a General Class Action in South Africa‖ (2013) 2 TSAR 
370 372.  
39
 De Vos (2012) TSAR 747. 
40
 Para 21. 
41
 Paras 23-25. 
42
 According to V Morabito & J Caruana ―Can Class Action Regimes Operate Satisfactorily without a 
Certification Device? Empirical Insights from the Federal Court of Australia‖ (2013) 61 Am J Comp L 
579 580-582, certification of class actions is an important part of those class action regimes that currently 
regulate class actions in American federal district courts and in ten Canadian jurisdictions. Australia, 
however, does not require court certification. According to the author, the only other contemporary class 
action regime that does not employ the certification device operates in Sweden. Sweden uses an opt-in 
regime. Australia, however, also employs opt-out devices like Ontario and the United States and thus 
provides a more useful and relevant case study than Sweden.  
43
 Hurter (2010) TSAR 409 413. 
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 There must be a class, identifiable by objective criteria. 
 There must be a cause of action raising a triable issue. 
 There must be issues of fact and/or law common to all the members of the class. 
 The relief sought or damages claimed must flow from the cause of action and must be 
ascertainable and capable of determination. 
 If the claim is for damages, there must be an appropriate procedure for allocating 
damages to the class members. 
 The proposed representative must be suitable to be permitted to conduct the action 
and to represent the class. 
 It must be shown that a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating the 
claims of the class members.44 
 
Importantly, according to Wallis JA, the above requirements overlap to some extent; for 
instance, it is not possible to determine class composition without considering the nature of 
the claim. Wallis JA added that a class action may be appropriate where the class 
members share common issues, but that it is not necessarily the case. He further held that 
it is conceivable that a class action could be certified in respect of some issues, such as 
negligence in a mass personal injury claim, with the result that other issues, such as 
damages, would need to be resolved separately.45   
 
In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd46 (―Mukaddam CC‖), Jafta J referred to section 
173 of the Constitution and confirmed the power of our superior courts to protect and 
regulate their own processes and, where necessary, to develop the common law to give 
effect to the interests of justice. Jafta J held that the interests of justice should be our 
courts‘ guiding consideration when considering class action certification applications.47  
 
Regarding the certification ‗requirements‘ mentioned in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, 
Jafta J stated as follows:  
 
―In Children‘s Resource Centre…the Supreme Court of Appeal laid down requirements for 
certification. These requirements must serve as factors to be taken into account in determining 
                                                          
44
 Para 26. 
45
 Para 26. 
46
 2013 10 BCLR 1135 (CC).  
47
 Paras 33-34. 
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where the interests of justice lie in a particular case. They must not be treated as conditions 
precedent or jurisdictional facts which must be present before an application for certification 
may succeed. The absence of one or another requirement must not oblige a court to refuse 
certification where the interests of justice demand otherwise.‖48 
 
In other words, according to the Constitutional Court in Mukaddam CC, the certification 
‗requirements‘ laid down in Children’s Resource Centre Trust should be treated as a set of 
relevant ‗factors‘ that have to be taken into account when determining whether or not the 
class action should be certified. A court is also not limited to considering these factors and 
may consider other relevant factors not mentioned by Wallis JA.49 Further, in examining 
the prevalence or absence of each or all of the above-mentioned factors, the court‘s 
certification decision should be informed by the interests of justice.50  
 
Unlike the position in the selected foreign jurisdictions, there is no South African statute or 
court rule that regulates class actions. Our courts have been required to develop 
appropriate class action procedural rules through their inherent jurisdiction embodied in 
section 173 of the Constitution.51 Consequently, in Mukaddam CC, Froneman J stated the 
following in relation to the development of the common law by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Children’s Resource Centre Trust:  
 
―My understanding of the legal position flowing from this development is that courts are bound 
by the authoritative exposition of the development of the common law by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal – or by this Court, if it adds to or alters any feature of the development made by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. Courts have no discretion under section 173 of the Constitution not 
to apply the common law as authoritatively articulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal or this 
                                                          
48
 Para 35. 
49
 Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) para 47. According to W de Vos ―Opt-in Class 
Action for Damages Vindicated by Constitutional Court: Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods CCT 131/12‖ (2013) 4 
TSAR 757 765-766, relegating the requirements for a class action to mere ‗factors‘ under the umbrella of ‗the 
interests of justice‘ is questionable. He states that ―[t]his flies in the face of the very nature of a class action 
and the position in the leading class action regimes. A class action is very different from an ordinary civil suit. 
For a class action to proceed as such certain essential requirements must be satisfied, otherwise it would be 
a travesty to call it a class action‖. 
50
 Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 
08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016) para 32. 
51
 C Plasket ―South Africa‖ in D R Hensler, C Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The Globalization of Class Actions 
(2009) 256 261. 
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Court. What they may do is to apply the developed law within the framework of their own 
process. Their decision not to allow certification may be set aside on appeal only if there was a 
material misdirection of fact or law. I see no reason to deviate from this approach here.‖52 
 
1 2 Problem statement 
 
It is apparent from what has been set out above that the class action is in its infancy in 
South African law.53 In the absence of legislation or rules that deal with class actions, the 
court in Children’s Resource Centre Trust was required to provide guidance on the 
suggested approach to be adopted when dealing with class proceedings in South Africa.  
This judgment effectively details key aspects of the law relating to class actions in South 
Africa. However, various ambiguities, inconsistencies and problems remain. In this regard, 
South African case law on class action procedure has not yet been subjected to a 
comprehensive and critical analysis in order to provide answers to a number of vital 
questions. These include the following:  
 
i) when is a class action, as opposed to joinder, the appropriate procedural device to be 
utilised to adjudicate a claim and when is it appropriate to use the opt-in, as opposed 
to the opt-out, class action regime?;  
ii) when, if ever, should notice of a class action be given to class members and when 
would individual notice to each class member be required, or would some form of 
general notice to the class suffice?; 
iii) what is the approach that our courts should follow and what are the devices that they 
could utilise to determine damages in personal injury class actions?; and,  
iv) how should a class action be managed and what should the role of the courts be in 
this regard?  
 
The SALC did consider some of the above-mentioned issues in its working paper and final 
report;54 however, the SALC‘s recommendations, taking into account that the final report 
                                                          
52
 Para 67. 
53
 N Kirby ―South Africa‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe (2012) 378 382. South African law does allow for joinder of plaintiffs and it is 
familiar with the notion of the representative plaintiff. 
54
 See South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report and South African Law 
Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57. 
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was delivered in 1998, do not reflect later developments in class action law, both local and 
foreign. Further, where the SALC did consider these issues, it was done relatively briefly. 
This dissertation will consider these issues in much more detail and, given the novelty of 
the procedure, it wil do so with reference to the approaches of the selected foreign 
jurisdictions.   
 
Ultimately, the purpose of the dissertation is to assist in developing a structure that could 
facilitate the adjudication of class actions in South Africa regarding the key areas identified 
above.  At present, the development of the procedural framework within which the class 
action device operates is left entirely to our courts‘ discretion. It is, however, not 
necessarily ideal to employ an ad hoc approach in respect of procedural problems that 
arise on a case-by-case basis.55 A haphazard developmental approach to the regulation of 
class actions could potentially result in an inconsistent approach by the various divisions of 
the High Court of South Africa.56 In this regard, certain contradictions, inconsistencies and 
problems with the approaches of our courts in class actions to date will be considered 
throughout the dissertation.  
 
According to Karlsgodt, there are, in addition to the European Union, 38 jurisdictions 
recognising some form of class action procedure. He states that most of these jurisdictions 
regulate class actions by specially designed legislation or court rules.57 Locally, several 
scholars have called for specific class action legislation to be introduced in South Africa,58 
                                                          
55
 Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 15. 
56
 G Saumier ―Competing Class Actions across Canada: Still at the Starting Gate After Canada Post V 
Lepine?‖ (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 462 463. For example, Ontario allows certification of a resident and non-
resident class on an opt-out basis and, as the number of provinces allowing class actions increased, the risk 
of competing and potentially overlapping actions grew and eventually materialised. This has led to 
inconsistent results.  
57
 P G Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (2012). 
58
 See inter alia W de Vos Verteenwoordiging van Groepsbelange in die Siviele Proses LLM dissertation 
RAU (1985); W de Vos ―‘n Groepsgeding in Suid-Afrika‖ (1985) 3 TSAR 296; W de Vos ―‘n Groepsgeding 
(‗class action‘) as Middel ter Beskerming van Verbruikersbelange‖ (1989) De Rebus 373; De Vos (1996) 
TSAR 639; E Hurter ―Some thoughts on current developments relating to class actions in South African law 
as viewed against leading foreign jurisdictions‖ (2006) 39(3) CILSA 485; E Hurter ―The class action in South 
Africa: Quo Vadis‖ (2008) 41(2) De Jure 293; E Gericke ―Can class actions be instituted for breach of 
contract?‖ (2009) (2) THRHR 304. 
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which could ensure that development of class action procedure does not depend entirely 
on our courts, and which could enable South Africa to follow in the footsteps of other 
countries with specific class action legislation.59 For example, Walker states that ―[t]he 
sequential introduction of legislation into the various Canadian jurisdictions has enabled 
the provincial legislators to learn from the experience in other provinces and to refine the 
existing models for their own legislation‖.60 A similar approach should be followed in South 
Africa where guidance is sought from the experiences of the selected foreign jurisdictions 
in order to develop and refine our own class action legislation.     
  
The dissertation is divided into six chapters. This chapter provides an introduction and 
contains a brief historical and comparative exposition of the development of the class 
action as well as an indication of the issues that the dissertation seeks to address. Chapter 
two considers what test our courts should apply and what factors they should consider 
when determining the appropriateness of a class action as opposed to joinder. It also 
considers when, if at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude the certification of 
a class action. The chapter further considers when, if at all, it is appropriate to use the opt-
in class action regime as opposed to the opt-out class action regime. 
 
Chapter three, in turn, deals with the issue of notice of the class action to members of the 
class in the context of the opt-out class action, on the one hand, and the opt-in class 
action, on the other. In respect of each class action regime, consideration is given to 
whether notice of the class action is required and, if so, whether individual notice to each 
class member is required, or whether some form of general notice to the class of the class 
action would suffice. In the context of the opt-out class action, the chapter also considers 
whether class members would be prejudiced if, as a result of not having been provided 
with (proper) notice, they fail to opt out of the class action. The chapter concludes by 
considering the role of the court in protecting the interests of absent class members.  
 
Our courts have not properly considered the approach to be followed when determining 
damages in mass personal injury class actions. It is accordingly unclear what approach 
our courts will follow, specifically what device(s), if any, they will utilise to determine 
                                                          
59
 F Cassim & O S Sibanda ―The Consumer Protection Act and the Introduction of Collective Consumer 
Redress through Class Actions‖ (2012) 75 THRHR 586 587-588. 
60
 J Walker Class Proceedings in Canada - Report for the 18th Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law (2010) 1.  
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damages in a mass personal injury class action. Chapter four accordingly evaluates 
certain alternative methods to determine damages in mass personal injury class actions in 
view of the existing procedural framework developed by our courts, with specific regard to 
the approaches followed by the selected foreign jurisdictions in this regard.  
 
Because of the management difficulties generally encountered in class action litigation, 
effective judicial management is considered increasingly important for the efficient 
functioning of class actions.61 As class action litigation is traditionally more complex than 
other kinds of litigation, it requires greater administration and management of the case.62 
The importance of managing class actions effectively is evidenced by the fact that 
manageability problems could potentially result in the termination of a class action.63 
Chapter five considers what the role of our courts should be in order to manage class 
actions effectively. It also evaluates court-annexed mediation as a tool that our courts 
could utilise to assist it in managing, and possibly resolving, class actions.  
 
The sixth and final chapter summarises and reflects on the findings reached and 
recommendations made in respect of the analysis conducted regarding the above-
mentioned research questions. It further attempts to integrate and synthesize these 
findings and recommendations and to indicate their implications for future legal 
development. 
                                                          
61
 C Piché ―Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements‖ (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 111 121. C S 
Diver ―The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Changes in Public Institutions‖ (1979) 
65 VA L Rev 43 45 states that the ―transformation in the character of litigation necessarily transforms the 
judge‘s role as well‖. 
62
 According to Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe 44, a tool that is regarded as useful in managing class action proceedings in the 
United States is to require the submission of a trial plan. The trial plan sets out the claim(s), the relief, the 
witnesses and evidence that will be used to prove the plaintiffs‘ claims at the trial. See also Piché (2010) 
Windsor YB Access Just 117.  
63
 In the United States, a class action will not be maintained if there is proof that it would indeed be 
unmanageable (due to inter alia the size of the class, the giving of notice and the distribution of damages) 
since it would then not be superior to other methods of adjudication as required by rule 23(b)(3). For 
example, in Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin 417 US 156 (1974) the size of the class and related issues such 
as notice to absent members and the distribution of an aggregate reward to class members caused serious 
doubt about the viability of the case.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CLASS ACTION AS AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL 
DEVICE AND THE OPT-IN REGIME COMPARED TO THE OPT-OUT 
REGIME 
2 1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned,1 the certification requirements stated in the judgment of Wallis JA in 
Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) 
Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae)2 (―Children’s Resource Centre Trust”) 
include that there must be a class, identifiable by objective criteria, and it must be shown 
that a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating the claims of the class 
members.3 A proper class definition inter alia enables the court to determine how 
notification to the putative class members should take place, to decide who does not form 
part of the class and may accordingly institute individual actions, and to establish who will 
be bound by the court‘s order.4 The requirement that a class action must be appropriate is, 
according to Erasmus and Van Loggerenberg, aimed at ensuring that only claims that 
cannot feasibly be instituted as ordinary actions with multiple plaintiffs are brought as class 
actions.5   
 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, after having listed the certification requirements,6 
Wallis JA proceeded to deal selectively with some of the requirements in more detail. He 
did not consider separately the certification requirement that a class action must be shown 
to be the most appropriate means of determining class members‘ claims. Instead, he 
essentially dealt with this requirement in the context of the first certification requirement, 
namely that there must be a class, identifiable by objective criteria. In this regard, Wallis 
JA mentioned obiter that: 
 
 
                                                          
1
 See chapter one above.  
2
 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA).  
3
 Para 26. 
4
 H J Erasmus & D E van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice (RS 41 2013) A2-23.  
5
 A2-25. 
6
 Para 26.  
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―In defining the class it is not necessary to identify all the members of the class. Indeed, if that 
were possible, there would be a question whether a class action was necessary, as joinder 
under Uniform Rule 10 would be permissible. It is, however, necessary that the class be defined 
with sufficient precision that a particular individual‘s membership can be objectively determined 
by examining their situation in the light of the class definition.‖7 
 
It can be inferred from the above comments of Wallis JA that, where all the claimants are 
identifiable,8 they may need to be joined as plaintiffs to the proceedings. A class action 
may therefore not be the appropriate procedural device to be utilised in such 
circumstances. Wallis JA does, however, clearly fall short of saying that a class action may 
never be used if the claimants are all personally identifiable. In fact, Wallis JA does 
mention that there is a measure of overlap between the certification requirements9 and he 
also refers to the circumstances when a class action may be instituted in South Africa,10 
such as where the class is large, where the class members are poor, and where the claims 
are not large enough for it to be pursued separately.11   
 
As mentioned, Wallis JA did not expressly deal with the certification requirement that a 
class action must be shown to be the most appropriate means of determining class 
members‘ claims. He also stated that it is unnecessary to identify all the class members, 
otherwise the necessity of a class action would be questionable. It accordingly remains 
unclear when, if at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude the certification of a 
class action. Moreover, it is unclear what the test is our courts must apply and what factors 
they must consider to determine the appropriateness of a class action.  
 
In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd12 (―Mukaddam SCA‖) the class action had been 
framed in an opt-in manner. This meant that the class would have been confined to 
individuals who took the necessary steps to opt into the class action. Nugent JA held that a 
class action was not suitable in casu. He held that once the class is confined to claimants 
who choose positively to advance their claims and are required to come forward for that 
purpose, he can see no reason why they are not capable of doing so in their own names – 
                                                          
7
 Para 29.  
8
 In the sense that the individual claimants can be named and specified.  
9
 Para 26. 
10
 Paras 19-22. 
11
 Para 19. 
12
 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA). 
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they do not need a representative to do so on their behalf. He then stated that the court 
rules make specific provision for multiple plaintiffs to join in one action.13 The court in 
Mukkadam SCA therefore found, at the expense of the opt-in class action regime, joinder 
to be the more appropriate procedural device.  
 
A potential problem evidenced by the approach of the court in Mukaddam SCA is that 
where, for example, the individual claimants are poor, uneducated and lack access to 
resources, or where the class is large, joinder may in fact be cumbersome and 
inappropriate, even though all the claimants are personally identifiable.14 This potential 
problem is significant in that a court ordering joinder in such circumstances could 
potentially undermine the rationale underpinning the incorporation of the class action 
mechanism into South African law namely, access to justice.15  
                                                          
13
 Para 12. Rule 10(1) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and 
Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa allows joinder of multiple plaintiffs in a single action and 
provides that: 
―Any number of persons, each of whom has a claim, whether jointly, jointly and severally, separately or in 
the alternative, may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same defendant or defendants against 
whom any one or more of such persons proposing to join as plaintiffs would, if he brought a separate 
action, be entitled to bring such action, provided that the right to relief of the persons proposing to join as 
plaintiffs depends upon the determination of substantially the same question of law or fact which, if 
separate actions were instituted, would arise on each action, and provided that there may be a joinder 
conditionally upon the claim of any other plaintiff failing.‖ 
14
 According to Erasmus & van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A2-21, the traditional rules 
governing joinder may be impractical where the claimants comprise a large group and/or all the potential 
claimants have not yet been identified. 
15
 The South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South 
African Law Report Project 88 (1998) paras 1.3-1.4. See also the South African Law Commission The 
Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 Project 88 (1995) para 5.28 where it is 
stated that ―[t]he whole purpose of class actions is to facilitate access to justice for the man on the street‖. 
See also Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 
1 where Cameron JA states that ―[t]he law is a scarce resource in South Africa. This case shows that justice 
is even harder to come by. It concerns the ways in which the poorest in our country are to be permitted 
access to both‖. In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA) para 11 it is stated that ―[t]he 
justification for recognising class actions is that without that procedural device claimants will be denied 
access to the courts‖. In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) para 29 Jafta J stated that 
―[a]ccess to courts is fundamentally important to our democratic order. It is not only a cornerstone of the 
democratic architecture but also a vehicle through which the protection of the Constitution itself may be 
achieved‖.  
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The primary difficulties associated with joinder is that it is a cumbersome and costly 
process. An interested party is required to file an application16 in terms of which the party‘s 
direct and substantial interest in the matter is set out and in terms of which the court is 
requested to join the party to the proceedings. Joinder is a costly procedure, since the 
interested party is generally required to make use of legal representation to bring the 
application. Cameron JA, in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v 
Ngxuza17 (―Ngxuza‖), referred to the difficuties associated with joinder and held as follows 
in this regard: 
 
―It is precisely because so many in our country are in a ‗poor position to seek legal redress‘, and 
because the technicalities of legal procedure, including joinder, may unduly complicate the 
attainment of justice, that both the interim Constitution and the Constitution created the express 
entitlement that ‗anyone‘ asserting a right in the Bill of Rights could litigate ‗as a member of, or 
in the interest of, a group or class of persons‖.18  
 
The law in the foreign jurisdictions that will be considered in this study relating to the 
circumstances when a class action should be used rather than joinder is comprehensively 
dealt with in statute, supplemented by an extensive body of case law. However, as we 
have seen,19 the position in South Africa is essentially as set out in the Children’s 
Resource Centre Trust, Mukaddam SCA and Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd20 
(―Mukaddam CC‖) cases. The court in Mukaddam CC did not deal with the comments of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal on joinder. This chapter accordingly, and especially in the 
light of the experiences of foreign jurisdictions, considers what test our courts should apply 
and what factors they should consider when determining the appropriateness of a class 
action compared to joinder. It also considers when, if at all, the identifiability of class 
members will preclude the certification of a class action.  
 
In the context of an opt-in class action, the class members who choose to opt into the 
class action will be identifiable.21 By suggesting that joinder is the appropriate procedural 
                                                          
16
 Notice of motion supported by affidavit(s).  
17
 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA).  
18
 Para 6.  
19
 See chapter one above.  
20
 2013 10 BCLR 1135 (CC). 
21
 In Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 
08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016) para 88, Mojapelo DJP, referring to the bifurcated proceedings 
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device where all the claimants are identifiable, the court in Mukaddam SCA essentially 
questioned the viability of the opt-in regime of class action litigation. This chapter 
accordingly further considers when, if at all, it is appropriate to use the opt-in class action 
regime as opposed to the opt-out class action regime.  
 
2 2 Class action as an appropriate procedural device compared to joinder 
 
2 2 1 American federal class action  
 
The threshold requirements for certification of a class action are contained in rule 23(a) of 
the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rules‖), which appear in 
Appendix A. These certification requirements are generally referred to as numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.22 The relevant certification 
requirement that merits consideration in the context of the class action as an appropriate 
procedural device compared to joinder, is the numerosity requirement contained in rule 
23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules. 
 
As mentioned, rule 23(a)(1) provides that a court may certify a class only if it ―is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable‖. Where joinder is found to be 
practicable, there will be no need for a class action.23 According to Anderson and Trask, 
the numerosity requirement does not merely require consideration of the number of 
putative class members. They state that consideration must also be given to ―whether 
aggregating the claims of the known class members would be feasible without a class 
action‖.24 They accordingly propose using feasibility, in addition to the number of putative 
class members, as the key considerations in determining whether joinder is impracticable 
and hence whether the numerosity requirement is met. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
that would follow upon his certification of the class action, held that ―the second stage of this bifurcated 
process involves the invocation of the opt-in method of identifying the total number of mineworkers who form 
part of the class action. This means that at the conclusion of the opt-in process the names and details of all 
the mineworkers who claim rights of membership to the classes will be known. There will be no need for 
them to issue summonses. The mining companies are already before court. All they will then need to know is 
who exactly the plaintiffs are‖. 
22
 P G Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 22.        
23
 R H Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 4 ed (2012) 39. 
24
 B Anderson & A Trask Class Action Playbook (2014) 25-26.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
The numerosity requirement does not require a claimant to identify the exact number of 
class members. However, the claimant would need to show that there is a sufficiently large 
number of people in the class to meet the rule 23 burden. It has been suggested that, 
while there is no magic number for satisfying numerosity, most courts will allow a class 
action to proceed if the class consists of at least 40 members.25 Further, it is generally 
accepted that ―when class size reaches substantial proportions…the impracticability 
requirement and hence the numerosity requirement is usually satisfied by the numbers 
alone‖.26 In other words, the bigger the class, the more likely it is that joinder is 
impracticable.  
  
Regarding the feasibility consideration, class proceedings may be appropriate where 
joinder is possible but not necessarily feasible.27  Ultimately, it would seem that, if joinder 
is possible but would needlessly complicate the litigation of the case, then class action 
proceedings may be appropriate.28 However, impracticability does not mean 
impossibility.29 In this regard, in Eggleston v Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union 
No. 130, U.A.30 it was held that:  
 
―[O]rdinarily it is not difficult to ascertain if a class approach would be useful to avoid the 
practical problems of trying to join many named plaintiffs or otherwise clog the docket with 
numerous individual suits. Except for the class approach many might never receive any redress 
for the wrong done them.‖31    
 
In addition to having to satisfy the requirements for certification, including the numerosity 
requirement, each class action must satisfy the requirements of either rules 23(b)(1), 
23(b)(2), or 23(b)(3).32 Rule 23(b)(3) pertains to the opt-out damages class action and 
specifically requires that a court assesses whether class action proceedings is ―superior to 
                                                          
25
 26. 
26
 M H Greer A Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions (2010) 58.  
27
 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 26-27. 
28
 26-27. 
29
 In Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931, 935-936, the court held that ―the district court in the present case, in 
concluding that numerosity was lacking because plaintiffs had not shown the class to be so large that joinder 
was ‗impossible‘, applied the wrong standard‖.  
30
 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7
th
 Cir. 1981). 
31
 Greer Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 60. 
32
 See Appendix A.  
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other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy‖. The 
superiority requirement ―reflects a broad policy of economy in the use of society‘s 
difference-settling machinery‖.33 Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) lists four factors that must be 
considered by a court in making this assessment:   
 
―(A) the class members‘ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defence of 
separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.‖ 
 
In Lake v First Nationwide Bank34 it was held that, in performing the superiority analysis, 
the court must consider the ―inability of the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and 
the improbability that large numbers of class members would possess the initiative to 
litigate individually‖. Specifically, the manageability requirement in rule 23(b)(3)(D) 
―encompass[es] the whole range of practical problems that may render the class action 
format inappropriate for a particular suit‖.35 It entails that a court focuses on the 
advantages of a class action compared to alternative forms of dispute resolution which 
may be available to the claimants, such as litigation through joinder. In re Managed Care 
Litigation36 it was held that this consideration ―requires the Court to determine whether 
there is a better method of handling the controversy other than through the class action 
mechanism‖. In Carnegie v Mutual Saving Life Insurance Company37 it was held that, 
where management problems may result in class proceedings being less fair and efficient 
than other dispute resolution methods, then a class action would be improper.38   
                                                          
33
 Berley v Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
34
 156 FRD 615, 625 (E.d.Pa. 1994). 
35
 Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S 156, 164 (1974). 
36
 209 F.R.D 678, 692 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
37
 No. CV-99-S-3292-NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21396, at 76-77 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2002). 
38
 See, for example, Klay v Humana, Inc 382 F3d 1214 (11
th
 Circuit 2004), where it was held that ―the district 
court acted well within its discretion in concluding that it would be better to handle this case as a class action 
instead of clogging the federal courts with innumerable individual suits litigating the same issues repeatedly. 
The defendants have failed to point to any specific management problems – aside from the obvious ones 
that are intrinsic in large class actions – that would render a class action impracticable in this case‖.  
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Manageability, as required by rule 23(b)(3)(D), becomes an important consideration where 
the administrative costs incurred in managing the class action will consume the award 
made in favour of the plaintiff class.39 A further factor to be considered in the context of 
manageability is the difficulty associated with notifying a significant percentage of the class 
– this may count against possible certification.40  
 
Although courts are reluctant to certify classes whose members would be difficult to 
communicate with or to identify, the sheer size of the class would not necessarily result in 
the denial of certification.41 Further, although certification generally should not be denied 
solely on the ground that class members would have to prove their damages on an 
individualised basis, potential difficulty in calculating damages may be a factor in 
assessing manageability.42 Further factors considered in determining superiority include 
whether an alternative regulatory mechanism exists and whether a class action would 
achieve significant judicial efficiencies.43    
2 2 2 Australia   
 
In order to determine what test our courts should apply and what factors they should 
consider when determining the appropriateness of a class action compared to joinder, it 
may also be worth considering the approach of the Australian federal class action regime 
in this regard. The Australian approach may also be relevant to determining when, if at all, 
the identifiability of class members will preclude the certification of a class action.  
 
In Australia‘s federal class action regime, unlike the American class action regime, there is 
no certification procedure.44 However, in order to commence a class action in Australia, 
three threshold requirements must be satisfied, namely: 
 
 At least seven persons must have claims against the same person; 
 The claims must arise out of the same, similar or related circumstances; and 
                                                          
39
 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 62. 
40
 See chapter three below regarding notice of class actions. 
41
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 131. 
42
 See chapter four below regarding the determination of damages in personal injury class actions. 
43
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 132. 
44
 The Supreme Courts of Victoria and New South Wales have class action regimes which largely mirror the 
Australian Federal Court class action regime.  
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 The claims must give rise to at least one substantial common issue of law or fact.45 
 
In terms of section 33H of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (―Federal Court 
Act‖),46 an application commencing a representative proceeding47 must describe or 
otherwise identify the group members to whom the proceeding relates. It must also specify 
the nature of the claims made, the relief claimed as well as the questions of law or fact 
common to the group members‘ claims.48 It is, however, unnecessary to name or specify 
the number of group members.49  
 
Once a representative proceeding has been instituted, it will continue unless the 
respondent applies to the court for an order terminating it.50 Thus, unlike the South African 
and American class action regimes, where the party bringing the action must prove that 
certain requirements are met before certification is granted, it is up to the respondent to 
raise non-compliance with them. Such a termination order may be granted notwithstanding 
compliance with the above-mentioned threshold requirements. In this regard, the Federal 
Court is empowered in terms of sections 33L, 33M and 33N of the Federal Court Act to 
order the discontinuance of a representative proceeding under Part IVA where: 
 
 in terms of section 33L, it appears likely to the court at any stage of a representative 
proceeding that there are less than seven group members;  
 in terms of section 33M, ―(a) the relief claimed in a representative proceeding is or 
includes payment of money to group members (otherwise than in respect of costs); 
and (b) on application by the respondent, the court concludes that it is likely that, if 
judgment were to be given in favour of the representative party, the cost to the 
respondent of identifying the group members and distributing to them the amounts 
                                                          
45
 Section 33C of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); V Morabito ―Australia‖ in  D R Hensler, C 
Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The Globalization of Class Actions (2009) 320 322. 
46
 See Appendix B. 
47
 S S Clark, J Kellam & L Cook ―Australia‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 392 406. 
48
 Section 33H(1). 
49
 Section 33H(2). 
50
 Clark et al ―Australia‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe 411. 
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ordered to be paid to them would be excessive having regard to the likely total of those 
amounts‖; or  
 in terms of section 33N, it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so for one 
or more of the reasons specified in section 33N(1)(a)-(d).51 
 
Section 33N provides that a respondent may apply to court for an order, or the court may 
decide mero motu, that the proceedings under Part IVA be discontinued where it is 
satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so because: 
 
―(a) the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a representative 
proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member 
conducted a separate proceeding; or 
(b) all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a  representative 
proceeding under this Part; or 
(c) the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of           
dealing with the claims of group members; or 
(d) it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative 
proceeding.‖  
 
In terms of section 33N, the first issue that a court must decide is whether one of the 
conditions in paragraphs (1)(a)-(d) has been satisfied, which involves comparing the 
representative proceeding to other available alternatives, such as joinder. If another 
alternative is available, the court must then consider whether, due to the existence and 
appropriateness of that alternative, it is in the interests of justice to grant an order 
terminating the representative proceeding.52  
 
As mentioned, section 33N(1)(b) provides that a respondent can apply to court for an order 
to discontinue proceedings where all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a 
                                                          
51
 See Appendix B.  
52
 Clark et al ―Australia‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe 414-415. See also, for example, McLean v Nicholson 2002 172 FLR 90 at paras 7,12 where the court 
held that section 33N(1)(b) clearly applied to the facts of the case and that joinder was a suitable alternative 
to the representative proceedings.   
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proceeding other than a representative proceeding.53 Although the same relief can 
generally be obtained by instituting individualised proceedings, it may, for example, be that 
class members are unidentifiable, that the class is numerous and that individual 
proceedings are not feasible, or that it would be too costly to pursue individualised 
proceedings. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that a court would order the 
discontinuance of class proceedings in terms of section 33N(1)(b).54  
  
Further, in terms of section 33N(1)(c), if the representative proceeding will not provide an 
efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims of group members, the court can 
also order its discontinuance. In Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd,55 Spender J held that: 
 
―Ultimately, if because of the extent of non-common issues, representative proceedings in the 
assessment of the court are not the preferable means of dealing efficiently and effectively with 
the claims, the court will no doubt terminate the representative nature of the proceedings...‖  
 
Similarly, in Hall v Australian Finance Direct Ltd,56 Hollingworth J of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria held that ―[t]he fact that a proceeding will at some stage involve an examination of 
numerous individual contracts or transactions has not prevented courts from allowing the 
common issues to be determined in [a] group proceeding‖.57 Hollingworth J cautioned 
against exercising the court‘s power under section 33N before, at least, the utility of the 
class action regime has been exhausted by a resolution of the common issues.58  
 
Representative proceedings can also be discontinued in terms of section 33N(1)(d) where 
it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative 
proceeding. It has been suggested that the power to order that the matter does not 
proceed as a class action where it is ‗otherwise inappropriate‘ is very broad and that there 
will usually be many competing issues to consider. In this regard: ―costs, availability of 
relief, the size of the group, the period of time over which the breaches occurred, delays, 
                                                          
53
 In McLean v Nicholson 2002 172 FLR 90 it was held that section 33N(1)(b) clearly applied insofar as the 
relief sought could be obtained by litigation through joinder. The court considered the fact that there were 
only ten (identifiable) plaintiffs and that such a procedure would therefore not be unfeasible.  
54
 P Cashman Class Action Law and Practice  (2007) 311-312. 
55
 1998 ATPR 41-613, 40, 726 approved in Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 255, 33. 
56
 2005 VSC 306. 
57
 Para 50. 
58
 Para 52. 
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and the nature of the causes of action, might make it inappropriate to pursue the claims by 
way of class action proceedings‖.59  
 
Even if the criteria specified in section 33N(1)(a)-(d) are satisfied, the court must 
nevertheless be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make an order that the 
representative proceeding be terminated.60 In Bright v Femcare Limited61 (―Femcare‖), 
Finkelstein J held that:  
 
―Whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make such an order has to be weighed against 
the public interest in the administration of justice that favours class actions. That requires one to 
consider the principal objects of the class action procedure. They are: (1) To promote the 
efficient use of court time and the parties‘ resources by eliminating the need to separately try 
the same issue; (2) To provide a remedy in favour of persons who may not have the funds to 
bring a separate action, or who may not bring an action because the cost of litigation is 
disproportionate to the value of the claim; and (3) To protect defendants from multiple suits and 
the risk of inconsistent findings.‖62 
 
Should a court make an order in terms of sections 33L, 33M, or 33N, discontinuing the 
representative proceeding, the representative party may continue it against the respondent 
on his or her own behalf.63 In addition, any person who was a class member for the 
purpose of the representative proceeding, may apply to court for an order joining him or 
her as an applicant to the proceeding.64  
 
There are various similarities and differences between the threshold requirements in 
section 33C of the Federal Court Act and the certification requirements contained in rule 
23 of the Federal Rules.65 Although section 33C does not require it to be impracticable to 
join class members, the requirements of numerosity and commonality are conceptually 
                                                          
59
 Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 321. 
60
 321.  
61
 2002 FCAFC 243; 195 ALR 574. 
62
 Para 152. For example, in Huang v Minister of State for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 50 ALD 
134, the potential for denying group members access to justice, insofar as separate individual proceedings 
were time barred, was held to be the decisive factor in permitting the class action to continue. 
63
 Section 33P(a). 
64
 Section 33P(b). See also Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 323. 
65
 D Grave, K Adams & J Betts Class Actions in Australia (2012) 128. 
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similar to subsections 33C(1)(a) and (c). There is no requirement in section 33C similar to 
the typicality requirement contained in rule 23. The adequacy-requirement is also not 
embodied in section 33C, but it has been suggested that this requirement is similar to 
section 33T which permits the court to substitute a representative party if they are unable 
to adequately represent the interests of group members.66  
 
According to Grave, Adams and Betts, the tendency of Australian courts has been not to 
place too much reliance on American case law regarding its certification requirements for 
guidance as to the proper interpretation of the threshold requirements under section 33C 
of the Federal Court Act. This is essentially the result of statutory differences between rule 
23 and section 33C and the increasing body of Australian jurisprudence available to 
provide direct guidance on interpretation related questions.67   
 
Some debate exists as to whether a formal certification mechanism should be introduced 
into Part IVA of the Federal Court Act. It has been suggested that, because the Australian 
federal class action regime lacks a certification phase, it is more ‗plaintiff-friendly‘ 
compared to the American class action regime.68 However, this suggestion should be 
approached with caution as there are a number of complexities involved in the comparison 
of the positions in Australia and the United States, including inter alia that: Part IVA of the 
Federal Court Act affords to Australian courts broad powers to terminate proceedings, 
even when commenced in accordance with the requirements of section 33C; and, the 
rules regulating the awarding of costs of litigation in Australia are different to those in the 
United States – the Australian ‗loser pays‘ costs convention,  which does not exist in the 
United States, generally disencourages the commencement of representative 
proceedings. Given the significant differences in the development of the common law in 
each jurisdiction regarding the respective commencement criteria and the distinct 
economic, social and legal environments within which each regime operates, there is little 
                                                          
66
 130. 
67
 In Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398, the High Court cautioned that it was 
―unprofitable and difficult‖ to make a precise comparison between a class action commenced under rule 23 
and its Australian equivalent.  
68
 Grave et al Class Actions in Australia 130. Unlike the requirement in rule 23(b)(3) that common issues 
predominate over individual issues, all that is required under section 33C is a single common issue of law or 
fact.  
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utility in a comparison of the ‗friendliness‘ of environments for plaintiffs beyond a broad 
comparison of the terms of the respective legislation.69 
 
2 2 3 Ontario  
 
The approach in Ontario is also relevant to establishing the test that our courts should use 
to determine the appropriateness of class proceedings. In Ontario, similar to South Africa 
and the United States but unlike Australia, a class action cannot be commenced without 
certification by a court.70 Section 5(1) of the Ontario Act provides that a class action should 
be certified where the following criteria are met: 
 
―(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action;  
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by the 
representative plaintiff or defendant; 
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues; 
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common 
issues; and 
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who: 
(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, 
(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing 
the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the 
proceeding; and  
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with the 
interests of other class members.‖  
  
In Hollick v Toronto (City)71 (―Hollick‖), it was held that section 5(1)(d) merits consideration 
of whether the proposed class action would be a ―fair and manageable method‖ to 
advance the plaintiffs‘ claims, taking into account the importance of the common issues in 
relation to the claims as a whole. To determine whether the proposed class action would 
be a fair and manageable method of advancing the plaintiffs‘ claims, the court must 
consider whether, if the proposed common issues are resolved, it would advance the 
                                                          
69
 Grave et al Class Actions in Australia 131. 
70
 H M Rosenberg & J Kalajdzic ―Certification‖ in J Walker & G D Watson (eds) Class Actions in Canada: 
Cases, Notes, and Materials (2014) 55 55.  
71
 2001 3 SCR 158. 
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action in a significant way.72 Importantly, the court must also consider alternatives to, and 
justifications for, class proceedings to determine whether it is the most appropriate way of 
dealing with the class members‘ claim(s). Such an alternative would, for example, include 
joinder.73 The court also held that ―the preferability inquiry should be conducted through 
the lens of the three principal advantages of class actions – judicial economy, access to 
justice, and behaviour modification‖.74  
  
In Markson v MBNA Canada Bank75 Rosenberg JA summarised the principles applicable 
to determining whether a class action is the preferable procedure as follows: 
 
―(1) The preferability inquiry should be conducted through the lens of the three principal 
advantages of a class proceeding: judicial economy, access to justice and behaviour 
modification; 
(2) ‗Preferable‘ is to be construed broadly and is meant to capture the two ideas of whether the 
class proceeding would be a fair, efficient and manageable method of advancing the claim and 
whether a class proceeding would be preferable to other procedures such as joinder, test 
cases, consolidation and any other means of resolving the dispute; and, 
(3) The preferability determination must be made by looking at the common issues in context, 
meaning, the importance of the common issues must be taken into account in relation to the 
claims as a whole.‖76 
 
According to Rosenberg JA, the preferability inquiry does not entail conducting separate 
inquiries in respect of each of the above-mentioned principles. To the contrary, ―the inquiry 
into the questions of judicial economy, access to justice and behaviour modification can 
only be answered by considering the context, the other available procedures and, in short, 
whether a class proceeding is a fair, efficient and manageable method of advancing the 
claim‖.77 
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In Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP78 (―Excalibur‖), 
Perell J concluded that, on the facts, joinder was the preferable procedure compared to a 
class action.79 In arriving at this conclusion, he held that it is relatively easy to satisfy the 
preferable procedure criterion and that, in casu, apart from failing to show that a class 
action was necessary to overcome any barriers to access to justice, a class action was not 
necessary to achieve judicial economy or to effect behaviour modification.80 
 
Recently, in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP81 
(―Excalibur ODC‖), the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the ruling of Perell J. It was argued 
that Perell J incorrectly found that joinder was the preferable procedure, as the respondent 
did not raise joinder in their submissions in the certification application. In response to this 
argument, Lederer J held that ―[j]oinder is not simply an alternative, it is the default position 
in considering whether a class proceeding is or is not the preferable procedure‖.82 It was 
found that Perell J had not imposed joinder on the plaintiff, but had simply pointed out that 
joinder ―would provide effective redress for Excalibur and… other investors could join the 
action as co-plaintiffs‖.83 In her dissent, Sachs J held that it could not be assumed that 
joinder was an available alternative as there was no evidence before Perell J that: the 
other identified class members would be prepared to assume the burdens, risks and 
responsibilities of commencing their own claims; the investors would be able to or would 
want to retain the same legal representative; or, the respondent would retain the same 
legal representative to defend these actions.84 
 
In agreeing with Perell J‘s finding that joinder was the preferable procedure, Lederer J 
made the following observation regarding the necessity of class proceedings:  
 
―A class action occupies an unusual place in our civil justice system. Typically, litigation is 
between two (or more) identified parties. There is a lis inter partes. The parties play an 
immediate role and take a direct responsibility for the carriage of the action. A class action is 
directed by more public concerns: access to justice, behaviour modification and judicial 
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economy. These broader concerns are the purpose behind the process. They change the role 
of the immediate parties and the general purpose of litigation, which is to resolve disputes 
between members of our society. We should be careful to use class proceedings when they are 
needed, not just because they can be made to apply and appear convenient. The decision of 
Mr. Justice Perell, where it considers the preferable procedure, reflects this concern.  He found 
that in this case, the action can be carried forward in a way that does not impinge on any of the 
three underlying policy concerns and without the added procedural requirements of a class 
proceeding. It may be, as the report of the Law Reform Commission suggested, that joinder will 
not always be an appropriate means of proceeding; that does not mean it never is. In this case, 
the motion judge found it both viable and appropriate. It can do the job.‖85  
 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the point of departure in Ontario law to 
determine whether a class action is the preferable procedure is to ascertain whether it 
represents a fair, efficient and manageable procedure that is preferable to any alternative 
method of resolving the claims. This is measured with regard to the underlying policy 
objectives of access to justice, behaviour modification and judicial economy and the extent 
to which certification furthers those objectives. In considering an alternative to a class 
action, the court should examine whether that option could provide suitable procedural 
protections and effective redress for the claims being made.86    
 
Specifically, it appears that courts should continue to apply the preferable procedure 
criteria set out in AIC Limited v Fischer87 (―AIC‖). This entails that courts ―focus on the 
underlying purpose and nature of the alternative proceeding as compared with the class 
proceeding‖ and that they ―assess the capacity of the alternative procedure to adequately 
resolve the claims raised by the class members‖.88 Sachs J for the minority stated that 
Perell J failed to follow AIC and that, if he had properly conducted the access to justice 
analysis detailed in AIC, he would not have concluded that joinder was the preferable 
procedure.89 However, Lederer J held that Perell J had in fact applied the preferable 
procedure criteria set out in AIC: 
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―Counsel for the plaintiff expressed concern that, in considering whether a class proceeding was 
the preferable procedure, Mr. Justice Perell was required, and failed, to consider five questions 
identified in AIC Limited v. Fischer to be answered when considering whether alternatives to a 
class action would achieve access to justice. They are listed by Mr. Justice Perell in his 
reasons. Each is considered by him, albeit not under a listed heading or within a discrete 
paragraph.  However, these questions are not to be ‗…considered in isolation or in a specific 
order, but should inform the overall comparative analysis‘. In the decision of Mr. Justice Perell, 
some are specifically dealt with and the answers to others are infused as part of and found 
throughout the discussion of the preferable procedure criterion.‖90 
 
Accordingly, the fact that the majority of the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the ruling of 
Perell J is relevant insofar as it provides insight into the interpretation and application of 
the preferable procedure requirement by Ontario courts. Perell J, in applying the preferable 
procedure requirement, essentially found that joinder was preferable because there were 
no significant economic, psychological or social barriers to individual actions. The 
applicants failed to show that there was a ‗genuine need‘ for the common issues to be 
resolved on a class-wide basis. In this regard, Perell J emphasised that the proposed 
representative plaintiff had a claim of almost $1 million that would justify taking on the 
litigation risk – it did not genuinely need a class action to obtain access to justice;  the 
class members were all known and were all ‗accredited investors‘ with a net worth of at 
least $1 million or two years of $200,000 plus income – they were not without resources to 
litigate; there was enough money at stake to warrant a contingency fee arrangement even 
without a class action; a class action would achieve only modest judicial economy over 
individual actions or the joinder of claims; there were no psychological or social barriers to 
bring individual claims; while a class action would be manageable, it would also be more 
procedurally cumbersome and protracted than a regular action; behaviour modification 
was not needed beyond the behaviour modification that comes from a regular tort action.91 
In this regard, Lederer J held that:  
 
―Joinder can respond to the issues without the additional steps (certification motion, 
identification of common issues and separation to deal with individual issues) that accompany a 
class proceeding. There is no reason to suggest that it cannot accommodate the needs of all 
those who wish to take part, each with an eye to the nature and value of their involvement. ‗A 
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common procedural barrier is that there is no other procedure [other than a class proceeding] to 
afford meaningful redress.‘ Here there is joinder.‖92 
 
The founding papers in an application for certification of a class action in Ontario should, in 
view of the above, address the availability of joinder as an alternative to the class action, 
with regard to the considerations set out above. In particular, respondents should consider 
addressing inter alia the availability of joinder as an available alternative to the class action 
and the relative ‗necessity‘ of the class proceeding as a mechanism for pursuing the 
claims at issue, all within the framework detailed by the court in AIC.  
 
2 2 4 South Africa  
 
As we have seen, the law in the foreign jurisdictions referred to above regarding the 
circumstances when a class action, rather than joinder, should be utilised is, for the most 
part, comprehensively dealt with in statute and court rules, supplemented by an extensive 
body of case law. The approach of our courts in determining the appropriateness of a 
class action, in the absence of legislation and court rules regulating the issue, will be 
considered in more detail below. 
 
2 2 4 1 Joinder as an alternative 
 
Before considering the approach of our courts to determining the appropriateness of a 
class action, a brief note on joinder may be appropriate. The joinder of defendants is 
defined in rule 10(3) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the 
Several Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa (―Uniform Rules‖): 
 
―Several defendants may be sued in one action… whenever the question arising between them, 
or any of them and the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs depends upon the determination of 
substantially the same question of law or fact which if such defendants were sued separately  
would arise in each separate action.‖93 
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Under the common law a number of defendants may be joined whenever convenience so 
requires.94 In this regard, Caney J in Anderson v Gordik Organisation95 held that 
joinder may be justified even if the person joined is not a necessary party96 and accepted 
that the court could, in a proper case, permit joinder purely on the grounds 
of convenience especially in order to save costs or to avoid multiplicity of actions.97 In such 
a case, the right of relief of the party sought to be joined to the proceedings must be 
dependant upon determining substantially the same question of law or fact.98 This 
common-law power is complemented by rule 10(1) of the Uniform Rules which allows 
joinder on the grounds of convenience under certain circumstances. In Vitorakis v Wolf99 it 
was held that ―our modern rules of court are so explicit on this point that there is now 
hardly anything left of the basic common-law approach to joinder and intervention‖.100 
However in Rabinowitz NNO v Ned-Equity Insurance Co Ltd101 the court held that the rules 
were not intended to be exhaustive of the cases in which a party may be joined and that 
the court could still exercise its common-law power to allow joinder whenever convenience 
so requires.102 Victor J, in Fluxmans Incorporated v Lithos Corporation of SA,103 held that: 
 
―Parties may only be joined as a matter of necessity and not convenience. It is only necessary if 
the parties sought to be joined would be prejudicially affected by the judgment of the court in the 
proceedings. See Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and another 
2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) at par [12] where the court held that: ‗It has by now become settled law 
that the joinder of a party is only required as a matter of necessity — as opposed to a matter of 
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convenience — if that party has a direct and substantial interest which may be affected 
prejudicially by the judgment of the court in the proceedings concerned (see eg Bowring NO v 
Vrededorp Properties CC and Another 2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA) para 21). The mere fact that a 
party may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation does not warrant a non-joinder plea. 
The right of a party to validly raise the objection that other parties should have been joined to 
the proceedings, has thus been held to be a limited one.‘‖ 
 
In Shake's Multi-Save Supermarket CC v Haffejee; In re: Shake's Multi-Save Supermarket 
CC v Haffejee104 (―Shakes‖), an application of joinder was opposed by arguing that joinder 
of parties on the basis of convenience is no longer possible.105 Reliance was placed  on 
the above comment of Victor J. In Shakes, Landman J held as follows: 
 
―In my view, the grammatical construction of the dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
the Judicial Service Commission judgment does not support the proposition. The court also 
made it clear that it was not concerned with joinder as a matter of convenience and that a plea 
of non-joinder can only be sustained if a person, who is not party to the action, has a direct and 
substantial interest which may be prejudicially affected by the judgment of the court in the 
proceedings in question. If the court in Fluxman Incorporated meant to say that parties may only 
be joined as a matter of necessity I would respectfully disagree. It is competent for the plaintiff 
to seek to join the Close Corporation on the grounds of convenience.‖106 
 
As is evident from the above, an alternative to joinder on the basis of convenience is that 
parties may be joined on the basis of necessity because the party who is sought to be 
joined has a direct and substantial interest in the matter.107 Where it is apparent that there 
is another party with a direct and substantial interest in the matter, the court has no 
discretion to allow the matter to proceed without joinder. This is because of the principle of 
audi alteram partem; interested parties should be afforded an opportunity to be heard 
before an order is made that will affect them.108 However, where the court is satisfied that 
there has been waiver of a right to be joined, joinder of necessity can effectively be 
circumvented.  
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A direct and substantial interest has been held to be ―an interest in the right which is the 
subject-matter of the litigation and not merely a financial interest which is only an indirect 
interest in such litigation‖.109 It is a legal interest in the subject matter and the outcome of 
the litigation, excluding an indirect commercial interest. The possibility of such an interest 
is sufficient, and it is not necessary for the court to determine that it does in fact exist.110 In 
the absence of a direct and substantial interest, a court has a discretion to order joinder on 
the basis of convenience.111 
 
In order to show that a class action is the most appropriate means to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims, the appropriateness of joinder as an alternative would also need to be 
considered. The above exposition of joinder of necessity and convenience will accordingly 
become relevant when considering the South African position regarding the assessment of 
the appropriateness of class proceedings set out below.  
 
2 2 4 2 Class action objectives 
 
In Ngxuza, Cameron JA held that the primary feature of class actions is that, although they 
are not formally and individually joined, class members benefit from, and are bound by, the 
outcome of the class action, unless they opt out.112 He referred to the fact that, until 1994, 
if a claimant wanted to participate in existing court proceedings, he or she had to comply 
with the formalities of joinder.113 Cameron JA accordingly dealt with the differences 
between joinder and a class action and the circumstances where a class action would be 
more appropriate than litigating through joinder. It is worth repeating what Cameron JA 
held in this regard: 
 
―The difficulties the traditional approach to participation in legal process create are well 
described in an analysis that appeared after the class action was nationally regularised in the 
United States through a Federal Rule of Court more than 60 years ago: 
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‗The cardinal difficulty with joinder…is that it presupposes the prospective plaintiffs 
advancing en masse on the courts. In most situations, such spontaneity cannot arise either 
because the various parties who have the common interest are isolated, scattered and utter 
strangers to each other. Thus, while the necessity for group action through joinder clearly 
exists, the conditions for it do not. It may not be enough for society simply to set up courts 
and wait for litigants to bring their complaints – they may never come. What is needed, 
then, is something over and above the possibility of joinder. There must be some 
affirmative technique for bringing everyone into the case and for making recovery available 
to all. It is not so much a matter of permitting joinder as of ensuring it.‘ [H Kalven & M 
Rosenfield ―The Contemporary Function of Class Suit‖ (1941) University of Chicago Law 
Review 684 687-688] 
  
The class action cuts through these complexities. The issue between the members of the class 
and the defendant is tried once. The judgment binds all and the benefits of its ruling accrue to 
all. The procedure has particular utility where a large group of plaintiffs each has a small claim 
that may be difficult or impossible to pursue individually…The reason the procedure is invoked 
so frequently lies in the complexity of modern social structures and the attendant cost of legal 
proceedings:  
 
‗Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which 
individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not 
know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to 
assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary 
enforcement, if there is any at all.‘ [H Kalven & M Rosenfield ―The Contemporary Function 
of Class Suit‖ (1941) University of Chicago Law Review 684 686]‖114    
 
In Excalibur ODC, Sachs J referred to the frailties of joinder as an alternative procedure as 
recognised by the Ontario Law Reform Commission.115 She stated that joinder will not be 
of much assistance to individuals with small claims, especially insofar as individual litigants 
will generally be liable for the costs pertaining to their legal representation whether the 
action succeeds or fails. And if it fails, they may also be liable for the defendant‘s costs. 
Further, according to Sachs J, ―[i]f the victims of a mass wrong are a less than cohesive 
group, all are unlikely to be joined in one action…the result will be a multiplicity of 
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proceedings, with the concomitant risk of inconsistent verdicts, additional expense for the 
parties and a greater burden on the courts‖.116 
 
According to Cameron JA, because there are so many poor individuals in South Africa 
who do not have the necessary resources to litigate, and because there are technicalities 
associated with joinder, the attainment of justice could be unduly complicated.117 He did 
not comment on the identifiability of class members and its impact on the appropriateness 
of class proceedings. Cameron JA attached significant weight to access to justice as a 
consideration in deciding the appropriateness of a class action compared to joinder. He 
held that the needs of the types of individuals referred to above ―who are most lacking in 
protective and assertive armour‖ should inform our understanding of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―Constitution‖), and that ―it is against 
the background of their constitutional entitlements‖ that the class action provision in the Bill 
of Rights must be interpreted.118 Cameron JA emphasised that, although there is no 
legislative framework which regulates class actions in South Africa, section 39(2) of the 
Constitution enjoins the courts to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights when developing the common law, and upon which section 173 confers inherent 
power to develop the common law, taking the interests of justice into account.119  
 
In Pretorius v Transnet Second Defined Benefit Fund120 (―Pretorius‖), Makgoba J referred 
to Ngxuza and confirmed the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal that the courts are 
enjoined by section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution to interpret the Bill of Rights so as to 
―promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom‖ and, in terms of subsection (2), to develop the common law 
so as to ―promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights‖.121 With reference to 
sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution, Makgoba J held that the provisions regarding a 
class action must be interpreted ―generously and expansively, consistent with the mandate 
given to the courts to uphold the Constitution, thus ensuring that the rights in the 
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Constitution enjoy the full measure of protection to which they are entitled‖.122 In relation to 
assessing the appropriateness of class proceedings, Makgoba J held as follows:  
 
―The situation in the present case seems pattern-made for class proceedings. This is so in that 
the class the applicants represent in this case is drawn from the very poorest within our society 
(old pensioners), those in need of statutory social assistance. They also have the least chance 
of vindicating their rights through the ordinary legal process. As individuals they are unable to 
finance a legal action, given their meagre income in the form of pension moneys. What they 
have in common is that they are victims of official excess, bureaucratic misdirection and what 
they perceive as unlawful administrative methods.‖123 
 
The primary consideration taken into account by Makgoba J in deciding whether a class 
action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating the claims of the class members was 
access to justice. Specifically, Makgoba J considered the ability of individual class 
members to seek legal redress by means of joinder and whether, through joinder, they 
would be able to vindicate their rights.124   
 
Makgoba J did not refer to the comments of Wallis JA in Children’s Resource Centre Trust 
or Nugent JA in Mukaddam SCA on the issue of joinder.125 He did, however, refer to 
Ngxuza and accordingly attributed significant weight to the impact of the claimants‘ social 
and financial circumstances on their ability to vindicate their rights through a class action 
as opposed to some other mechanism, such as joinder. Accordingly, the court in Pretorius, 
as was the case in Ngxuza, attached significant weight to the claimants‘ constitutional right 
of access to justice. However, the courts in Ngxuza and Pretorius did not provide guidance 
regarding the test that our courts should apply, and the factors that they should consider, 
when determining the appropriateness of a class action, compared to joinder. They also 
did not indicate when, if at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude class 
certification.   
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2 2 4 3 Identifiability of class members  
 
The Ngxuza and Pretorius judgments differ significantly from the Mukaddam SCA 
judgment in respect of the courts‘ approach to determining when a class action is the most 
appropriate means of adjudicating class members‘ claims, as opposed to joinder. The 
identifiability of class members appears to be the key consideration which the court in 
Mukaddam SCA took into account to determine whether a class action is the appropriate 
means for adjudicating class members‘ claims. Accordingly, where the individual class 
members are all identifiable, regardless of inter alia their financial means, the size of their 
individual claims and the size of the class, they may need to be joined as plaintiffs to the 
proceedings. A class action may therefore not be the appropriate procedural device to be 
utilised in such circumstances. However, where for example the individual class members 
are not in a financial position to vindicate their rights through ordinary litigation, where the 
class is numerous, or where the individual claims of class members are small, joinder may 
be costly, cumbersome and inappropriate. Requiring joinder in such circumstances may 
deprive class members of their right to access to justice. In other words, the fact that class 
members are identifiable should not necessarily mean that a class action is not the 
appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ claims. There are other 
considerations that must be taken into account in making this determination. These 
considerations will be dealt with in more detail below.  
 
Hurter states that the approach adopted by the court in Ngxuza conforms to the view in 
foreign jurisdictions that the class should merely be ascertainable or identifiable and not 
require greater specificity. She states that ―it would therefore be safe to say that in SA it 
will not be required that the identity of each member be known, but that it would be 
sufficient if it can be determined in some manner whether a person is a member of the 
class or group or not‖.126   
 
It has been suggested in the context of the American class action that, while a class does 
not need to be ascertainable, if the plaintiff can identify each individual class member by 
name, the class may not be too numerous for joinder to be impracticable.127 However, the 
approach of the United States in this regard is that the identifiability of individual class 
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members will form part of the assessment of the impracticability of joinder – it is not the 
only consideration in determining practicability of joinder compared to class 
proceedings.128 There are other relevant factors to consider, such as the geographical 
dispersion of class members. The more geographically dispersed the class is, the more 
difficult it would be to require joinder of individual class members. In other words, if the 
class is limited to a specific geographical territory, it is more likely that joinder would be 
feasible.129 Even where all the class members are identifiable, joinder is also likely to be 
impracticable where each class member‘s claim is small or when the class members are 
poor, uneducated or lack the resources that are necessary to pursue their claims 
individually. In such circumstances, the class members are unlikely to litigate unless a 
class is certified, thus making joinder in the absence of a class all but impossible.130 
Consideration will also be given to the ability and potential willingness of class members to 
institute individual actions.131 The facts of the specific case may also indicate other 
reasons why joinder is impracticable.   
 
In respect of representative proceedings in Australia, it is important to bear in mind that 
simply satisfying one of the requirements in section 33N is insufficient for the purpose of 
seeking the discontinuance of the representative proceeding. For example, where a court 
is of the view that the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to be continued 
as a representative proceeding, are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if 
each group member conducted a separate proceeding, or where all the relief sought could 
be obtained by means of litigation through joinder,132 the court would also need to be 
convinced that it is in the interest of justice to grant the order discontinuing the 
representative proceeding.133 
 
It would appear that the relevant considerations in determining the practicability of joinder 
and the superiority of class proceedings in the context of the American class action are 
similar to the considerations that are relevant in determining the appropriateness of 
representative proceedings in the context of the Australian Federal Court Act. For 
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example, considering whether the representative proceeding will provide an efficient and 
effective means of dealing with the claims of group members134 also forms part of the 
American impracticability and superiority inquiries.135 At the very least, in both these class 
action regimes there is no room for concluding that joinder is practicable or appropriate 
solely on the basis that all the individual class members are identifiable.136 The same 
applies in respect of the class action regime of Ontario – the identifiability of all the class 
members does not necessarily exclude a class action as the preferable procedure.137 In 
view of these considerations, it therefore does not appear to be the case that, where the 
class members are all identifiable, joinder is necessarily the most appropriate adjudication 
mechanism. There are other relevant considerations that should be taken into account in 
conducting the appropriateness-inquiry. These considerations will be dealt with in more 
detail below. 
 
2 2 4 4 Access to justice 
 
It is apparent from the approaches of the selected foreign jurisdictions that the class action 
objectives constitute important considerations when determining the appropriateness of a 
class action, compared to joinder. In the United States, the court in Safran v United 
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO138 held that the ―numerosity requirement reflects the 
general theory behind class action lawsuits which is to permit a large group of individuals 
whose interests are sufficiently related to bring one lawsuit, instead of many lawsuits, so 
as to conserve judicial resources and increase judicial access‖.139 As has been mentioned, 
in Femcare Finkelstein J for the Federal Court of Australia held that whether or not it is in 
the interests of justice to make an order that the representative proceeding be terminated 
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137
 In Keatley Surveying Inc v Teranet Inc 2014 ONSC 1677, Sachs J held that a plaintiff is only required to 
propose a class definition that provides for an identifiable class of two or more people – a plaintiff is not 
required to establish the actual existence of two or more potential class members. 
138
 132 FRD 397 (WD Pa 1989). 
139
 401. 
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requires consideration of the principal objects of the class action.140 Similarly, in the 
context of class proceedings in Ontario, the court in Hollick held that the class action 
objectives should constitute the lens through which the preferability inquiry should be 
conducted.141 In Excalibur, the Ontario Supreme Court, regarding the preferability inquiry, 
referred with approval to AIC:142  
 
―The preferability analysis must be conducted through the lens of judicial economy, behaviour 
modification and access to justice. Justice Cromwell for the Court stated that access to justice 
has both a procedural and substantive dimension. The procedural aspect focusses on whether 
the claimants have a fair process to resolve their claims. The substantive aspect focuses on the 
results to be obtained and is concerned with whether the claimants will receive a just and 
effective remedy for their claims if established.   In AIC Limited v. Fischer, Justice Cromwell 
pointed out that when considering alternatives to a class action, the question is whether the 
alternative has potential to provide effective redress for the substance of the plaintiffs' claims 
and to do so in a manner that accords suitable procedural rights. He said that there are five 
questions to be answered when considering whether alternatives to a class action will achieve 
access to justice: (1) Are there economic, psychological, social, or procedural barriers to access 
to justice in the case? (2) What is the potential of the class proceeding to address those 
barriers? (3) What are the alternatives to class proceedings? (4) To what extent do the 
alternatives address the relevant barriers? (5) How do the two proceedings compare?‖143 
 
Hurter suggests that for a class action to be successful in the South African context, it 
needs to be uniquely South African ―and cannot be the product of selective and haphazard 
adaptations of foreign solutions. It should be borne in mind that such solutions evolved in 
response to practice specific needs and are therefore not necessarily applicable to our 
situation, or may come with undesirable baggage‖.144  
 
It is submitted that our courts‘ point of departure in determining whether a class action is 
the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate claimants‘ claims should also be the principal 
objectives of a class action. This entails determining, with reference to the facts of the 
specific case, whether a class action is necessary to achieve access to justice, whether it 
                                                          
140
 Para 152. 
141
 Paras 27-32. 
142
 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38. 
143
 Paras 196-200. 
144
 Hurter (2008) De Jure 303-304.   
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is necessary to achieve judicial economy and/or whether it is necessary to effect behaviour 
modification. However, it is submitted that, in South Africa, access to justice should be the 
primary consideration when assessing the appropriateness of class proceedings 
compared to joinder, as was the case in Ngxuza and Pretorius. Section 34 of the 
Constitution enshrines the right of access to courts and states that ―[e]veryone has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum‖. The Constitution also recognises the values of human dignity and the 
advancement of human rights, and requires the State to respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfil the rights recognised in the Constitution.  
 
In Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide145 (―Mdeyide‖), the Constitutional Court held that:  
 
―The fundamental right of access to courts is essential for constitutional democracy under the 
rule of law. In order to enforce one's rights under the Constitution, legislation and the common 
law, everyone must be able to have a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law, 
decided by a court. The right of access to courts is thus protected in the Constitution‖.146  
 
The Mdeyide case dealt with the limitation of the right of access to courts as provided for in 
section 34 of the Constitution by section 23(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act 59 of 1996, 
which limitation pertains to the imposition of a time limit with regard to claims for 
compensation against the Road Accident Fund. In determining the reasonableness and 
justifiability of the limitation, the Constitutional Court held that: 
 
―Socio-economic conditions in South Africa are of course highly relevant in considering the 
reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation of the present kind. In a society where the 
workings of the legal system remain largely unfamiliar to many citizens, due care must be taken 
that rights are adequately protected as far as possible‖.147  
 
The court148 referred to Mohlomi v Minister of Defence149 where Didcott J referred to:   
 
                                                          
145
 2011 2 SA 26 (CC). 
146
 Para 1.  
147
 Para 70. 
148
 Para 70. 
149
 1997 1 SA 124 (CC). 
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―[T]he background depicted by the state of affairs prevailing in South Africa, a land where 
poverty and illiteracy abound and differences of culture and language are pronounced, where 
such conditions isolate the people whom they handicap from the mainstream of the law, where 
most persons who have been injured are either unaware of or poorly informed about their legal 
rights and what they should do in order to enforce those, and where access to the professional 
advice and assistance that they need so sorely is often difficult for financial or geographical 
reasons‖.150 
 
Giving priority to those who are particularly vulnerable, in particular because of historical 
and socio-economic factors, is constitutionally required.151 Cameron JA, in Ngxuza, 
mentioned that the needs of these types of individuals should inform our understanding of 
the Constitution‘s provisions and that it is against the background of their constitutional 
entitlements that section 38 should be interpreted. He emphasised that section 39(2) of the 
Constitution enjoins the courts to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights 
when developing the common law. This is amplified by section 173 conferring an inherent 
power upon the courts to develop the common law, taking the interests of justice into 
account.152  
 
It is against the above background that it is submitted that our courts‘ primary 
consideration in determining the appropriateness of class proceedings should be class 
members‘ right to access to justice.153 For example, where the individual claimants are 
unable to litigate individually through joinder because they are drawn from the poorest 
portion of our society, access to justice dictates that a court should allow the matter to 
proceed as a class action. This ensures that the claimants‘ financial and social 
circumstances do not serve to constitute a barrier to access to justice.154     
 
As mentioned, the test in AIC essentially entails conducting the preferability analysis 
through the lens of judicial economy, behaviour modification and access to justice, and 
                                                          
150
 Para 14. See also Thusi v Minister of Home Affairs and 71 Other Cases 2011 2 SA 561 (KZP) para 104; 
S v Khanyile 1988 3 SA 795 (N) 813A–B. 
151
 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 8-9. See also Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 25, where it was held that ―[r]ights also 
need to be interpreted and understood in their social and historical context‖.  
152
 Para 12. 
153
 See fn 15 above.  
154
 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) para 14. 
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considering whether the class action alternative will achieve access to justice. This inter 
alia entails determining whether there are economic, psychological, social, or procedural 
barriers to access to justice in the case.155 It is proposed that a test similar to the one 
formulated in AIC be applied by our courts to determine whether a class action is 
appropriate to adjudicate class members‘ claims. 
 
It is suggested that our courts, when determining the appropriateness of a class action, 
compared to joinder, firstly consider whether certification of a class action is necessary to 
achieve access to justice.156 In AIC it was held that ―[a] class action will serve the goal of 
access to justice if (1) there are access to justice concerns that a class action could 
address; and (2) these concerns remain even when alternative avenues of redress are 
considered‖.157 To determine whether certification is necessary to achieve access to 
justice, it must be determined whether there are any potential barriers to access to justice, 
the existence of which can effectively be addressed by certification of a class action.158 
Possible barriers to access to justice include the geographical dispersion of class 
members; the inability of claimants to engage in individualised litigation; and, the 
difficulties associated with requiring litigation through joinder. These pontential barriers are 
                                                          
155
 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38.  
156
 For example, in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 
85 OR (3d) 321 para 217 Perell J held that it was not shown that ―a class action is necessary to overcome 
any barriers to access to justice‖.  
157
 Para 26. 
158
 In the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General (1982) 121 it is stated that class actions can help overcome barriers to access to justice and may 
accordingly perform an important function in society. In Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz 
Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217 Perell J concluded that, on the facts, 
joinder was the preferable procedure inter alia because it was not shown that a ―class action is necessary to 
overcome any barriers to access to justice‖. In AIC Limited v Fischer 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38 it was held 
that a court must consider whether there are barriers to access to justice in the given case. In Ministry of the 
Attorney General, British Columbia, Consultation Document: Class Action Litigation for British Columbia 
(1994) 8 it was held that ―the opt out model is the more effective means to ensure that the barriers to justice, 
which class actions are intended to overcome, are reduced‖. See also Alberta Law Reform Institute Class 
Actions (2000) Final Report No. 85 97; South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions 
Report para 5.11; and, Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 
1184 (SCA) paras 4-6 where Cameron JA held that society cannot simply set up courts and wait for litigants 
to bring their complaints as barriers may exist that preclude their participation in litigious proceedings; hence, 
the need for class proceedings. 
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similar to those referred to by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Robidoux v Celani159 where it was held that, when determining the practicability of joinder, 
―[r]elevant considerations include judicial economy arising from the avoidance of a 
multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of class members, financial resources of 
class members, the ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and requests for 
prospective injunctive relief which would involve future class members‖.160 
 
The geographical dispersion of class members should be taken into consideration as a 
potential barrier to access to justice. As mentioned, the more geographically dispersed the 
class members are, the less likely it is that they will engage in individualised litigation and 
the more impractical it is to join those class members.161 In such circumstances, a class 
action is likely to be more appropriate than joinder as a mechanism to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims.162  
 
The inability of claimants to engage in individualised litigation is a further potential barrier 
to access to justice. This barrier entails consideration of various factors which may 
contribute to, or result in, the claimants‘ inability to institute and pursue individual suits, 
such as whether the class members are poor and whether they lack resources.163 The 
poorer the individual class members are, the more likely it is that they would be unable to 
litigate in the absence of certification of the class action.164 A lack of resources and the 
                                                          
159
 987 F.2d 931. 
160
 936. 
161
 See, for example, Dameron v Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 595 F. Supp 1404, 1408 (D Md 1984), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part 815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Southeast Hotel Properties Limited Partnership 
Investor Litig, 151 F.R.D. 597, 601 (WDNC 1993). United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 
Local 899 v Phoenix Associates, Inc, 152 F.R.D. 518, 522 (SD W Va 1994). 
162
 According to Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 27, if the class is limited to a specific geographical 
territory it is likely that joinder would be feasible.   
163
 See South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working 
Paper 57 para 5.25, where it is stated that a large portion of South African society is poor, illiterate and 
ignorant because they have not received a quality education and that the need to ensure that such people 
benefit from class actions is greater in South Africa than in certain other foreign jurisdictions.  
164
 In Lake v First Nationwide Bank 156 FRD 615, 625 (E.d.Pa. 1994) it was held that, in performing the 
superiority analysis in terms of rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules, the court must consider the ―inability of the 
poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers of class members would 
possess the initiative to litigate individually‖. Similarly, according to Cameron JA in Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 6, because there are so many 
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inability of class members to meet the costs of legal representation generally means that 
litigation through joinder would be too expensive.165 It is therefore likely that, in such 
circumstances, a court would conclude that a class action is appropriate.166 Other relevant 
factors that our courts should consider that may contribute to the inability of claimants to 
engage in individualised litigation include:  
 
―[I]gnorance of the availability of substantive legal rights (Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Class Actions, vol. I (1982) (‗OLRC Report‘), at p. 127), ignorance of 
the fact that significant injuries have occurred (OLRC Report, at pp. 127-28), limited language 
skills (see e.g. Rubenstein, at § 4:65), elderly age of the claimants (see e.g. Cloud v. Canada 
(Attorney General) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.)), frail emotional or physical state of the 
claimants (see e.g.Rumley v. British Columbia, 2001 SCC 69, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184), fear of 
reprisals by the defendant (OLRC Report, at p. 128; see e.g. Webb v. K-Mart Canada Ltd. 
(1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 389 (S.C.J.)), or alienation from the legal system as a result of negative 
experiences with it (OLRC Report, at pp. 128-29)...‖167  
 
There may also be procedural hurdles that could deprive claimants of access to justice. It 
has been mentioned above that the primary difficulties associated with joinder is that it is a 
cumbersome and costly process. In Ngxuza, Cameron JA also referred to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
poor individuals in South Africa who do not have the necessary resources to litigate, the attainment of justice 
could be unduly complicated. See also M Nyenti ―Access to Justice in the South African Social Security 
System: Towards a Conceptual Approach‖ (2013) 4 De Jure 901 914 where he states that ―[o]ne of the 
factors restricting the right of access to courts in South Africa is the long distances that many people have to 
travel in order to access the courts and related services‖.  
165
 See Gold Fields Limited and Others v Motley Rice LLC, In re: Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited and Others 2015 4 SA 299 (GJ) para 55, where Mojapelo DJP held that ―[t]he positive impact of 
litigation funding agreements that no one can deny is that such agreements promote access to justice. The 
importance is elevated a step higher where the funded litigant is one who, because of poverty and lack of 
resources, would otherwise not have been able to litigate…‖ 
166
 In Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931 936 it was held that ―the potential class members are distributed over 
the entire area of Vermont. They are also economically disadvantaged, making individual suits difficult to 
pursue...Thus, the district court abused its discretion in determining that the class was not so numerous that 
joinder of all members would be impracticable‖. 
167
 2013 SCC 69 para 27. See also Nyenti (2013) De Jure 914, where he states that ―knowledge of rights is a 
prerequisite to access to justice‖.   
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technicalities in legal procedure, including joinder, as a possible barrier to access to 
justice.168  
 
Our courts should accordingly consider, on the facts of the case, whether certification of a 
class action is necessary to overcome the above-mentioned barriers and to achieve 
access to justice.169  
 
2 2 4 5 Practical considerations 
 
However, it is submitted that simply considering potential barriers to access to justice and 
determining whether certification is necessary to overcome those barriers, is insufficient to 
assess the appropriateness of a class action. Although access to justice, informed by the 
above-mentioned factors, should constitute the primary consideration, the courts‘ 
assessment should further be informed by practical considerations that are otherwise 
relevant to determining the appropriateness of class actions compared to joinder.170  
 
Our courts should also consider the judicial economy that would arise if the multiplicity of 
actions were avoided as well as the necessity of class proceedings to effect behaviour 
modification. Achieving judicial economy would entail joining together a number of lawsuits 
that would otherwise have been brought separately.171 Behaviour modification would entail 
                                                          
168
 Para 6. In Eggleston v Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U.A. 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7
th
 
Cir. 1981), regarding the American feasibility consideration, the court held that ―[o]rdinarily it is not difficult to 
ascertain if a class approach would be useful to avoid the practical problems of trying to join many named 
plaintiffs or otherwise clog the docket with numerous individual suits. Except for the class approach many 
might never receive any redress for the wrong done them‖. See also Kirby ―South Africa‖ in World Class 
Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe 386; Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 4-6.  
169
 In Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931 936 it was held that the ―[d]etermination of practicability depends on 
all the circumstances surrounding a case…‖ 
170
 See Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza  2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 
16.  
171
 See, for example, the approach in Ontario as set out in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz 
Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217 where Perell J held that it was not shown 
that ―a class action is necessary to overcome any barriers to access to justice. In the case at bar, a class 
action is not necessary to achieve behaviour modification and a class action would not be particularly helpful 
in providing judicial economy.‖ See also Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 3 SCR 158 paras 27-32; Markson v 
MBNA Canada Bank 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 paras 69-70; Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v 
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deterring potential defendants, who may otherwise have assumed that their minor wrongs 
would not result in litigation, from similar future wrongdoing.172 
 
Apart from considering judicial economy and behaviour modification, it is further proposed 
that the courts should also consider any other practical consideration that may be relevant 
when determining the appropriateness of class proceedings. Such considerations could 
typically include the manageability of the class action;173 whether the class members‘ 
claims are large enough to warrant being pursued separately;174 and, the importance of 
the common issues in relation to the claims as a whole. The manageability of the class 
action entails taking into account inter alia the size of the class,175 the identifiability of class 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2015 ONSC 1634 para 26; AIC Limited v Fischer 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-
38. In Bright v Femcare Limited 2002 FCAFC 243; 195 ALR 574 para 152, Finkelstein J, for the Federal 
Court of Australia, held that whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make an order that the 
representative proceeding be terminated, requires consideration of the principal objects of the class action 
procedure. See also South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.11.3. 
172
 Western Canadian Shopping Centres v Dutton (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534 para 29. See also R Mulheron The 
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (2004) 6. 
173
 For the type of considerations that could typically inform the manageability of the class action see, for 
example, Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 62; Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S 156, 164 
(1974); Carnegie v Mutual Saving Life Insurance Company No. CV-99-S-3292-NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
21396, 76-77 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2002); Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 3 SCR 158 para 32; Markson v MBNA 
Canada Bank 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 paras 69-70; and, Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v 
Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217. 
174
 In Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 19, Wallis JA mentions considerations 
that are relevant to determining the appropriateness of class proceedings compared to joinder, including 
considering whether the claims are large enough to warrant being pursued separately. See also Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 4-5.  
175
 Regarding the numerosity requirement contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules, the bigger the class the 
more likely it is that joinder would be impracticable. According to Greer A Practitioner’s Guide to Class 
Actions 58, it is generally accepted that ―when class size reaches substantial proportions…the 
impracticability requirement and hence the numerosity requirement is usually satisfied by the numbers 
alone‖. See also Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 131 where it is stated 
that, although courts are reluctant to certify classes whose members would be difficult to communicate with 
or identify, the sheer size of the class would not necessarily result in the denial of certification. Regarding 
section 33N(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976, representative proceedings can be 
discontinued where it is ―otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative 
proceeding‖. According to Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 321, the size of the class is a relevant 
consideration to determine whether it is ‗otherwise inappropriate‘. In Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
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members176 and the extent of the non-common issues that would require individualised 
adjudication.177 The weight given to each of these factors should vary in proportion to 
those factors that form part of the access to justice consideration. For example, although 
the class members are identifiable, if the individual claimants are poor and therefore 
unable to litigate through joinder, a court should not find that the fact that they are 
identifiable makes joinder the appropriate means for adjudicating the claimants‘ claims. 
Extensive provision needs to be made for individuals who are not in a social or financial 
position to seek legal redress.178   
 
Importantly, as part of the practical considerations referred to above, a court would need to 
consider the manageability of class proceedings. Judicial management is considered to be 
increasingly important for the effective functioning of civil litigation in general, and of the 
class action system in particular.179 Moreover, as class action litigation is traditionally more 
complex than other kinds of litigation, it requires greater administration and management 
of the case.180 Where manageability problems occur during the course of class 
proceedings, they could potentially result in the termination of the class action.181  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Limited (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016) 
para 52 Mojapelo DJP held that ―[w]hat we have here is that the sizes of the two classes may be very large 
but that does not make the class definition overbroad or the class action trial unmanageable‖. 
176
 According to Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 40, the approach of the 
United States is that the identifiability of individual class members will form part of the assessment of the 
impracticability of joinder. It is not the only consideration in determining the practicability of joinder compared 
to class actions. In Keatley Surveying Inc v Teranet Inc 2014 ONSC 1677, Sachs J held that, in Ontario, a 
plaintiff is only required to propose a class definition that provides for an identifiable class of two or more 
people – a plaintiff is not required to establish the actual existence of two or more potential class members. 
See also Kirby ―South Africa‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around 
the Globe 378 412; Greer Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 58; Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 
26; and section 33H(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976.  
177
 Chapter five below considers whether individual issues such as causation and damages, may render a 
class action unmanageable. 
178
 See Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza  2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 
4-5. 
179
 C Piché ―Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements‖ (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 111 121. 
180
 According to Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe 44, a tool that is regarded as useful in managing class action proceedings in the 
United States is to require the submission of a trial plan – a document that sets out the claim(s), the relief, 
the witnesses and evidence that will be used to prove the plaintiffs‘ claims at the trial. See also Piché (2010) 
Windsor YB Access Just 117. 
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The South African Law Commission (―SALC‖) has recommended that, because class 
actions are complex and the right and obligations of absent class members are 
determined, our courts should be more active in managing class actions compared to 
ordinary litigation.182 It accordingly proposed that ―the courts should be given broad 
general management powers exercisable either on the application of a party or class 
member or on the court‘s own motion‖.183   
 
Although the draft legislation proposed by the SALC does not expressly incorporate the 
manageability of class actions as a factor to be considered at the certification stage, it will 
no doubt play a role in the context of other questions. For example, it would be relevant in 
deciding whether a class action would be the appropriate method of adjudicating class 
members‘ claims.184  If a class action would turn out to be unmanageable, it is unlikely that 
class proceedings would be regarded as appropriate. 
 
2 2 4 6 Summary 
 
Following Children’s Resource Centre Trust and Mukaddam SCA it remains unclear what 
test our courts must apply to determine the appropriateness of a class action and what 
factors they must consider to make this determination. The court in Mukaddam SCA erred 
in its approach to assessing the appropriateness of a class action by essentially 
concluding that, where all the individual class members are identifiable, joinder is more 
appropriate. It has been shown why such a conclusion could be problematic.  
 
The approaches of the foreign jurisdictions referred to above have effectively been to 
assess the appropriateness of class actions with regard to the principal advantages of the 
class action. It is submitted that our courts should adopt a similar approach. The approach 
of our courts in assessing appropriateness should, however, be tailored to meet the needs 
and demands of our society.  It is accordingly suggested that, in making this assessment, 
our courts should attach significant weight to access to justice, due to the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
181
 In Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin 417 US 156 (1974) the enormity of the class and related issues such as 
notice to absent members and the distribution of an aggregate award to class members caused serious 
doubt about the viability of the case.  
182
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.9.2. 
183
 Para 5.9.4. 
184
 De Vos (1996) TSAR 649-650.  
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prominence of this principle, as well as the importance of responding to acute social 
needs. Specifically, our courts should consider possible barriers to access to justice to 
determine whether certification is necessary. Furthermore, our courts should consider 
whether certification is necessary to achieve judicial economy and behaviour modification. 
Finally, the courts should also determine whether it would otherwise be inappropriate to 
allow the class proceedings to continue by considering inter alia the manageability of the 
class action; the importance of the common issues in relation to the claims as a whole; 
and whether the class members‘ claims are large enough to warrant being pursued 
separately. However, it is submitted that the access to justice consideration should, in a 
South African context and upon considering all the circumstances surrounding the case, 
be attributed more weight than those factors that form part of the aforementioned 
supplementary inquiry. 
 
2 3 Opt-in class action regime 
 
As mentioned, Nugent JA in Mukaddam SCA held that, once the class is confined to 
claimants who choose positively to advance their claims and are required to come forward 
for that purpose (i.e. who choose to ‗opt-in‘), he can see no reason why they are not 
capable of doing so in their own names through joinder – they do not need a 
representative to do so on their behalf.185 By suggesting that joinder is the appropriate 
procedural device where all the claimants are identifiable, Nugent JA clearly questioned 
the viability of the opt-in regime of class action litigation.  Nugent JA also held that the opt-
in class action regime can only be utilised in exceptional circumstances.186 As exceptional 
circumstances were not proved, he found that a class action was not the most appropriate 
way to pursue the claims.187  
 
The court in Mukaddam CC held that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mukaddam SCA 
was wrong to find that an applicant in an opt-in class action is required to show exceptional 
circumstances. Although the court did not provide reasons for its disagreement with the 
                                                          
185
 Para 12.   
186
 If the effect of Nugent JA‘s comment that joinder is appropriate where all the class members are 
identifiable is to negate the need for a South African opt-in class action regime, then Nugent JA seemingly 
contradicts himself by requiring that exceptional circumstances must be proved before the opt-in procedure 
can be used.  
187
 Paras 11, 14. 
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finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this regard, the fact of the matter is that, as our 
law stands at the moment, there is no need to prove exceptional circumstances to be able 
to utilise the opt-in procedure.  
 
The SALC recommended that courts should have a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no 
notice orders.188 The approach of the court in Mukaddam SCA regarding the opt-in class 
action regime, as mentioned above, contradicts this recommendation. It also complicates 
the issue of notice in class action proceedings.189 This part of the study will accordingly 
consider the nature and status of the opt-in class action compared to the opt-out class 
action and, in view of Nugent JA‘s comments, when, if at all, the opt-in procedure should 
be utilised rather than the opt-out procedure.190     
 
It may be worthwhile, in view of the above, to revisit the distinction between the opt-in and 
opt-out class action regimes. As mentioned,191 in an opt-out class action, individuals who 
fall within the class definition are automatically included in the class unless an individual 
affirmatively requests exclusion from the class. In other words, class members are 
provided with an opportunity to opt out if they do not wish to be part of the class action.192 
Class members who do not opt out are bound by the outcome of the class action.193 Class 
members who choose to opt out are at liberty to pursue individual claims against the 
defendant.  
 
In an opt-in class action, individual class members who fall within the class definition must 
affirmatively request inclusion to form part of the class action. Class members who do not 
opt into the class action are not bound by its outcome and they will accordingly be at 
liberty to pursue individual claims against the defendant. Naturally, they will also forfeit the 
opportunity to share in the benefits obtained by the class in the event of a favourable 
judgment. 
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Support for the opt-out regime is essentially based on the view that the opt-in requirement 
could undermine one of the primary purposes of class action litigation, which is to facilitate 
access to justice.194 It has also been argued that the opt-in regime pressuposes that failing 
to opt in is the result of a properly contemplated decision by the individual class member 
not to participate in the class action. However, this is not necessarily always the case, 
especially in South Africa where the existence of financial and social barriers could result 
in a failure to opt in. Such a requirement could accordingly defeat the primary purpose of 
class actions, namely access to justice, especially where there are small individual claims 
involved.195 
 
Conversely, support for the opt-in regime is essentially premised on the belief that 
individuals who are unaware of the litigation should not be bound by its outcome. In other 
words, in the absence of proper notice of the class proceedings, one should not be bound 
by the judgment of the court in the matter.196 Proponents of the opt-in regime further argue 
inter alia that it makes it easier for class members to assess197 whether they are being 
adequately represented in the proceedings, since they are required to act positively to join 
in and benefit from the class action. It may also have the effect of reducing the costs 
associated with the litigation and result in increased efficiency, which is beneficial for all 
interested parties.198   
 
Before considering the nature and status of the opt-in class action compared to the opt-out 
class action in further detail and when, if at all, the opt-in procedure should be utilised 
rather than the opt-out procedure, the approaches of foreign jurisdictions will first be 
considered.  
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2 3 Opt-in class action regime 
 
2 3 1 The approaches of foreign jurisdictions 
 
The opt-out class action regime is undoubtedly universally more popular than the opt-in 
class action regime. The opt-in class action regime is, however, utilised in a limited 
number of foreign jurisdictions, such as the group litigation regime in Sweden and the 
Group Litigation Order under the Civil Procedure Rules in England and Wales.  Further 
examples of jurisdictions employing an opt-in class action regime are Germany, 
specifically in the context of certain securities cases, and Denmark where a new class-
action provision allowing for opt-in class actions was recently enacted.199  
 
Ontario subscribes to the opt-out class action regime.200 In the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Report on Class Actions201 consideration was given to the perceived 
disadvantages of the opt-in class action regime, specifically to the reason why an opt-in 
class action scenario generally results in a smaller class than in the case where class 
members are permitted to opt out.202 The Ontario Commission confirmed that there is 
disagreement regarding the conclusions that should be drawn from a failure by individuals 
to opt into a class action. On the one hand, it has been argued that a failure to opt in 
reflects disinterest in the class action claim. It has, conversely, been argued that the failure 
to opt in arises from a variety of factors, other than the lack of interest on the part of 
putative class members, which may result in the size of the class being reduced in an 
arbitrary and inappropriate manner. Such factors, according to the Ontario Commission, 
include fear of involvement in the legal process, concern over the amount of legal costs, 
fear of sanction from employers or others who may be in a position to retaliate, or the 
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demands of everyday life.203 These factors may prevent a class member from taking the 
steps necessary to opt in.204  
 
The Ontario Commission further found that the necessity to give notice to class members 
that they must opt into the class action creates difficulties that may result in the exclusion 
of class members who are not necessarily indifferent to the harm done to them. In many 
class actions, the identity of class members is initially unknown and, accordingly, 
notification that they must opt in if they wish to participate in the class action presents a 
serious problem. To the extent that class members do not receive this information, an opt-
in requirement may exclude individuals who never had a real opportunity to express 
interest in the suit. Even where class members can be located, they may not appreciate 
the significance of a notice and may fail to read it. They may also experience problems 
understanding its content. Further, according to the Ontario Commission, even if class 
members understand the notice, they may be unsure whether the class action applies to 
them.205  
 
The Ontario Commission concluded that low response rates by class members who are 
required to opt in may be attributable to problems of the sort described above and not 
necessarily to any general lack of interest in class actions. It stated that it is important to 
provide increased access to the courts for persons who wish to pursue existing remedies 
but are unable to do so. It also found that, irrespective of the claims‘ merits, economic, 
social and psychological barriers may prevent them from being individually litigated. Class 
actions can help overcome such barriers and, by providing increased access to the courts, 
may perform an important function in society.206 The Ontario Commission accordingly 
endorsed the opt-out class action regime for inter alia the reasons set out above.207  
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In Australia, the issue as to whether it should adopt an opt-in or opt-out class action model 
was subject to extensive debate prior the enforcement of Part IVA of the Federal Court 
Act.208 The opt-out model is now embodied in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, Part 4A of 
the Supreme Court Act209 and Part 10 of the Civil Procedure Act.210 The Australian Law 
Reform Commission (―ALRC‖) previously recommended that, ―[s]ubject to the provision of 
appropriate protection, it should be possible to commence a group member‘s proceeding 
without first obtaining consent of that group member‖, i.e. opt-out class action proceedings 
should be possible and are indeed preferable.211 When the Federal Court of Australia 
Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth) was debated in the House of Representatives, the Attorney 
General made the following comment which effectively echoes the view of the Ontario 
Commission referred to above, in that significant weight was attached to the exclusionary 
effect of the opt-in class action regime in respect of potential class members and the 
consequential deprivation of their right to access to justice: 
 
―The Government believes that an opt out procedure is preferable on both grounds of equity 
and efficiency. It ensures that people, particularly those who are poor or less educated, can 
obtain redress where they may be unable to take the positive step of having themselves 
included in the proceedings. It also achieves the goals of obtaining a common, binding decision 
while leaving a person who wishes to do so free to leave the group to pursue his or her claim 
separately.‖212   
 
The approach followed by the foreign jurisdictions discussed above is therefore to reject 
the opt-in class action regime insofar as it arbitrarily reduces the size of potential classes 
at the expense of putative class members‘ right of access to justice. For example, the 
Ontario Commission held that: 
 
―In our view, the incorporation of an opt in requirement…would be fundamentally inconsistent 
with the access to justice rationale that we have endorsed as a basic justification for an 
expanded class action procedure in Ontario...Since we believe that the meaning of silence is 
equivocal, and does not necessarily indicate indifference or lack of interest, class members 
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should not be denied whatever benefits are secured by the class action by failing to act at this 
stage of the proceedings…‖213  
 
Similarly, it has been stated that ―the opt out model is the more effective means to ensure 
that the barriers to justice, which class actions are intended to overcome, are reduced‖.214 
Hensler states that ―[i]n consumer class actions involving small individual losses, requiring 
class members to opt in would lead to smaller classes that would likely obtain smaller 
aggregate settlements…The social science research on active versus passive assent 
suggests that minority and low-income individuals might be disproportionately affected by 
an opt-in requirement, a worrisome possibility‖.215  
 
In its report on class actions, the Alberta Law Reform Institute lists various perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of both the opt-in and opt-out class action regimes.216 It 
provides that the general advantages of opting out include enhancing access to justice, in 
that class members are automatically included as part of the class; that class members 
retain the choice to opt out of the proceedings for whatever reason; and that class 
members who opt out can pursue individualised litigation.217 The disadvantages of opting 
out include that class members may not receive notice of the class proceedings; that class 
members who do not opt out are bound by the outcome of the proceedings whether or not 
they want to be; that the class proceedings may attract claimants who do not want to be 
part of the proceedings or would not otherwise have litigated; and that opting out operates 
in violation of the freedom of the individual to choose whether or not to institute 
proceedings.218   
 
Arguments for opting in include that a class member will be bound by the result only if he 
or she intends to be bound thereto; that all class members who stand to benefit will have 
shown some interest in the litigation; that the outcome will not be binding upon individuals 
who do not have knowledge of the lawsuit; that opting in is consistent with the general 
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position in respect of ordinary procedures for commencing legal proceedings; and, that 
persons who do not opt in can litigate their claims outside the ambit of the class action.219 
Arguments against opting in include that the potential class members who do not choose 
to opt in may not know of the class proceedings; that opting in may deny access to justice 
to potential class members who fail to opt in because of economic, psychological and 
social barriers; and that, a class action is essentially a permissive joinder device if it is 
available only to those people who choose to sue together.220  
 
It is apparent from the above that the choice between the opt-in and opt-out class action 
regimes is a difficult one and one that has been subject to debate. Our courts have also 
not provided sufficient guidance on this issue. The following part of this chapter 
accordingly considers, with regard to the approaches of the foreign jurisdictions referred to 
above, whether there is room for the opt-in class action regime in South African law and 
when, if at all, the opt-in procedure should be utilised rather than the opt-out procedure.    
 
2 3 2 Possible approaches in South African law  
 
As mentioned, the SALC recommended that the court should provide directions as to the 
procedure to be followed as part of the certification process and that the court should have 
a wide discretion to determine its own procedures. Further, the court should possess 
broad general management powers, exercisable either on the application of a party or on 
the court‘s own motion. The SALC proposed that legislation should be adopted regulating 
class actions in South Africa and that the legislation should deal with the questions of 
when, by whom, to whom, and how notice should be given. As a general rule, according to 
the SALC, notice to class members and prospective class members should always be 
given and the court should retain a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders. 
The court should, in all cases, consider whether notice of the certification application 
should be given to all persons eligible to elect to join the class.221  
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It is apparent from the above that the SALC clearly envisaged that circumstances may 
arise where it would be preferable to require members to opt into class proceedings. To 
establish the basis for the SALC‘s recommendation that the court should retain a 
discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders, it is necessary to consider the 
SALC‘s Working Paper. In the Working Paper, the SALC stated that provision should be 
made for opt-in notice in limited situations because there may be circumstances where 
class members with substantial claims would be severely prejudiced if the class action fails 
because it was not effectively prosecuted. A judgment in such circumstances would render 
the individual claims res judicata, therefore preventing further litigation on the same issue. 
It is therefore important to ensure that class members know of the class action if they are 
to be bound by the outcome.222 Therefore, according to the SALC, circumstances may 
indeed arise that justify use of the opt-in, rather than the opt-out, procedure.  
 
As mentioned, in an opt-in class action, individual class members who fall within the class 
definition must, upon receiving the opt-in notice, opt into the class action to form part 
thereof. Class members who do not opt into the class action, whether it is because they 
did not receive notice or whether they did receive notice but consciously chose not to opt 
into the class action, are not bound by its outcome and they will accordingly be at liberty to 
pursue individual claims against the defendant. Naturally, they will also forfeit the 
opportunity to share in the benefits obtained by the class in the event of a favourable 
judgment. 
 
According to the SALC, the advantage of opt-in notice is that there is certainty as to who 
the members of the class are and what the aggregate value of the claims is. The 
defendant is thus in a better position to make a well-reasoned judgment as to his or her 
liability in order to decide whether to make a settlement offer.223 The fact that the opt-in 
procedure is nothing more than a permissive joinder device is not a problem. Litigation 
through joinder is made possible by our court rules; however, there is a point at which 
joinder becomes cumbersome. The SALC states that ―it becomes cumbersome when 
there are more than four or five plaintiffs and extremely cumbersome when there are more 
than about ten‖.224 Claimants who opt in will be in much the same position as plaintiffs who 
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join in an action, except that the representative will conduct the action on their behalf. The 
actual management of the action is likely to be simpler and less cumbersome than where a 
large number of plaintiffs are joined.225 The SALC accordingly found that there are 
circumstances where joinder, although possible, would not be appropriate and that, in 
such cases, the opt-in procedure may be the appropriate means of adjudicating class 
members‘ claims.  
 
The SALC recommended that the courts may require that opt-in notice be given, but stated 
that it would be an exception rather than the rule. According to the SALC it is obvious why 
the opt-out procedure is preferable. Similar to the findings of the Ontario Commission, the 
SALC attached significant weight to financial and social barriers, the existence of which 
may preclude participation in class proceedings by potential class members. The SALC 
considered the fact that a large portion of our society is poor, illiterate and uninformed 
because they have not been properly educated. It is therefore important to ensure that this 
portion of society benefits from class actions, probably more so than in certain other 
foreign jurisdictions. Accordingly, the SALC recommended that courts should only order 
that opt-in notice be given where there is a possibility that class members may be severly 
prejudiced. Prejudice in this context entails being bound by a judgment without having 
knowledge of the class action.226 The SALC uses the following example: an airplane crash 
where a large number of people suffer damage,227 and where the individual claims are 
sufficiently large to make it probable that the claimants would enforce their own claims. In 
such a scenario, according to the SALC, the claimants should not be bound by a judgment 
unless they have expressly consented to be bound.228  
 
From the above example it can be inferred that the SALC appears to have envisaged that 
the opt-in procedure should be used in circumstances where the size of the class would be 
much more limited compared to where an opt-out procedure would typically be used, the 
individual class members would be identifiable as, for example, with the survivors of an 
airplane accident and, importantly, each class member would have a substantial individual 
claim. De Vos states that the opt-in regime of class action litigation caters especially for 
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those circumstances where the members of the class have substantial individual claims. 
He argues that, since the judgment in a class action has res judicata effect on all the class 
members, except those who have been excluded, it is important that class members with 
such claims should be apprised of the action and given the option to associate themselves 
with it. Otherwise they could be severely prejudiced if a class action fails due to 
mismanagement.229 
 
In Mukaddam SCA, Nugent JA held that the fact ―[t]hat the plaintiffs might be numerous – 
in this case it is said that there might be 100, although there is no reason to think that all 
will join – is in itself no reason to preclude a joint action. Perhaps there will be more paper 
– though even that is not necessarily true – but that is no more than administrative 
inconvenience…‖230 The court footnoted this comment with the following statement: ―In the 
United States a class action is not competent if all the claimants can be joined. Rule 23(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party seeking certification to 
demonstrate, amongst other things, that ‗the class is so numerous that joinder is 
impracticable‘‖.231  
 
The above-mentioned comments of Nugent JA are problematic in various respects. It is 
not the case in the United States that, where joinder of all the claimants is possible, class 
proceedings are not appropriate. American class proceedings may be appropriate where 
joinder is possible but not necessarily feasible.232 If joinder is possible but would 
needlessly complicate the litigation of the case, then class action proceedings may be 
appropriate.233 Impracticability of joinder does not entail impossibility.234 Accordingly, the 
identifiability of individual class members will form part of the assessment of the 
impracticability of joinder – it is not the only consideration in determining practicability of 
joinder compared to class proceedings.235 
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It further appears that Nugent JA did not give proper consideration to the judgment of 
Cameron JA in Ngxuza where he held that joinder presupposes that prospective plaintiffs 
will approach courts en masse, but that this often fails to materialise insofar as the ―various 
parties who have the common interest are isolated, scattered and utter strangers to each 
other‖.236 In such circumstances, the conditions for group action through joinder do not 
exist. According to Cameron JA, society cannot simply set up courts and wait for litigants 
to bring their complaints as barriers may exist that preclude their participation in litigious 
proceedings; hence, the need for class proceedings.237 Simply stating that a numerous 
class consisting of approximately 100 claimants is insufficient to preclude litigation through 
joinder – or stated differently, that joinder is possible where the class consists of 100 
claimants – does not take account of the practicalities associated with joinder or the 
benefits of a class action. Such an approach disregards the considerations that are 
relevant in determining the appropriateness of class proceedings as a means of 
adjudicating the claims of class members.   
 
Linkside v Minister of Basic Education238 (―Linkside‖) serves as a fitting example and 
evidences what the SALC and De Vos had in mind when stating that circumstances may 
arise where use of the opt-in procedure is both necessary and justifiable. Linkside is the 
first South African opt-in class action. A class action was instituted in the Eastern Cape 
High Court, Grahamstown, against the Minister of Basic Education, the Director–General 
of the National Department of Basic Education, the MEC, Department of Basic Education 
in the Eastern Cape Province and the Head of Department for Basic Education in the 
Eastern Cape Province seeking an order directing the respondents to appoint educators 
permanently to allocated vacant substantive posts and to reimburse schools that were 
forced to pay educators whom the State was required to pay. The class action was 
instituted on behalf of all public schools registered as such in the Eastern Cape whose 
vacant substantive posts were not filled on a permanent basis and who were forced to pay 
educators whom the State was required to pay. The schools were afforded the opportunity 
to opt into the class action by sending a written notice to the legal representatives of the 
class.239 The opt-in class action was consented to by the Department of Basic Education. 
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The case was subsequently settled in terms of which the Eastern Cape Basic Education 
Department was ordered to pay R81-million to the schools that opted into the class action.  
In Linkside, the number of class members who opted in were limited to 90, all of whom 
were identifiable, and the claims of the individual class members were large enough to 
make it likely that they would litigate independently in the absence of a class action. In this 
regard, the differences between Linkside and other South African class action cases, 
including Ngxuza, Children’s Resource Centre Trust and Mukaddam SCA, are obvious.240 
For example, in Ngxuza Cameron JA states that: 
 
―The situation seemed pattern-made for class proceedings …Their individual claims are small: 
the value of the social assistance they receive … would secure them hardly a single hour‘s 
consultation at current rates with most urban lawyers. They are scattered throughout the 
Eastern Cape Province, many of them in small towns and remote rural areas …‖ (own 
emphasis).241 
 
He further refers to ―[t]he circumstances of this particular case – unlawful conduct by a 
party against a disparate body of claimants lacking access to individualised legal services, 
with small claims unsuitable for if not incapable of enforcement in isolation…‖ (own 
emphasis).242 
 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA held that ―[t]he class of people on whose 
behalf the appellants seek to pursue claims … is both large and in general poor. Any 
claims they may have against the respondents are not large enough to warrant their being 
pursued separately…‖ (own emphasis).243  
 
Because the judgment has a res judicata effect on all class members other than those who 
have been excluded, the class members in Linkside should not be bound by a judgment 
unless they have been apprised of the action and given the option to associate themselves 
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with it. The more targeted opt-in mechanism was accordingly preferable, otherwise the 
putative class members could be severely prejudiced if the class action failed due to 
mismanagement.  
 
As we have seen, according to the Ontario Commission, it is questionable whether it is 
necessary to protect the interests of individuals with large claims from any prejudice that 
might ensue if the class action was not prosecuted skilfully. The Ontario Commission 
stated that, where a class member wanted to institute proceedings independently, he or 
she would be free to do so by opting out of the class action.244 However, the possibility 
exists that the opt-out notice may not come to the attention of the class member, that the 
class member consequently fails to opt out of the class action, and that an unsuccessful 
outcome of such action due to mismanagement would be binding on the class member. 
The opt-in regime, with its individualised notice, is accordingly preferable in the 
circumstances.245  
 
The purpose of affording to the court a discretion to choose between the type of class 
action procedure to be followed is inter alia to determine, with reference to the facts of the 
specific case, whether ordering that the opt-in procedure be utilised would have the effect 
of potentially denying people a legal remedy simply because they may fail to comprehend 
the opt-in requirement, may be fearful of taking action, or may otherwise be precluded 
from opting into the class action. Therefore, when considering the potential utilisation of 
the opt-in regime rather than the opt-out regime, this discretion should operate to protect 
those individuals who may be excluded from the class proceedings by virtue of the nature 
of opt-in proceedings.  
 
Linkside reinforces the submission that there is scope in South African law for the opt-in 
class action regime, coupled with the discretion of our courts to make opt-in, opt-out or no-
notice orders. The finding in Mukaddam SCA that joinder is appropriate where the class 
members are identifiable, effectively obviates the need for the opt-in class action regime. It 
appears that Nugent JA subscribed to the view that the opt-in procedure is nothing more 
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than a permissive joinder device. This cannot be correct. As mentioned, there are 
circumstances where the class members are identifiable but where joinder is nonetheless 
cumbersome and unfeasible.246 A preferable approach is accordingly one in terms of 
which our courts are afforded a discretion to choose, with regard to the circumstances of 
each case, whether to require opt-in, opt-out or no-notice at all.247  
 
2 4 Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
 
Before concluding, it may be worthwhile to briefly comment on Nkala v Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Limited248 (―Nkala‖), where the South-Gauteng division of the High Court 
of South Africa dealt with the issue of the appropriateness of class actions as a 
certification-factor. In Nkala, Mojapelo DJP held as follows in this regard: 
 
―[W]e hold that once it has been established that there are sufficient common issues whose 
determination would advance the cases of all individual mineworkers, then there is no need for 
the court to engage in the exercise of examining whether these common issues outweigh the 
non-common ones. In such a case it has to be in the interests of justice that a class action be 
certified. Articulated differently, once the determination on whether there are sufficient common 
issues to warrant a class action is made, the question of the most appropriate way to proceed 
would almost certainly fall away.‖249 
  
Mojapelo DJP appears to have largely based the certification decision on the likelihood 
that determining the common issues would advance the individual mineworkers‘ cases.250  
He found that, following upon receipt of the common evidence, the determination of the 
common issues would move the litigation forward.251 If there are sufficient common issues 
to warrant certification, then it would be in the interests of justice that the court certifies a 
class action.252  
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He further stated that Wallis JA in Children’s Resource Centre Trust did not find that the 
requirement that a class action must be the appropriate means of determining the claims 
of class members is one that must be satisfied before certification succeeds. To reach this 
conclusion, Mojapelo DJP referred to Wallis JA‘s comment that there is an overlap 
between the certification requirements and that ―[t]he fact that there are issues common to 
a number of potential claimants may dictate that a class action is the most appropriate 
manner in which to proceed, but that is not necessarily the case‖.253 Mojapelo DJP 
correctly held that the Supreme Court of Appeal ―left it at that‖ and held that a court 
therefore does not need to inquire into the appropriateness of class proceedings before 
deciding whether to certify the class action.254   
 
Wallis JA clearly listed as a separate certification requirement ―whether given the 
composition of the class and the nature of the proposed action a class action is the most 
appropriate means of determining the claims of class members‖.255 He held that ―[w]ithout 
excluding the possibility of there being other issues that require consideration, it suffices 
for our purposes to say that a court faced with an application for certification of a class 
action must consider the [certification] factors…and be satisfied that they are present 
before granting certification‖.256 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not suggest 
that a court would only need to consider some of the factors; rather, the court expressly 
found that a class action could not be certified unless each of these factors is present.   
 
Further, in Mukaddam CC, the court found that the requirements listed by Wallis JA ―must 
serve as factors to be taken into account in determining where the interests of justice lie in 
a particular case…The absence of one or another requirement must not oblige a court to 
refuse certification where the interests of justice demand otherwise‖.257 It is submitted that 
the finding by the Constitutional Court should not be construed to mean that a court does 
not need to consider all the certification factors listed by Wallis JA before deciding whether 
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to certify a class action. Rather, it should be interpreted to mean that, after having inquired 
into the presence of each of the factors listed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Children’s Resource Centre Trust, a court may decide to certify a class action even if one 
of the factors is absent or has not been complied with. In other words, a court should at 
least inquire into the appropriateness of class proceedings in the circumstances. Such an 
approach is reinforced by Makgoba J‘s finding in Pretorius v Transnet Second Defined 
Benefit Fund258 that ―the Constitutional Court endorsed the approach set out by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and in addition thereto the Constitutional Court laid down the 
principle applicable for certification, to wit, the interests-of-justice principle‖.259 Therefore, 
considering all the certification-factors, a court should consider whether it would be in the 
interests of justice to certify the class action. However, Mojapelo DJP failed to do so. 
 
By not considering the appropriateness of class proceedings, a court may fail to take into 
account factors that may operate against the certification of a class action, notwithstanding 
the existence of common issues that, if determined, would advance class members‘ 
claims. In this regard, it is unclear what, according to Mojapelo DJP, the court‘s approach 
would be in circumstances where there are common issues the determination of which 
would advance class members‘ claims, but certification of the class action would give rise 
to manageability concerns. For example, what about those cases where a court is of the 
view that it would be problematic to notify a significant percentage of the class, or where 
class members would have to prove causation and damages on an individualised basis? 
In other words, what about the practical difficulties that may result in class proceedings 
being inappropriate for a particular suit?260 It cannot be that such considerations should be 
discarded solely because there are common issues and the determination of these issues 
would advance class members‘ claims. With respect, it would be untenable for our courts 
to overlook the (in)appropriateness of class proceedings in such circumstances.  
 
Consider also, for example, the collapse of a bridge where five individuals, all of whom 
reside in the same area, are injured. These individuals would have common issues that, if 
determined, would advance their claims. According to Mojapelo DJP, a class action would 
be certified and no further questions would need to be asked as to the appropriateness of 
class proceedings. However, it is likely that, in such circumstances, joinder would be 
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possible and would not needlessly complicate the litigation of the case. The class is small, 
the individual claimants are likely to litigate individually if a class action is not certified and 
the class members are not geographically dispersed. Essentially, joinder of parties in 
terms of the court rules would be practical and appropriate. Conversely, class proceedings 
would be inappropriate. However, the consequence of the above-mentioned approach of 
Mojapelo DJP is effectively to render superfluous the joinder provisions and to require 
certification of the class action in such circumstances. It does not take account of 
alternative, feasible, methods of adjudication, compared to class proceedings, even 
though such alternatives may also be in the interests of justice. Mojapelo DJP‘s approach 
is also at odds with the above-mentioned approaches of the selected foreign jurisdictions, 
especially Ontario and the United States. Both jurisdictions require some degree of 
investigation into the suitability of class proceedings in addition to the existence of 
common issues of fact or law.261 
 
It is, with respect, difficult to comprehend how the court in Nkala could conclude that the 
appropriateness of a class action did not have to be considered before deciding whether to 
certify the proceedings. It is also difficult to conceive of circumstances where a class action 
should be utilised notwithstanding the existence of more appropriate alternatives. In other 
words, if there is another device available that is more appropriate than a class action in 
the circumstances, why would such a device not be utilised at the expense of class 
proceedings? The question is relevant even where determination of the common issues 
may advance class members‘ claims. It is accordingly not possible to agree with the 
finding by Mojapelo DJP that the existence of common issues that, if determined, would 
advance class members‘ claims, means that a court would not have to consider the 
appropriateness of class proceedings, including alternatives thereto.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, Mojapelo DJP nevertheless proceeds to consider the issue of 
―what the most appropriate way to receive the common evidence and to resolve the 
common issues‖262 is, and whether there are viable alternatives to class proceedings in the 
circumstances.263 He states that the respondents failed to provide an alternative to class 
proceedings that ―would be best suited for the receipt of a substantial amount of very 
focussed evidence of a common nature and the determination of common legal 
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issues…‖264 Further, the respondents ―do not disown the possibility that they would bring 
evidence common to all the claims of the mineworkers whether in a class action or in 
numerous individual actions‖.265 In Nkala, Mojapelo DJP accordingly held as follows 
regarding the appropriateness of class proceedings:  
 
―[T]he institution of hundreds of thousands of separate individual hearings is not more 
appropriate than the proposed class action to resolve the disputes between the mineworkers 
and the mining companies. This is so even if the proposed class action only resolves some of 
the disputes between them. Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed class action is the most 
appropriate way for this matter to proceed.‖266 
 
Mojapelo DJP appears to conflate the certification requirement that there must be common 
issues of fact or law and that a class action should be found to be the appropriate method 
to adjudicate class members‘ claims. Wallis JA, in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, held 
that for the purpose of certification, it would not have to be shown that the class action 
would dispose of every aspect of the claim. According to Wallis JA, the question is whether 
―there are common issues that can be determined that will dispose of all or a significant 
part of the claims by the members of the class or sub-class‖.267 This appears to be the 
criteria that Mojapelo DJP utilised in Nkala to decide on the appropriateness of class 
proceedings. However, as discussed above, the appropriateness inquiry constitutes a 
separate certification requirement that entails taking into account other relevant factors, 
such as the existence of appropriate alternative methods of adjudication and the objectives 
and manageability of class proceedings. It may therefore be that, despite the existence of 
common issues, class proceedings may be otherwise inappropriate. Hence the suggestion 
by Wallis JA that ―[t]he fact that there are issues common to a number of potential 
claimants may dictate that a class action is the most appropriate manner in which to 
proceed, but that is not necessarily the case‖.268  
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The above-mentioned conflation by Mojapelo DJP of Wallis JA‘s certification requirements 
may also explain why, rather unconnectedly, a majority of the factors that are relevant to 
determining the appropriateness of class proceedings compared to other methods of 
adjudication are scattered throughout his judgment. For example, he does consider the 
class action objectives of access to justice269 and judicial economy270 and the 
manageability of class proceedings.271 Ultimately, Mojapelo DJP may have reached the 
correct conclusion by certifying the class action. However, the formula that he used to 
reach this conclusion is, for the above reasons, questionable to say the least. His 
approach does not lend itself to creating legal certainty and judicial uniformity insofar as 
the above issues are concerned. It is accordingly suggested that, to provide certainty  and 
clarity in this regard, it is necessary for our legislature, supplemented by a developing body 
of case law, to regulate class actions by inter alia separating and unpacking the different 
certification requirements, including the appropriateness-requirement along the terms 
proposed above. 
 
2 5 Suggested approach to assessing the appropriateness of a class action and 
determining when to use an opt-in class action  
 
A central theme in this chapter has been the importance of access to justice and how it 
could serve as the foundation for the incorporation of the class action into South African 
law. It is essentially against this background that a court should decide on the 
appropriateness of class proceedings as a means of adjudicating the claims of class 
members.  
 
Our courts‘ assessment should be aimed at establishing whether certification of a class 
action is necessary to achieve access to justice. This includes giving consideration to 
whether any possible barriers exist and whether certification is necessary to overcome 
such barriers. Further, the appropriateness inquiry entails determining whether a class 
action is necessary to achieve judicial economy and behaviour modification. Finally, the 
court should consider any other relevant factor that may assist it in determining whether 
class proceedings are otherwise appropriate. 
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In the light of these considerations it is suggested that, when a court is required to 
determine whether a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating class 
members‘ claims, the court should adopt the following test. The test takes account of the 
experiences of foreign jurisdictions and the South African class action experience to date, 
and it requires a court to balance various considerations. The court should: 
 
1. determine whether certification of a class action is necessary to achieve access to 
justice. This entails considering whether there are any potential barriers to such access, 
the existence of which could be effectively addressed by certification of a class action. 
The following factors may be considered in this regard: 
1.1. the geographical dispersion of class members;  
1.2. the inability of class members to engage in individualised litigation; and 
1.3. the difficulties associated with litigation through joinder; 
2. determine whether a class action is necessary to achieve the judicial economy arising 
from the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions; 
3. determine whether a class action is necessary to achieve behaviour modification; and 
4. take all the surrounding circumstances into account and consider any other relevant 
factor that may assist it in determining whether a class action is otherwise appropriate, 
including:  
4.1. the manageability of the class action;  
4.2. the importance of the common issues in relation to the claims as a whole; and 
4.3. whether the class members‘ claims are large enough to warrant being pursued 
separately. 
 
The manageability of the class action under 4.1 above requires taking into account inter 
alia the identifiability of class members, the size of the class and the extent of the non-
common issues that would require individualised adjudication. Moreover, determining 
whether it is ‗otherwise appropriate‘ to certify a class action in terms of 4 above entails 
taking all circumstances surrounding the case into account.272 In other words, the 
manageability of the class action under 4.1 should not be the only or even dominant 
consideration taken into account in assessing the appropriateness of class proceedings, 
as opposed to other mechanisms such as joinder, as a means of adjudicating the claims of 
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class members. Rather, a holistic, common sense and pragmatic approach needs to be 
adopted where the assessment is made, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case. It is further recommended that, to promote legal certainty, consistency and uniformity 
in respect of the approaches of our superior courts, legislation should be adopted to 
regulate our courts‘ assessment of class proceedings‘ appropriateness as set out above  
 
The above-mentioned observations do not detract from the fact that the identifiability of 
class members is important as it essentially informs the court‘s decision regarding how 
notification to potential class members should take place, to decide who forms part of the 
class and may accordingly institute individual actions, and to establish who will be bound 
by the court‘s order.273 This is significant in that, in class proceedings, once a final 
judgment or settlement is reached, the claims of members of the class are res judicata. 
Without a proper class definition, a large number of people may be deprived of their right 
to seek legal relief for a violation of their rights without having been provided with a fair 
opportunity to exercise a real choice as to whether to associate themselves with the class 
action. This would not only undermine their right of access to justice, but would be contrary 
to the best traditions of public interest litigation which is to give poor people a meaningful 
voice in litigation that affects them.274  
 
The choice between opt-in and opt-out procedures is equally important insofar as the 
exercise of the choice may similarly have the effect of excluding a large number of people 
from the class proceedings. Specifically in the context of the opt-in procedure where 
claimants are required to actively, rather than passively, join the class proceedings, it is 
likely that the class would be smaller in size compared to where the opt-out procedure is 
utilised, potentially infringing upon the right of access to justice of the excluded class 
members.  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no choice to be made between opt-
in and opt-out class actions – it may be that the circumstances of the case are such that 
the opt-in procedure is indeed preferable to the opt-out procedure. As was the case in 
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Linkside, this may occur where the court is confronted with a relatively small group275 of 
individual claimants each of whom is identifiable and especially where each claimant has a 
substantial individual claim. In this regard, the court should assess whether the size of the 
claimants‘ individual claims is such that it is unlikely that they would, in the absence of 
class proceedings, litigate independently. If it is likely that they would litigate 
independently, then those claimants should be given an opportunity to opt into the 
proceedings.  
 
If, in such a case, the opt-out procedure, rather than the opt-in procedure, is utilised, it may 
be prejudicial to individuals who have no knowledge of the class proceedings but who are 
bound by its outcome.276 For if the opt-in procedure is followed, and an individual is not 
given notice, then the class action judgment would not be binding upon that individual and 
he or she would be at liberty to pursue individualised litigation. The primary advantage of 
providing the court with judicial discretion to choose between requiring opt-in, opt-out and 
no-notice orders, is that it enables the court to decide, with reference to the circumstances 
of the particular case, which procedure would be most suited to the overall disposition of 
the case.277 
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CHAPTER THREE: NOTICE OF CLASS ACTIONS 
 
3 1 Introduction  
 
Notice to class members in class action proceedings is important in various respects. Most 
significantly, it informs class members of the class action so that they are in a position to 
choose to participate in the class action. Notification at a later stage, after the trial has 
commenced, may also be required, for example, as the court may direct.1 The issue of 
notice is also important in the light of the audi alteram partem principle and the doctrine of 
res judicata. Apart from being an important issue, notice is also very complicated, 
especially in circumstances where the class is large, and it comprises individuals who are 
poor, illiterate and often without access to the resources that are required to bring the 
action to their attention. The method employed in giving notice and the accompanying 
costs could raise complex issues that may even threaten the continuation of a class 
action.2   
 
As mentioned in chapter two, the South African Law Commission (―SALC‖) recommended 
that courts should have a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders.3 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre 
Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae)4 (―Children’s 
Resource Centre Trust”) provided guidelines regarding the certification process but, as the 
court refused to grant leave to the applicants to proceed with a class action, the court did 
not deal with other complex issues, such as notice to absent class members. Notice to 
class members was not discussed separately as a class action certification requirement. In 
the absence of statutory or court guidance regarding notice in class actions, it is unclear 
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whether and in what circumstances notice to class members is required, what the form of 
the notice should be and what its nature, scope, ambit and contents should entail.5 
 
This chapter considers the issue of notice of the class action to class members in the 
context of the opt-out class action, on the one hand, and the opt-in class action, on the 
other. In respect of each class action regime, consideration is given to whether notice of 
the class action is required and, if so, whether individual notice to each class member is 
required, or whether some form of general notice would suffice. In the context of the opt-
out class action, the chapter also considers whether class members would be prejudiced 
if, as a result of not having been provided with (proper) notice, they fail to opt out of the 
class action. The chapter concludes by considering the role of the court in protecting the 
interests of absent class members.  
 
3 2 Notice in the context of the opt-out class action regime 
 
3 2 1 Notice affording an opportunity to opt out of the class action generally   
required 
 
The point of departure to determine whether notice of the class action and of class members‘ 
right to opt out thereof is required, is section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
African, 1996 (―Constitution‖). Section 34 guarantees the right of access to courts by providing 
that ―[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of 
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum‖.  
 
In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd6 (―Mukaddam CC‖), the Constitutional Court 
explained the importance of the right of access to courts:  
 
―Access to courts is fundamentally important to our democratic order. It is not only a 
cornerstone of the democratic architecture but also a vehicle through which the protection of the 
Constitution itself may be achieved. It also facilitates an orderly resolution of disputes so as to 
do justice between individuals and between private parties and the state. Our courts are 
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mandated to review the exercise of any power by State functionaries, from the lowest to the 
highest ranking officials.‖7 
 
In De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council8 (―De 
Beer‖), the Constitutional Court considered whether a municipal rate collection procedure 
permitted in the Greater Durban Metropolitan Area by section 105 of the Durban Extended 
Powers Consolidated Ordinance No. 18 of 1976 (Natal), infringed the fair hearing 
requirement of section 34, because its provisions concerning notice of the hearing to 
affected people were allegedly deficient. The court considered the scope of the fair hearing 
component of section 349 and held as follows: 
 
―This section 34 fair hearing right affirms the rule of law which is a founding value of our 
Constitution. The right to a fair hearing before a court lies at the heart of the rule of law. A fair 
hearing before a court as a prerequisite to an order being made against anyone is fundamental 
to a just and credible legal order. Courts in our country are obliged to ensure that the 
proceedings before them are always fair. Since procedures that would render the hearing unfair 
are inconsistent with the Constitution courts must interpret legislation and rules of court, where it 
is reasonably possible to do so, in a way that would render the proceedings fair. It is a crucial 
aspect of the rule of law that court orders should not be made without affording the other side a 
reasonable opportunity to state their case.  That reasonable opportunity can usually only be 
given by ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to bring the hearing to the attention of the 
person affected. Rules of courts make provision for this.  They are not, however, an exclusive 
standard of reasonableness.  There is no reason why legislation should not provide for other 
reasonable ways of giving notice to an affected party.  If it does, it meets the notice 
requirements of section 34.‖10 (own emphasis). 
 
It is trite that fairness in civil proceedings includes the principle of audi alteram partem – as 
is evidenced by the above quoted passage in De Beer – the principle that persons affected 
by a decision should be given a fair hearing by the decision-maker prior to the making of 
the decision.11 In the context of the opt-out class action regime, unless a class member 
has given notice to opt out, the judgment will have a res judicata effect on all the class 
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members. In other words, where the class member does not opt-out of the class action, 
the class action judgment will be binding upon him or her. This means that the class 
member will not be able to litigate independently from the class action; he or she would be 
deprived of the opportunity to seek independent judicial enforcement of his or her claim. 
According to the SALC, ―[i]n these circumstances it is important to ensure that the 
claimants have knowledge of the action and the way in which it is being prosecuted if they 
are to be bound by it‖.12 And, in the explanatory notes to the Draft Bill, it further states that 
―[i]t is very important that the members or potential members of the class be informed and 
be kept informed of all aspects related to the class action as the judgment in a class action 
is binding (res judicata) on them‖.13      
 
Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude that the general point of departure in the context of 
the opt-out class action regime should be that, in accordance with the principle of audi 
alteram partem and the doctrine of res judicata, class members should receive notice of 
the proceedings in terms of which they are inter alia informed of their opt-out right. 
 
3 2 2 Circumstances where notice to opt-out is not required 
  
In recommending that our courts should have a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no 
notice orders,14 the SALC expressly recognised that circumstances may arise where a 
court can order that no notice of the opt-out class action be given to class members. 
Therefore, although the general rule is that class members should receive notice of the 
class action, circumstances may arise in the context of an opt-out class action where no 
notice may be required by the court.  This appears to be contrary to what has been stated 
above regarding the reasons for generally requiring that individual notice of opt-out class 
actions be given to class members. The effect of the court not requiring that notice of the 
opt-out class action be given to the class members is that they will be bound by a 
judgment given in an action of which they are likely to have no knowledge at all.15  
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The Ontario Commission stated that it is not necessarily problematic that class members 
would be bound by a judgment given in an action of which they are likely to have no 
knowledge at all. The circumstances where it would not be problematic to order that no 
notice be given to class members include: (i) cases in which individual class members 
would be affected by the judgment notwithstanding withdrawal; (ii) cases in which the right 
to opt out would be unimportant because the claims were not sufficiently large to justify the 
expense of independent litigation; (iii) where the court is of the view that the individual 
interests are outweighed by the desirability of securing a broad binding effect for the 
judgment; or, (iv) where the individual interests are outweighed by the public interest in 
achieving judicial economy and consistency of judgments.16 These circumstances warrant 
more detailed consideration. 
 
Firstly, according to the Ontario Commission, there may be instances in which individual 
class members would be affected by the class action judgment notwithstanding their 
withdrawal from the class action. The Ontario Commission referred with approval to rule 
23 of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rules‖) insofar as it does 
not extend an opt-out right to class members in class actions where injunctive or 
declaratory relief is sought. This is because the class members may be affected by the 
judgment regardless of whether they opt out of the class action. Where injunctive relief is 
sought, class members would clearly be affected by the court order. It may also be, 
depending on the nature of the declaratory relief sought, that the class members would be 
affected by the court order even though some of them have opted out of the class action. 
The Ontario Commission referred to the following example in this regard: where a court 
makes an order declaring a legislative provision ultra vires – in such circumstances, a 
class member would be affected by the court order regardless of whether the member has 
opted out of the class action. In such circumstances, therefore, no notice to opt out of the 
class action would have to be given to class members.17 The opt-out right would be 
illusory.  
 
Secondly, according to the Ontario Commission, no notice to opt out of the class action 
would have to be given to class members where the right to opt out would be unimportant 
because the claims are not sufficiently large to justify the expense of independent 
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(1982) 486-487. 
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litigation. In this regard, the Ontario Commission stated that ―[w]hen claims of class 
members are not individually recoverable, by definition, it would not be economically 
feasible for them to sue the defendant independently‖.18 The institution of an individual 
action in such circumstances is, according to the Ontario Commission, only theoretical and 
the right to opt out amounts to nothing more than a ―gratuitous gesture‖.19 The amounts of 
the class members‘ individual claims are accordingly relevant to determine whether notice 
of the class action would have to be given to class members.20 
 
Thirdly, the Ontario Commission stated that, where the court is of the view that the 
individuals‘ interests in opting out of the class action are outweighed by the desirability of 
securing a broad binding effect for the judgment, no notice of the class action would have 
to be given to class members. In addition, where the individuals‘ interests are outweighed 
by the public interest in achieving judicial economy and consistency of judgments, the 
Ontario Commission was of the view that no notice of the class action would have to be 
given to the class members.21 The Ontario Commission did not provide examples of 
circumstances where the individuals‘ interests in opting out of the class action are 
outweighed by the desirability of securing a broad binding effect for the judgment or where 
the individuals‘ interests are outweighed by the public interest in achieving judicial 
economy and consistency of judgments. 
 
Section 20(2) of the Draft Bill proposed by the Ontario Commission essentially lists the 
above circumstances as factors that should be considered by a court in deciding whether 
class members should be given notice to opt out of the class action. These factors 
therefore effectively constitute the criteria that a court must take into account to make the 
above-mentioned determination. The Ontario Class Proceedings Act of 1992 (―Ontario 
Act‖), enacted subsequent to the report issued by the Ontario Commission, requires that 
notice of certification of a class action be given by the representative party to the class 
members but that the court may dispense with notice if, having regard to certain factors 
listed in section 17 the Ontario Act, the court considers it appropriate to do so. These 
factors are: 
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 486. 
19
 486. 
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 486. 
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 487-488. 
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1. The cost of giving notice; 
2. The nature of the relief sought;  
3. The size of the individual claims of the class members; 
4. The number of class members; 
5. The places of residence of class members; and 
6. Any other relevant matter.22  
 
The Ontario Act accordingly does not expressly legislate specific circumstances where no 
notice to opt out of the class action should be given. However, the factors listed in section 
17 above are clearly indicative and appear to have taken account of some of the 
circumstances mentioned by the Ontario Commission in its report where it is envisaged 
that no notice would be required.  
 
In its Working Paper, although the SALC favoured the approach of the Ontario 
Commission, it recommended that the court‘s discretion be ―extended by providing a 
choice between an opt-in notice (in limited circumstances), an opt-out notice, and no 
notice at all‖. It recommended that the certifying court should provide directions regarding 
the giving of notice, including whether notice of the action should be given to the class 
members and, if so, the form of the notice, whether it should afford a right to opt in or to 
opt out, and how it should be communicated to the class.23 It further recommended that, 
when deciding whether notice should be given to the class members and, if so, what the 
appropriate directions would be, the court should take into account the following factors:  
 
1. The extent to which class members may be prejudiced by being bound by a judgment 
given in an action which may not have come to their attention; 
2. The size of the class; 
3. The probable general level of education and understanding of class members; 
4. The possibility of identifying members of the class; 
5. The type of relief claimed; 
6. Where the claim is for monetary relief, the size of each class member's claim; 
7. The likelihood of class members enforcing their claims individually; and 
8. Any other relevant factor.24 
                                                          
22
 Section 17(3). 
23
 Para 6.34. 
24
 Para 6.35. 
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It is apparent from the Working Paper that the SALC envisaged that circumstances may 
exist where no notice of the class action may be required. The SALC proposed that the 
above-mentioned factors be taken into consideration to assist courts in making this 
determination. In its subsequent Report, the SALC recommended, as part of the Draft Bill, 
the adoption of the following clause that deals with notice in class actions:  
 
―Notice in class actions 
8. (1) The court which certifies an action as a class action may give directions to the 
representative with regard to - 
(a) the giving of notice of the action to the members or potential members of the class 
concerned; 
(b) the form which such notice should take; 
(c) the way in which such notice is to be communicated to the members of the class. 
(2) In considering the question whether notice should be given to the members of 
a class and, if so, what directions are appropriate in respect thereof, the court shall take into 
account - 
(a) the extent to which the members of the class might be prejudiced by being bound by a 
judgment given in an action which may not have come to their attention; 
(b) the potential size of the class; 
(c) the general level of education and development of the members of the class; 
(d) the ease with which members of the class can be identified; 
(e) the type of relief claimed; 
(f) where monetary relief is claimed, the amount of the claim of each member of the class; 
(g) the difficulties likely to be encountered by members of the class in enforcing their 
actions individually; 
(h) any other relevant factor. 
(3) The court may - 
(a) require from those members of the class who do not wish to be bound by the judgment 
written notice of their exclusion as members of the class; 
(b) require from those members of the class who wish to be bound by the judgment 
written notice of their inclusion as members of the class; or 
(c) order that no notice to members of the class is necessary.‖25 
 
The SALC therefore clearly favours a discretionary approach in terms of which a court can 
decide whether notice of a class action to class members is required. According to the 
SALC, it is likely that notice would be required where class members‘ claims are monetary 
                                                          
25
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report 94. 
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in nature; however, it would not necessarily be required for all such claims. For example, 
where the individual claims are small and the class is numerous, the court may decide that 
notice of the class action to the class members is unnecessary.26   
 
The factors to be considered in terms of section 8(2) of the Draft Bill in determining inter 
alia whether notice of the class action would have to be given to class members are 
substantially similar to the factors mentioned in the Working Paper, with minor variations. 
One such variation is the recommendation in the Working Paper that a court should 
consider the likelihood of class members enforcing their claims individually, compared to 
the recommendation in the Report that a court should consider the difficulties likely to be 
encountered by class members in enforcing their actions individually. The Report‘s 
recommendation clearly takes the recommendation in the Working Paper even further.  
The SALC is not simply concerned with the likelihood of claims being enforced individually; 
rather, the SALC proposes that the primary consideration in this regard should be the 
difficulties that a class member would encounter if he or she pursues it individually.  
 
This variation is insignificant insofar as the Report‘s consideration presupposes a 
willingness amongst class members to enforce their claims individually – the court is 
expected to go further than simply considering the likelihood of individual litigation by 
considering whether it would be practically feasible. Where, for example, there would be 
various practical difficulties associated with independent enforcement of class members‘ 
claims, a court may exercise its discretion to order that no notice of the class action would 
have to be given as individual enforcement may be unfeasible and therefore unlikely.  
There are, however, other factors that a court should take into account in making this 
determination as mentioned above – this factor does not operate in isolation. The 
proposed subsection 2(h) enables a court to take into consideration any other factor that 
may be relevant to determine whether notice of the action should be given to class 
members. This would include factors not listed in subsection (2). 
 
The factors that are listed in section 17(3) of the Ontario Act are also substantially similar 
to those proposed by the SALC in section 8(2). Both list class size, the nature of the relief 
sought and the size of the individual class members‘ claims. The Ontario Act refers to the 
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 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 
para 5.18. 
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cost of giving notice and the places of residence of class members, whereas section 8(2) 
fails to do so. The SALC refers to the possible prejudice class members would suffer as a 
result of being bound by a judgment that has not come to their attention; class members‘ 
general level of education and development; whether class members are easily 
identifiable; and the difficulties likely to be encountered by members of the class in 
enforcing their actions individually – these factors are not referred to in the Ontario Act. 
The aforementioned dissimilarity is, however, immaterial as section 17(3) of the Ontario 
Act and the proposed section 8(2) of the Draft Bill make provision for consideration of any 
other relevant factors.  
 
It is extremely difficult to categorise and legislate various situations where notice of a class 
action and of class members‘ right to opt out thereof should not be required. This is 
because the factors may, at the same time, operate both in favour of and against the 
giving of notice. For example, one cannot simply say that, where the potential size of the 
class is very large,27 notice would not be required.28 It may be that, notwithstanding the 
size of the class, the class members‘ individual claims are sufficiently large so as to justify 
the expense of independent litigation.29 In such circumstances, in exercising its judicial 
discretion, the court may decide to direct that notice of the class action and of class 
members‘ right to opt out thereof should be given to class members.  
 
However, as the factors do serve to indicate circumstances where it may be possible that 
no notice would need to be given, the court should consider them in exercising its 
discretion. For example, if the class members would not be prejudiced by being bound to a 
judgment given in the class action;30 or where the class is very large,31 the monetary relief 
claimed by each individual class member is small, and the class members cannot be 
easily identified,32 the court may order that notice of the class action and of the class 
members‘ right to opt out is not required. There is also clearly an overlap between the 
above-mentioned factors – for example, the difficulties likely to be encountered by class 
                                                          
27
 Section 8(2)(b).  
28
 Because it may, for example, be too expensive. 
29
 Section 8(2)(f). 
30
 Section 8(2)(a). See the discussion under 3 2 4 below regarding possible prejudice to be suffered by class 
members who fail to opt out of the class action as a result of (improper) notice.   
31
 Section 8(2)(b). 
32
 Section 8(2)(f).  
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members in enforcing their actions individually33 may be attributable to the general level of 
education and development of the members of the class.34 A consideration of the relevant 
circumstances of the class action case, including factors not expressly referred to in the 
proposed section 8(2), such as the costs associated with the giving of notice, is 
accordingly required by the court in exercising its discretion. 
 
3 2 3 General or individual notice to opt-out? 
 
3 2 3 1 Introduction 
 
It has been concluded above that the point of departure for issuing notice of an opt-out 
class action to class members should be that notice of the members‘ right to opt out 
should be given. This position should only be departed from in a limited number of 
circumstances. The reason for this approach is premised upon the principle of audi 
alteram partem and the doctrine of res judicata. Class members should be notified of the 
class action and of their right to opt out. This is because the class members have a right 
not be bound by a court order without having been afforded an opportunity to state their 
cases.  
 
The question now arises how notice should be effected. As the class action judgment 
would have a binding (res judicata) effect on all members who have failed to opt out of the 
class, it stands to reason that individual notice of the class action should be required as a 
first port of call. This would ensure that the class members are aware of the class action 
and that they could choose whether they want to form a part of the action or whether they 
want to opt-out thereof.  
 
However, does the point of departure that individual notice of an opt-out class action 
should be given to class members constitute an absolute requirement? Stated differently, 
is it permissible for a court to require general notice where the likelihood exists that certain 
class members may not become aware of the notice and therefore fail to opt out of the 
class action? The risk in giving general, as opposed to individual, notice is obvious – class 
members who did not receive notice and who, consequently, failed to opt out would be 
                                                          
33
 Section 8(2)(g). 
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bound by the court decision and would be precluded from enforcing their claims 
individually outside the scope of the class action.  
 
3 2 3 2 Approaches of foreign jurisdictions  
 
In order to determine whether the notion that individual notice of an opt-out class action 
should be given to class members constitutes an absolute requirement, it may be 
instructive to consider the approaches of foreign jurisdictions in this regard. These 
approaches will then be compared to the South African position insofar as individualised 
notice vis-á-vis general notice is concerned.  A consideration of the approaches of these 
foreign jurisdictions will also assist in determining, in the absence of individualised notice, 
what steps would have to be taken to ensure that class members are aware of the class 
action and of their right to opt out.  
 
Unlike the categories of class actions contained in rules 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal 
Rules, which generally are not subject to notice of certification or a right to opt out,35 class 
actions certified under rule 23(b)(3) are subject to specific notice and opt-out 
requirements.36 Rule 23(b)(3) therefore affords due process protections through the 
requirement of notice and the opportunity to opt out of the class action.37 Rule 23(c)(2) of 
the Federal Rules specifically provides that the ―court must direct to class members the 
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort‖.38 Any form of notice deemed 
                                                          
35
 The only notice expressly required by rule 23 for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes is notice of a proposed 
settlement pursuant to rule 23(e).  
36
 R H Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 4 ed (2012) 193. 
37
 L S Mullenix ―Re-Interpreting American Class Action Procedure: The United States Supreme Court 
Speaks‖ (2000) 5 ZZP Int 337 342-343. Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are known as ‗mandatory‘ classes 
because a judgment is binding on all class members – no class member may opt out and rule 23 does not 
require notice in such actions. The rationale for the absence of these due process protections for rule 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes is based on the members having the same or similar interests and are not 
pursuing individual damage claims. In the latter circumstances, some class members may have a high 
interest in opting-out of the class action to pursue individual monetary recovery. 
38
 According to P G Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 33, the ―best notice practicable‖ requirement can be 
satisfied by a variety of methods, although notice by regular first-class US mail has been recognised as a 
preferred method when the mail is reasonably likely to be delivered to the class members.   
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necessary by the certifying judge must conform to the requirements of rule 23(c)(2)(B) 
which requires that the notice informs class members of the nature of the action, the 
definition of the class, the claims alleged and the class member‘s right to appear in or to 
opt out of the action. The notice must also state, in plain language, the binding effect of the 
class action judgment.    
 
In Mullane v Cent Hanover Bank & Trust Co39 (―Mullane‖) it was held that due process 
requires that notice must be ―reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections‖.40 According to Mullane, due process does not mandate individual notice 
in all situations; the ―practicalities and peculiarities‖ can be weighed in determining what 
constitutes adequate notice.41 However, in Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin42 (―Eisen‖) the 
United States Supreme Court held that, because the names and addresses of the absent 
class members were easily ascertainable, they had to be given individual notice.43 
Accordingly, individual notices had to be sent to all class members who could be identified 
with reasonable effort. The costs of the notices had to be borne by the representative 
plaintiff(s), although this requirement would effectively prevent the class action from 
proceeding.44 Eisen accordingly established a stricter standard for notice than what was 
                                                          
39
 339 US 306, 315 (1950). 
40
 314.  
41
 314-315. 
42
 417 US 156 (1974). 
43
 175. The district court found that, out of a prospective class of six million individuals and institutions, about 
2,250,000 could be identified by name and address. However, the court found that the cost of mailing notices 
to all of these individuals and institutions would be prohibitive; it therefore sanctioned a combination of 
individual notices and publication of notice in the Wall Street Journal and other newspapers. The court held 
that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in the case and therefore most of the notice costs had to be borne by 
the defendants. 
44
 The Supreme Court held that the combination of individual and public notice did not satisfy rule 23(2)(b)‘s 
requirements and that there was no basis in law for the district court‘s preliminary decision on the merits and 
imposing costs on the defendant. See, however, for example, In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability 
Litigation 818 F2d 145, 167-168, 175 (2
nd
 Cir 1987) where it was held that notice through announcements in 
national publications and on radio and television were acceptable where members of the class could not be 
located through reasonable means.  
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previously required to ensure due process.45 The court imposed such an onerous notice 
requirement that it effectively denied the class members access to justice. 
 
Requiring that individual notice be given to each class member is probably in accordance 
with a literal interpretation of rule 23(c)(2). However, it has been argued that it could not 
have been the intention of the drafters of the rule to set up such an impractical 
requirement; otherwise, the costs associated with individual notice could potentially result 
in the termination of the class action.46 This is exactly what happened in Eisen where two 
and a quarter million members of the class of about six million small investors on the New 
York stock exchange could be identified through reasonable effort. Although the costs of 
individual notice would have amounted to $225 000, the Supreme Court insisted upon 
such notice to all these members. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the total 
amount, which effectively ended the class action. The stringent notice provisions often 
associated with opt-out class actions has accordingly caused serious problems.47   
 
It has been submitted that rule 23 cannot be regarded as a clear command of absolute 
individual notice to all identifiable class members regardless of other circumstances. Such 
a requirement seems ―inconsistent with the spirit of Rule 23‖.48 The court in Eisen 
recognised that Mullane permitted notice by publication, but concluded that publication 
was not sufficient when names and addresses are known.49 Therefore, although Eisen 
required individual notice to identifiable class members, notice by publication, including via 
the Internet, appears to be permissible when the class is so large that its members cannot 
                                                          
45
 See also Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts 472 US 797 (1985) where it was held that, in the context of rule 
23(b)(3), due process dictates that an absent plaintiff should be provided with an opportunity to opt out of the 
class action.  
46
 W de Vos ―Reflections on the Introduction of a Class Action in South Africa‖ (1996) 4 TSAR 639 647. 
47
 J B Weinstein Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and 
Other Multiparty Devices (1995) 136. In ―Class Actions--Notice and Manageability (Eisen v Carlisle & 
Jacquelin)‖ (2012) 48 St John's Law Review 355 360, it was stated that ―[a] literal reading of rule 23 supports 
this holding. However…such a reading makes rule 23 more stringent than is constitutionally mandated. In 
view of the emasculating effects of this strict construction, a holding that rule 23 notice requirements are 
equivalent to the constitutional mandates may have been more efficacious‖. 
48
 St John's Law Review (2012) 361. 
49
 361. 
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be identified.50 A case in point is In Re “Agent Orange” Products Liability Litigation51 where 
it was held that notice through announcements in national publications and on radio and 
television was acceptable where members of the class could not be located through 
reasonable means.52 
 
The situation in Ontario differs from that in the United States. Whereas Federal Rule 23 
favours individual notice, the Ontario Act allows notice by any means that the court 
considers appropriate and it specifically authorises notice by publication. Section 17 
describes various forms of notice that may be approved by the court as well as the factors 
the court should consider when determining the form and extent of notice. Section 5(1)(e) 
of the Ontario Act provides that the plaintiff must produce a ‗workable plan‘ for 
disseminating notice to class members.  
 
For the reasons below, it is proposed that the approach adopted in South Africa should be 
more closely aligned to the approach of Ontario where the court exercises a discretion 
having regard to various factors, rather than the approach of the United States where 
individual notice must be given where class members are reasonably identifiable. 
 
3 2 3 3 Individual notice absolutely required? 
 
The problem with always requiring individual notice to class members is that, although it is 
preferable, circumstances may arise where such notice is simply not feasible or possible. 
For example, it may not be feasible to require that individual notice be given to class 
members where the class is very large53 and the costs associated with the issuing of the 
notice are so excessive that it may result in the discontinuance of the class action.54 It may 
further be impossible to issue individual notice where, for example, the class members are 
unidentifiable.55 For instance, in Children’s Resource Centre Trust the putative class 
                                                          
50
 L Silberman ―The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action — With a Comparative Eye‖ (1999) 7 Tul J 
Int’l & Comp L 201 212.  
51
 818 F.2d 145, 167-168. 175 (2d Cir. 1987). 
52
 Silberman (1999) Tul J Int’l & Comp L 212. 
53
 Section 8(2)(b) of the Draft Bill proposed by the South African Law Commission. 
54
 See the discussion under 3 2 4 below regarding possible prejudice to be suffered by class members who 
fail to opt out of the class action as a result of (improper) notice – it includes a discussion on class members‘ 
potential liability for costs.  
55
 Section 8(2)(d) of the Draft Bill proposed by the South African Law Commission. 
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consisted of more than one million individuals – giving notice to each individual class 
member would probably have been impossible. In these circumstances, it may therefore 
be necessary to limit class members‘ right to be heard by requiring that notice be given 
generally to the class and that class members would not need to be notified individually of 
the class action and of their right to opt out.  In this regard, De Vos states that: 
 
―In appropriate circumstances… the judge might decide that it would not be necessary to notify 
all members of the class or that notice by means of publication in the media, instead of personal 
notice, would suffice. Lest some might argue that lack of (proper) notice would impinge upon the 
notion of due process of law, I should add that the requirement of adequate representation 
ensures that the interests of the absent members are protected.‖56 
 
It may be worth restating that the sui generis nature of class actions are evidenced by the 
fact that the rights and interests of non-parties are determined. It is therefore important to 
ensure that their interests are adequately protected. One possible way is through the 
certification requirement that the class representative adequately represents the interests 
of the class.57 What this means is that a court must be satisfied as to the suitability of the 
proposed representative to conduct the action and to represent the class.58 In this regard, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Children’s Resource Centre Trust held that a court must 
be satisfied that the class representative does not have a ―conflict of interest with the class 
members and that the representative must have the capacity to litigate properly on behalf 
of the class‖.59  The court held that, where the litigation is aimed at enriching the class 
representatives or to serve the interests of individuals other than the class members, a 
conflict of interest would arise. The capacity-inquiry is important because unsuccessful 
litigation would have the effect of destroying the claims. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal required that a court must be addressed on the following issues in the 
certification application:  
 
                                                          
56
 De Vos (1996) TSAR 648. 
57
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.6.20. See also the 
discussion under 3 2 5 below regarding the role of the judge to protect the interests of absent class 
members. 
58
 Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 26. 
59
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1. Whether the representative has the time, the inclination and the means to procure the 
evidence necessary to conduct the litigation. 
2. Whether the representative has the financial means to conduct the litigation. If the 
representative does not have the necessary financial means, the application must 
address the way in which the litigation will be financed.  
3. Whether the representative has access to legal representation with the capacity to 
effectively conduct the litigation. This will require considering the likely magnitude of the 
case and the resources involved.  
4. How the legal representatives will be funded. If a contingency fee arrangement is made, 
the details of the arrangement must be disclosed to ensure that it does not give rise to a 
conflict of interest.  
5. Whether the litigation is pursued at the behest, and for the benefit, of the legal 
representatives, or in the genuine interests of class members. It is for this reason that in 
other jurisdictions the court‘s approval of any settlement is required. Whilst this issue did 
not arise in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, the court held that some similar 
requirement would need to be imposed when that situation does arise.60 In Nkala v 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited61 (―Nkala‖), Mojapelo DJP held that ―such 
approval is obligatory as the provisions of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (‗CFA‘) 
are applicable. We hold that it is in any event correct that any settlement agreement 
reached after certification of the class action should be subject to the approval of the 
court and that it should only be valid once approved by the court. This is to ensure that 
the settlement reached is fair, reasonable, adequate and that it protects the interests of 
the class‖.62  
 
Should the court be satisfied that the class representative does not have a conflict of 
interest with the class members and that the representative has the requisite capacity to 
litigate properly on behalf of the class, the class members would be regarded as being 
adequately represented.  
 
According to the SALC, adequacy of representation needs to be balanced against the 
need for individual notice. A strict interpretation of the right to a fair trial in the context of 
class actions requires that notice be given to all the individual class members who may be 
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 Paras 46-48. See also Pretorius v Transnet Second Defined Benefit Fund 2014 6 SA 77 (GP) para 21. 
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affected by the judgment. Referring to De Vos,63 the SALC stated that the reason for 
requiring that individual notice be given to class members is that a binding class action 
judgment would operate unfairly in respect of those class members who did not receive 
individual notice of the proceedings and, therefore, were unable to litigate their own 
claims.64 However, according to De Vos, class members‘ right to be heard may be limited 
provided it is fully guaranteed by the representative party. The representative of the class 
would effectively function as the conduit of absent class members, which means that 
absent class members would still be ‗heard‘. De Vos is of the view that our courts should 
follow a lenient approach by emphasising the importance of adequate representation 
rather than insisting on individual notice to all members of a class.65  
 
If our class action mechanism is to be successful – if success is to be measured against 
the attainment of the class action objectives – then individual notice simply cannot be 
required in all circumstances. Although individual notice is preferable, circumstances may 
arise where it is not feasible or possible. For the purposes of class certification all that is 
necessary is that the class be objectively defined. It is not necessary to know the precise 
identities of class members. In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, it was expressly stated 
that it is not a certification requirement that the individual identities of the class members 
must be known.66 Such circumstances should not signify the termination of opt-out class 
actions; rather, compliance with the ‗adequacy of representation‘ certification requirement 
means that the class members‘ interests are sufficiently protected by the class 
representative. Therefore, the class members‘ right to be heard can justifiably be limited by 
not requiring that individual notice of the opt-out class action be given to them.  
 
If individual notice of the opt-out class action were an absolute requirement from which 
derogation is impermissible, it would undermine the primary purpose of the class action, 
which is to facilitate access to justice.67 Class members, who may comprise the poorest 
portion of our society and who are confronted with financial, psychological and social 
barriers, would be denied access to justice and deprived of the opportunity to share in the 
fruits of a favourable class action judgment. This is especially the case in South Africa 
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where a large percentage of our society is illiterate, uninformed and impoverished because 
they are not properly educated – it is important to ensure that benefits flowing from class 
actions accrue to these individuals. Requiring individual notice when it would be 
impossible or unfeasible would also defeat a further purpose of the class action 
mechanism, which is to avoid a multiplicity of actions on the same or similar issues; this 
may, in turn, result in inconsistency in court decisions. The right to a fair trial as 
entrenched in section 34 of the Constitution can therefore, in the context of notice of the 
class action and of class members‘ right to opt out thereof, justifiably be limited, having 
specific regard to adequacy of representation as a certification requirement and to the 
overall purpose of the class action mechanism.  
 
An example of a South African class action case where individual notice to class members 
was not required is Pretorius v Transnet Second Defined Benefit Fund68 (―Pretorius‖). 
There were potentially class members who would be bound by the class action court order 
because they did not receive individual notice of the class action.69 This did not prevent the 
court from certifying the class action.70 The court made the following order regarding notice 
of the class action:   
 
―6. That the first and second applicants be and are hereby ordered to give notice to members of 
the first and second respondents of the class action to be instituted by the applicants by one 
publication in the following newspapers with a national spread in the language indicated 
therewith: 
(i) Sunday Times in English; 
(ii) Rapport in Afrikaans; 
(iii) City Press in Xhosa and Zulu; 
(iv) Sowetan in Setswana/Sesotho and Zulu; and 
                                                          
68
 2014 6 SA 77 (GP). 
69
 In Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 29, the extent of the court‘s mentioning 
of class action notice was that it is necessary for the class to be defined with sufficient precision that an 
individual‘s membership can be objectively determined by examining their situation in the light of the class 
definition and that this is important inter alia because it affects the manner in which notice is given to 
members of the class. Our class action case law makes little, if any, further reference to the issue of notice.  
70
 It is not apparent at first glance, but the ‗members of the first and second respondents‘ referred to in the 
order are the absent class members. 
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by one publication in the following newspapers with a regional spread in the languages 
indicated therewith:  
 (i)   Beeld in Afrikaans and English; 
 (ii)   Die Burger in Afrikaans and English; 
 (iii)  Volksblad in Afrikaans; and 
 (iv)  Natal Mercury in English. 
7.   That the third respondent, insofar as it may be necessary and practicable, be directed to 
assist the applicants in order to give notice to the members of the first and second respondents 
by way of notices at pension paypoints of the envisaged class action to be instituted by the first 
and second applicants. 
8.   That the publication of the class action in the newspapers and notices at pension pay points 
shall include: 
(i)   A summary of the relief sought against the respective respondents by the applicants; 
(ii)   full details of the attorneys of record acting on behalf of the applicants; and 
(iii) an advisory notice that: 
(a)   Any member of the first or second respondent has the option to opt out of the proceedings 
envisaged on their behalf within 60 days from date of the publication of the notice in the printed 
media set out above; and 
(b)   that such members electing to opt out of the proceedings should file such election within 60 
days with the first and second applicants' attorneys of record of such publication,  failing which 
such member shall be bound by the decision of the court.‖71 
 
The Nkala-case72 is a further instance where the South Gauteng Division of the High Court 
of South Africa found that individual notice was not required and that general notice would 
suffice. Mojapelo DJP held that, ―[i]n our view, the notices, as they stand, are sufficient and 
so too are the processes that will be set in motion to advertise them. They are designed to 
ensure that they are brought to the attention of the maximum number of mineworkers 
possible‖.73  
 
It is therefore apparent that individual notice is not an absolute requirement in South 
African class action litigation. The question that arises is, in the absence of individualised 
notice, what steps would need to be taken to ensure that class members are potentially 
aware of the class action and of their right to opt out. The Pretorius case provides one 
                                                          
71
 88. 
72
 (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016). 
73
 Para 168. 
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possible alternative way to giving notice to class members.  
 
3 2 3 4 Suggested approach to giving general notice 
 
Where the court exercises its discretion and orders that general notice, as opposed to 
individualised notice, should be given, the question that arises is what steps would need to 
be taken to ensure that class members are potentially aware of the class action and of 
their right to opt out. It may be instructive to revisit the De Beer case in this regard. In De 
Beer, it was held that the first requirement for a fair hearing is that reasonable notice of the 
hearing must be given to an affected person. In assessing reasonableness, consideration 
must be given to the circumstances of the case in light of the purpose of the notice 
requirement, namely to bring relevant information about the claim and the hearing to the 
attention of anyone affected by it.74 The court also held that:  
 
―The hearing itself must also be fair. It can be fair in relation to notice only if the court has a 
discretion not to grant the order or to require further notice to be given if fairness demands that 
it be done. The court must, in addition, have the power to investigate whether it is reasonably 
possible to bring the notice to the attention of the affected person if it is clear that fairness 
requires an investigation of that kind.‖75 
 
Other factors that the Constitutional Court in De Beer deemed relevant to the assessment 
of the reasonableness of notice were the nature of the order that could be made as a 
result of the hearing and the gravity of its consequences.76 
 
The part of the judgment in De Beer that relates to notice in the context of the right to a fair 
hearing is equally applicable to notice in the context of class actions. This is borne out by 
the judgment in Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape77  
(―Ngxuza (HC)‖). In Ngxuza (HC), one of the terms of the order as agreed between the 
parties to the dispute pertained to notice: 
 
                                                          
74
 Para 13. See also Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA) para 2, where it was held 
that the object of publication was to give members of the class the opportunity if they wished to opt out of the 
proceedings envisaged on their behalf. 
75
 Para 14. 
76
 Para 15. 
77
 2001 2 SA 609 (E). 
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―That the Eastern Cape Welfare Department (‗the Department‘) is to give notice by way of the 
print and electronic media, constituency offices, welfare offices, advice offices, traditional 
leaders and at all pay points at which social grants are paid to beneficiaries, calling upon 
persons whose disability grants were terminated between 1 March 1996 and 28 September 
2000 to present themselves at the time and place specified in the relevant notice to be 
interviewed and, if necessary, to be medically examined with the view to determining whether or 
not such person qualifies to receive a disability grant;‖78 
 
The court in Ngxuza (HC) had to determine inter alia whether the respondents properly 
complied with the above term of the agreed order. The applicants submitted that class 
members were not given proper notice to present themselves at a specified time and place 
as required by the order. The process followed by the respondents was accordingly 
alleged to be insufficient and the process had to be redone in a more specific and detailed 
manner.  
 
The respondents conceded that they did not fully comply with the court order regarding 
notice, but submitted that there had been substantial compliance.79 Although the court did 
not refer to De Beer, the court effectively had to decide whether substantial compliance 
amounts to reasonable notice to class members. The court held that, although the 
respondents did not give proper notice through the media as set out in the original order, 
they had taken ―elaborate and, judging by response, reasonably effective measures to 
make the process known‖.80 The court stated, however, that the possibility remained that 
many of those affected might not have heard or known of the review process. On the 
evidence of the respondents, 8459 persons did not come forward to have themselves 
examined. Their names and the pay points where their names were listed were known. 
The court, in line with the above-quoted passage in De Beer regarding the requirement 
that the hearing must be fair, ordered that a further attempt be made to give these persons 
proper notice of the review process and afforded the respondents the opportunity to 
suggest the most effective way of giving further notice and for the applicants to comment 
thereon.81  
 
                                                          
78
 3. 
79
 6-7. 
80
 10. 
81
 10-11. This is similar to the ‗workable plan‘ requirement in the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 
6. 
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It is apparent from De Beer that reasonable notice is required, that is a reasonable attempt 
should be made to ensure that the class members are aware of the class action and of 
their right to opt out. The question that arises then is what constitutes reasonable notice of 
opt-out class action proceedings. Stated differently, in what circumstances would a court 
be of the view that reasonable steps have been taken to bring the class action to the 
attention of the affected persons, i.e. the class members? 
 
Generally, the rules of court make provision for what constitutes reasonable notice but, 
according to De Beer, such rules do not provide an exclusive standard of 
reasonableness.  In the absence of court rules that make provision for notice of class 
actions, reasonableness will have to be assessed based on the circumstances of each 
case. This assessment should take place in light of the purpose of the notice requirement, 
namely to bring relevant information about the claim and the hearing to the attention of 
anyone affected by it. The assessment will be made by the court through the exercise of 
its inherent jurisdiction.  
 
In Mukaddam CC, the court held that it is common practice in our courts that procedural 
requirements are applied flexibly. For example, our courts may condone non-compliance 
with enacted rules if it would be in the interests of justice. The court further held that, to 
exercise the right of access to courts, certain defined procedures must be followed to 
enable adjudication of the dispute. These procedures are set out in the court rules. The 
Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local 
Divisions of the High Court of South Africa (―Uniform Rules‖) regulate the form and 
process of the different divisions of the High Court of South Africa. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court have their own rules. The court rules should advance 
access to justice, rather than hinder it. Accordingly, courts are not created for rules; rather, 
rules are made for courts.82 The primary function of court rules is to attain justice. 
However, circumstances not provided for in court rules may arise and, in such 
circumstances, the proper approach would be to ask the court for guidance.83 
 
                                                          
82
 Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) para 32. 
83
 Paras 31-33. Section 173 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop 
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice‖. 
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Our superior courts accordingly have a discretion to decide on the appropriate notice-
scheme with regard to the circumstances of each case before it. There may be 
circumstances, for example, where the class is so numerous that individual notice is 
simply not feasible or possible. In those circumstances, a court may decide that 
reasonableness dictates the giving of notice through, for example, publication in the 
media. It is submitted that this discretion should be exercised by taking account of the 
factors mentioned by the SALC in section 8(2) of the Draft Bill in deciding whether 
individual or general notice is required in the circumstances and, if general notice will 
suffice, what steps must be taken to bring the notice to the class members‘ attention. The 
SALC referred to De Vos who is in favour of such a discretionary approach and is of the 
view that courts would then be able to devise appropriate notice schemes for each class 
action according to the circumstances surrounding each given case.84  
 
Ultimately, it has to be considered whether the notice scheme of a particular class action 
would potentially infringe upon the fairness requirement of section 34. Is the notice-
scheme determined by the court reasonably capable of bringing the class action to the 
attention of the class members? Is it reasonably probable that the class members would in 
the ordinary course become aware of the class action after the notice-scheme has been 
executed?85 It is undesirable, if not impossible, to try to determine the requirements of 
reasonableness in the abstract.  The reasonableness of notice must be assessed on its 
own merits with reference to the circumstances of the case.86  
 
In the Access to Justice Report, Lord Woolf stated the following regarding a discretionary 
approach of the sort referred to above: 
 
―In a multi-party action where there are many claims, each of which is small, there is little to 
recommend in a rule making notice to each potential claimant mandatory. The costs of 
identifying potential claimants, and preparing and sending the notice, will make the litigation as 
a whole uneconomic. In any event, where such claimants receive the notice and choose to opt 
out, they will receive nothing. Because, with small claims it is uneconomic for them to litigate 
individually, they will almost invariably remain members of the group. In the United States, in 
small claims group actions, very few of the tens of thousands – in some cases millions – of 
                                                          
84
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.10.21. 
85
 De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council 2002 1 SA 429 (CC) para 20. 
86
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potentially claimants actually notified choose to opt out. Accordingly, courts must have the 
discretion to dispense with notice enabling parties to opt out having regard to factors such as 
the cost, the nature of the relief, the size of individual claims, the number of members of a 
group, the chances that members will wish to opt out and so on…Yet even if the court decides 
that notice must be given to members of a group, it should have a discretion as to how this is to 
be done – individual notification, advertising, media broadcast, notification to a sample group, or 
a combination of means, or different means for different members of the group. In each case 
the court must take into account the likely cost and benefit before deciding on the course of 
action.‖87   
 
It is submitted that a discretionary notice regime appears to be superior to other notice 
regimes, even if it may result in certain class members being unaware of the class action. 
Ultimately, it is the most appropriate way to achieve the access to justice goal of class 
actions.88 
 
3 2 4 The relationship between prejudice due to being bound by a judgement and 
the notice-requirement in opt-out class actions  
 
3 2 4 1 Introduction  
 
The SALC envisaged that, in circumstances where the class members have significant 
individual claims so that it is probable that they would enforce their claims in the absence 
of the class action, the court should order opt-in notice (as opposed to opt-out notice or no 
notice at all). In its Report, the SALC made the following statement regarding the 
circumstances where a court should order that opt-in notice be given to class members: 
  
―It is recommended that the court should order opt-in notice only where the court is of the 
opinion that the class members may be significantly prejudiced by the fact that they will be 
bound by a judgment given in an action which may not have come to their notice. The kind of 
case in which it is envisaged that there would be significant prejudice would be for instance 
where a large number of people suffer damages as a result of the same incident, such as an 
airplane crash. Where the individual claims are sufficiently large to make it probable that they 
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 Lord Woolf Access to Justice (Final Report, 1996) 236-237. 
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 Victorian Attorney General‘s Law Reform Advisory Council Class Actions in Victoria: Time for a New 
Approach (Report, 1997) 53. 
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would enforce their own claims then they should not be bound by a judgment unless they have 
expressly consented to be so bound.‖89 
   
Does this mean that class members in an opt-out class action, where such members 
usually have small individual claims, would not suffer significant prejudice if they were 
bound by a judgment given in an action that did not come to their notice? If they would not 
suffer any prejudice, the question arises whether it is at all necessary to give notice to 
class members of the class action and of their right to opt out thereof?  In answering these 
questions, it may be worthwhile, as a point of departure, to consider the principle of res 
judicata in more detail. This will assist in determining, firstly, who is bound by the judgment 
of the court in an opt-out class action and, secondly, what the possible prejudice is that 
individuals may suffer if, because they did not receive notice of the class action, they failed 
to opt out and are consequently bound by the court‘s decision. Finally, it can then be 
determined whether it is necessary to issue notice to class members in an opt-out class 
action in circumstances where class members‘ individual claims are insignificant and it is 
unlikely that they would litigate independently to enforce their claims in the absence of a 
class action.  
 
3 2 4 2 Res judicata  
 
According to the SALC, the court‘s judgment in class actions should generally be binding 
upon all the members of the class. This means that, if any of the class members institute 
subsequent proceedings against the defendant(s) regarding the same issues, the action 
should be dismissed based on a plea by the defendant(s) of res judicata. In other words, 
the defendant raises an objection arguing that the proceedings are precluded by judgment 
in the class action. 90  
 
In Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd,91 the court followed Kommissaris van 
Binnelandse Inkomste v Absa Bank Bpk92 in stating the following regarding the 
requirements that must be met to succeed with a plea of res judicata: 
                                                          
89
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 
para 5.25. 
90
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.11.4. 
91
 1999 3 SA 517 (B) 566. 
92
 1995 1 SA 653 (SCA). 
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―From the aforegoing analysis I find that the essentials of the exceptio res judicata are threefold, 
namely that the previous judgment was given in an action or application by a competent court 
(1) between the same parties, (2) based on the same cause of action (ex eadem petendi 
causa), (3) with respect to the same subject matter, or thing (de eadem re). (2) and (3) are not 
immutable requirements of res judicata. The subject matter claimed in the two relevant actions 
does not necessarily and in all circumstances have to be the same. However where there is a 
likelihood of a litigant being denied access to the courts in a second action, and to prevent 
injustice it is necessary that the said essentials of the threefold test be applied. Conversely in 
order to ensure overall fairness (2) or (3) above may be relaxed. A court must have regard to 
the object of the exceptio res judicata that it was introduced with the endeavour of putting a limit 
to needless litigation, and in order to prevent the recapitulation of the same thing in dispute in 
diverse actions, with the concomitant deleterious effect of conflicting and contradictory 
decisions. This principle must be carefully delineated and demarcated in order to prevent 
hardship and actual injustice to parties.‖ 
 
Does the requirement that the subsequent dispute must be between the ‗same parties‘ 
exclude the class members who, unlike the representative plaintiff, are usually not 
identified as individual parties?93 It has been stated that this requirement should not be 
interpreted narrowly to include only the identical individuals who were the actual parties to 
the initial proceedings in which the judgment, which is raised as res judicata, was given. 
Rather:  
 
―[T]hey include persons who are in law identified with those who were parties to the 
proceedings. Persons who are deemed to be the same as the persons who were engaged in 
the earlier proceedings in which the judgment was given all derive their interest in the latter 
proceedings from the parties to the earlier proceedings. The requirement that the persons in the 
earlier and later proceedings must be the same does not mean that the person who raises the 
exceptio must necessarily have been the defendant in the earlier proceedings, nor that the party 
against whom it is raised must have been the plaintiff in the earlier proceedings.‖94 
 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust,95 the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to Silver who 
states that the class action is: 
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―[A] procedural device that expands a court‘s jurisdiction, empowering it to enter a judgment that 
is binding upon everyone with covered claims. This includes claimants who, not being named as 
parties, would not ordinarily be bound. A classwide judgment extinguishes the claims of all 
persons meeting the class definition rather than just those of named parties and persons in 
privity with them, as normally is the case. Judges and scholars sometimes treat the class action 
as a procedure for joining absent claimants to a lawsuit rather than as one that permits a court 
to treat a named party as standing in judgment on behalf of them. This is a mistake…Class 
members neither start out as parties nor become parties when a class is certified.‖96 
 
Class members who fail to opt out of the class action would clearly be bound by the 
judgment of the court in the action by virtue of the judgment being res judicata in respect of 
these members. However, where the class members opt out of the class action, they 
would be entitled to litigate their claims independently. If this is the case, then the next 
question is what possible prejudice individuals could suffer if they failed to opt out because 
they did not receive notice of the class action, and are bound by the court‘s decision?  
 
3 2 4 3 Nature of prejudice 
 
It is conceivable that, where the individual claims are large, class members who fail to opt 
out because of the absence of (proper) notice may suffer prejudice.97 This is because the 
likelihood exists that the individual class members would, in the absence of the class 
action, have litigated individually to enforce their claims. The absence of notice in such 
circumstances deprives class members of the choice not to participate in the class 
proceedings. It is, however, unlikely that the opt-out class action mechanism would be 
utilised in circumstances where the class members‘ individual claims are large enough to 
justify the expense of independent litigation. In the Working Paper, the SALC stated that 
provision should be made for opt-in notice in limited situations because there may be 
circumstances where class members have substantial claims and they may be prejudiced 
if the class action fails or is not prosecuted effectively. In such a case, the judgment would 
be res judicata in respect of the individual class members‘ claims and it is therefore 
important to ensure that the claimants have knowledge of the class action.98 It is difficult to 
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 C Silver ―Class Actions – Representative Proceedings‖ in B Bouckaert and G de Geest (eds) 
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics 194.   
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 Where this part of chapter three refers to the absence of notice, it includes the giving of improper notice.  
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 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 
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conceive of circumstances where the opt-out mechanism would be used where the class 
members‘ claims are so large that they justify the expense of independent litigation. It is 
generally more likely that a court would order that opt-in notice be given in such 
circumstances.  
 
Where the class members‘ individual claims are small and it is therefore unlikely that they 
would have litigated in the absence of the class action, it is difficult to conceive of any real 
prejudice that would be suffered by class members by virtue of the application of the res 
judicata doctrine. The first and foremost objective of the class action mechanism is to 
afford greater access to justice. Litigation has become so expensive that claims of modest 
amounts and, at times, even those of significant amounts, are not economically feasible to 
pursue on an individual basis. In class action terminology, these are referred to as 
‗individually non-viable claims‘.99 Therefore, where one is dealing with individually non-
viable claims where it is unlikely that the individual class members would litigate their 
claims on an individual basis, the mere fact that the judgment would be binding upon these 
class members does not mean that it would be to the prejudice of the class members. In 
fact, the class members are afforded the opportunity to share in the fruits of a favourable 
class action judgment in circumstances where they would otherwise probably not have had 
their rights vindicated in a court of law. Especially in the South African context, the 
existence of social, psychological and financial barriers may mean that, but for the class 
action, individual class members would not have enforced their claims independently. 
Therefore, the fact that the judgment is res judicata in respect of the class members who 
failed to opt out of the class action as a result of the absence of notice, does not 
necessarily mean that those class members would suffer prejudice as a result thereof.   
 
This brings to bear the question of any other prejudice that class members would suffer if 
they do not receive notice? This question is significant because, if no real prejudice would 
be suffered in the context of the opt-out class action if notice were not given, it is unclear 
why class members would need to be given notice of the class action at all. Stated 
differently, if class members are not prejudiced by not receiving notice of the class action 
and of their opt-out right, why is it necessary for notice to be given, taking into account 
inter alia the administrative and financial burdens to be shouldered by the representative 
plaintiff(s) in this regard?   
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Another conceivable prejudice to be suffered where class members fail to opt out of the 
class action by virtue of the absence of notice is the possibility that they may be held liable 
for costs. If this is indeed possible, then it follows that class members should receive 
(individual) notice of the class action and of their right to opt out. According to the Ontario 
Commission: 
 
―In our view, the question of costs is the single most important issue this Commission has 
considered in designing an expanded class action procedure for Ontario. As we shall explain 
later, the matter of costs will not merely affect the efficacy of class actions, but in fact will 
determine whether this procedure will be utilized at all.‖100 
 
Generally speaking, the court cannot order a person who is not a party before it to pay 
costs.101 Applying this general rule to the definition of a ‗class action‘,102 it is apparent that 
class members, insofar as they are not parties to the dispute, cannot be ordered to pay 
costs. This rule does not apply in relation to the representative plaintiff who is indeed a 
party to the dispute and can accordingly be held liable for costs. It is therefore possible for 
a court to decide that where, for example, the class action fails, the representative 
plaintiff(s) should be held liable for the defendant‘s costs. However, in such circumstances 
the class members other than the class representative cannot be held liable for costs. The 
SALC prepared the table below to broadly illustrate the effect of the application of the 
general rule in class actions that costs follow the event.103 The table illustrates that, unless 
there is an arrangement to the contrary, the class members should have no entitlement to, 
or liability for the expenses of, the class action.104    
 
 
 
                                                          
100
 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions 647.  
101
 A C Cilliers,  C Loots & C Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 5 ed (2009) 952. See, for example, Lasersohn v Olivier 1962 1 All 
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102
 See 1 1 1 above. 
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Result of 
action 
Representative Other members of 
the class 
Defendants 
Action 
succeeds 
(Class wins) 
Entitled to party and party 
costs from the 
defendant(s) 
Liable for own attorney‘s 
fees on attorney client 
scale 
Entitlement: none 
Liability: None 
Entitlement: none 
Liable for (a) own 
attorney‘s fees on the 
attorney client scale 
and (b) the 
representative‘s costs 
on the party and party 
scale 
Action fails     
(Class 
loses) 
Entitlement: none 
Liable for (a) own 
attorney‘s fees on the 
attorney client scale and 
(b) the costs of the 
defendant on the party 
and party scale 
Entitlement: none 
Liability: None 
Entitled to party and 
party costs from the 
representative 
Liable for own 
attorney‘s fees on 
attorney client scale 
 
Costs will ordinarily not be payable by class members. It would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to recover costs from each class member, especially where the class consists 
of thousands of members. It would also defeat the primary purpose of class actions – to 
facilitate access to justice – if class members would prefer to opt out of class proceedings 
rather than to be held liable for costs. In Ontario and the United States, class members are 
not liable for costs except where they incur costs in the assessment of their individual 
claims.  A further recommendation of the Ontario Law Reform Commission was that only 
the representative plaintiff – not the class members – ―should be liable for costs associated 
with the certification hearing, the common questions stage of a class action or on an 
interlocutory motion‖.105 It has accordingly been recommended that, except for the 
representative party, class members should generally not be held liable for costs.106 
 
It is therefore apparent that, in the context of the opt-out class action, class members will 
generally not be held liable for costs. The same cannot be said in respect of opt-in class 
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actions. The Working Paper of the SALC provides as follows regarding the liability of class 
members for costs in the context of an opt-in class action: 
 
―In addition, it is recommended that where a court orders opt-in notice it should be able to direct 
that the notice require persons who opt-in to undertake to pay a contribution towards costs and, 
where necessary, to contribute towards providing security for costs. This would be appropriate 
where the members of the class are perceived to be persons who would be able to afford such 
a contribution and where their claims are sufficiently large to make it likely that they would have 
pursued them on their own in the absence of the class action. This complements the 
recommendation that a permissive joinder type of class action should be available and provides 
the court and the parties with an even wider range of options to consider in order to find an 
appropriate solution to the costs problem.‖107  
 
Section 11(2)(b) of the Draft Bill proposed by the SALC relates to costs and reinforces the 
SALC‘s recommendation that class members who opt into the class action can be held 
liable for costs. It provides as follows: 
 
―Costs 
11. (1) In a class action the court shall not order the representative to provide security for costs 
unless special circumstances apply. 
(2) The court may – 
(a) authorize a class action and appoint the representative subject to the rendering or making 
available of legal aid by the Legal Aid Board; 
(b) order those members of the class who elected to give written notice in terms of section 
8(3)(b) to contribute towards costs and, where appropriate, to provide security for costs.‖ 
 
If, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, class members in the context of the opt-
out class action cannot be expected to contribute to costs – although it may be possible for 
class members in an opt-in class action to be liable for costs – then the costs-issue 
amounts to nothing more than an immaterial risk. In other words, if class members fail to 
opt out of the class action because they have not received (individual) notice and it is 
unlikely that they would have litigated in the absence of a class action, there is no real 
prejudice that the class members would suffer. To the contrary, they could only stand to 
benefit from a favourable class action judgment – an unfavourable judgment would not 
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affect the class members‘ financial or social position in any way. The fact that the 
judgment is binding upon them would not operate to the class members‘ prejudice nor 
would the class members be exposed to liability for costs. Why then do these individuals 
have to be given notice at all?  
 
From a practical perspective, class members would suffer prejudice if they do not know of 
the class action and are accordingly not in a position to claim the benefit of a favourable 
judgment. It is from this perspective that it is submitted that notice of the class action would 
need to be given to class members at some point in the course of the class proceedings.  
However, does such notice necessarily need to be given at the certification stage in terms 
of which class members are afforded an opportunity to opt out of the class action? It has 
been suggested that it may be possible to do away with the problems presented by notice 
and the res judicata principle by providing that a judgment or settlement would be binding 
only on those who come forward to claim a benefit after judgment has been given or a 
settlement made. This means that class members can wait and see – they do not need to 
commit themselves to the class action – and only come forward where a favourable 
judgment has been given or settlement reached. According to the SALC, this is 
problematic where the class members who seek to benefit are expected to contribute 
towards costs at commencement of the action. However, as mentioned above, class 
members in an opt-out class action will infrequently, if ever, be required to contribute to 
costs. This concern is applicable to the opt-in class action where class members may need 
to contribute to costs; however, in such circumstances, class members cannot simply sit 
back and wait for judgment to be rendered – they need to opt in to share in the fruits of the 
judgment.108 
 
Where, however, the class representative will carry the cost-burden – the class members 
will accordingly not be expected to contribute to costs – the SALC suggests that class 
members only have to be given notice of the class action and of their right to claim a 
benefit in terms of a judgment or settlement once the favourable judgment is given or 
settlement is reached.109 Therefore, in the event of an unsuccessful judgment, no notice of 
the class action would have to be given to putative class members. Further, the effect 
would be that an unsuccessful judgment would not be res judicata against the class 
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members and a successful judgment or settlement would be res judicata only against 
those who claimed in terms of it.110  
 
Such an approach appears to operate unfairly in respect of the defendant(s) to the class 
action. A key advantage of a class action from the defendant‘s perspective is that, once an 
issue has been litigated, it cannot be faced with further actions of the same nature. 
According to the SALC, this is not a legitimate advantage for the defendant to have. The 
whole purpose of class actions is to facilitate access to justice for the average person – 
according to the SALC there is no reason why the defendant(s) should be placed in a 
more advantageous position than it would be at common law, in terms of which it could 
individually be sued by every person adversely affected.  
 
The SALC suggests that a multiplicity of actions would be avoided as the stare decisis 
principle would ensure that an unsuccessful class action would discourage other similarly 
placed persons from litigating, while a successful class action judgment would, in all 
likelihood, significantly reduce the number of separate actions that are brought.111  
 
Furthermore, in the context of the opt-out class action where the class members generally 
have economically non-viable claims making it unlikely that they would enforce their claims 
independently, it is submitted that the risk of a multiplicity of actions is insignificant. This is 
because, even if the class action is successful, it does not necessarily mean that all the 
individuals who opted out of the class action112 would enforce their claims independently. 
Further, financial, psychological and social barriers may prevent such class members from 
instituting action outside the ambit of the class action. It may simply not be worth litigating 
individually if the prospect of a favourable judgment does not justify the expenses to be 
incurred in pursuing the matter litigiously.  
 
                                                          
110
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Accordingly, if an approach is followed where class members could opt in only once a 
favourable judgment has been rendered, or settlement concluded, the putative class 
members would have a few options at their disposal. If the class action is successful, class 
members could opt in and the judgment or settlement would be res judicata against them. 
Alternatively, although it is unlikely, class members could choose not to opt into the class 
action with the result that the favourable judgment, or settlement, is not binding upon them.  
 
Where the defendant succeeded in defending the class action it is, for obvious reasons, 
unlikely that any of the individual class members would opt into the class action. In fact, it 
may even be unnecessary to give notice to the class members of the unsuccessful class 
action. This is an appealing aspect of such an approach insofar as the costs and 
administrative burden associated with giving notice to class members would be 
circumvented. The unsuccessful outcome would not be binding on the class members – 
the class members would be free to litigate independently in respect of the same matter, 
against the same party. It has been mentioned above that, because opt-out class actions 
generally entail economically non-viable claims and the class members generally comprise 
individuals who are poor and lack access to resources, it is submitted that it is highly 
unlikely in such circumstances that the individual class members would pursue 
independent litigation. The doctrine of stare decisis would also discourage it.   
 
However, there does not seem to be anything that would prevent the class members from 
instituting class proceedings de novo against the defendant. It is especially from this 
perspective that the SALC‘s proposal becomes perturbing – the doctrine of stare decisis 
would not prevent class members from instituting class proceedings afresh in an attempt 
to force the defendant into a settlement of the dispute. Such proceedings could be 
instituted under the pretense of arguing that the original judgment was incorrect and that it 
is therefore not binding upon the court. It is further unlikely that the court would be able to 
refuse certification of the class action based on judicial precedent – it is not a relevant 
consideration at that stage of the class proceedings. It is accordingly submitted that 
caution should be exercised by our courts in respect of the approach suggested by the 
SALC that the unsuccessful judgment should not be binding upon the class members – it 
may operate unfairly towards the defendant and it may result in an abuse of court process.  
It is a questionable and unsupportable approach. 
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3 2 5 Increased judicial supervision to protect absent parties 
 
An important factor to consider in the context of class members‘ right to individual notice is 
the responsibility of class action judges to protect the interests of absent class members.   
Judicial management is considered increasingly important for the effective functioning of 
civil litigation in general and of the class action system in particular.113 Moreover, as class 
action litigation is traditionally more complex than other kinds of litigation, it requires 
greater administration and management of the case.114 Where manageability problems 
occur during the course of class action proceedings, they could potentially result in the 
termination of the class action.115  
 
Trial judges in Australia possess extensive managerial powers. For example, a judge has 
the power to discontinue a class action and to substitute the representative plaintiff who 
does not adequately represent class members‘ interests. Further, the court also has to 
give its approval before a class action can be settled or discontinued and before 
settlement of the representative plaintiff‘s individual claim can take place.116  
 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules contains various provisions governing the trial court‘s 
powers, obligations and discretion in managing class actions.117 Rule 23(b)(3) specifically 
provides that the court at the certification stage must consider ―the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action‖.118 These difficulties include matters 
such as the size of the class, notice to class members, the presentation of evidence and 
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the assessment and distribution of damages, as discussed above. Further, rule 23(c) 
provides courts with managerial authority over class actions.119  Rule 23(e) requires that 
proposed settlements be approved by a judge. Judges also approve the final settlement, 
review objections by class members and play a role in approving the adequacy of the 
class representative and class counsel.120  
 
In Ontario, case management is widely used in class actions and mandated specifically by 
the Ontario Act.121 Courts use their powers in case management to prevent this complex 
form of litigation from becoming too cumbersome and to protect the interests of class 
members.122   
 
The SALC has recommended that, because of the complexity of class actions and the fact 
that it entails the determination of rights and obligations of absent class members, courts 
should actively manage the conduct of class actions, more so than they would do in 
ordinary civil litigation.123 They accordingly proposed that ―the courts should be given 
broad general management powers exercisable either on the application of a party or 
class member or on the court‘s own motion‖.124 Although the draft legislation proposed by 
the SALC does not expressly incorporate the manageability of class actions as a factor to 
be considered at the certification stage, it would no doubt play a role in the context of other 
questions. For example, it would be relevant in deciding whether a class action would be 
the appropriate method of proceeding in a given case.125  
 
                                                          
119
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 25. 
120
 J Brewster ―A Kick in the Class: Giving Class Members a Voice in Class Action Settlements‖ (2013) 41 W 
St U L Rev 1 11. 
121
 See, for example, section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. titled ―Court may 
determine conduct of proceeding‖. 
122
 J Kalajdzic, W A Bogart & I Matthews ―Canada‖ in D R Hensler, C Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The 
Globalization of Class Actions (2009) 46.  
123
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.9.2. 
124
 Para 5.9.4.  
125
 De Vos (1996) TSAR 649-650. A consideration of this question in the context of the manageability of 
class actions is, however, also potentially problematic in that the approach of our courts in determining when 
a class action, compared to joinder, is the appropriate procedural device to be utilised for the adjudication of 
a claim, has been largely inadequate. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
However, our courts have not dealt with the issue of the manageability of class actions as 
a possible factor to be considered during certification. It accordingly merits consideration in 
this study, which is undertaken in chapter five.  
 
It is further necessary, specifically in the context of class action litigation, that the role of 
judges be reconsidered to ensure that they become more actively involved in the 
management of the class action, in part to protect absent class parties. The increasing 
size and complexity of class action lawsuits necessitate a more ‗hands on‘ management 
approach. As such, class-action judges must become actively involved in the litigation.126 It 
is accordingly likely that the role of judges would need to be redefined.127  
 
Class actions involve judgments against absent class members – in other words, the 
interests of individuals not before the court may be affected by the judgment of the court. 
Class action litigation is fundamentally different from any other form of litigation in the 
sense that it is representational in nature. The result is that there are concerns regarding 
class members‘ right to a fair trial, as mentioned above. These concerns do not arise 
during ordinary litigation because the individuals are generally present at court and 
represent their own interests. Class members are generally not present at court and do not 
represent their own interests. Their interests are represented through the class 
representative and the class legal representatives. Foreign jurisdictions have for some 
time considered the issue of due process protections of absent class members who will be 
bound by the class judgment.  
 
The general view adopted by foreign jurisdictions to address the due-process concerns 
regarding absent class members who are bound by the class action judgment, is that class 
action judges should seek to protect such members by closely monitoring adequacy of 
representation, and by ensuring that the outcome will promote their interests. For example, 
judges should reject proposed settlements that concern class members who are not 
adequately represented.128 In fact, it has been stated that adequacy of representation is 
the most crucial requirement of Federal Rule 23, since the judgment in a class action 
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conclusively determines the rights of absent class members.129 Class action judges 
accordingly have a crucial role to fulfill in this regard.  
 
According to Piché, the revised role of judges in the class action context entails a 
departure from their traditional role in litigation, thus becoming more actively involved in 
the prosecution of the class action, in part to protect absent class parties.130 The judge in 
class action litigation is required to exercise judicial power and authority in ways not 
required in non-class litigation.131 This role is not limited to ensuring that class members 
are adequately represented. Scrutinizing adequacy of representation is only a component 
of the court‘s responsibility to protect absent class members‘ interests. For example, the 
notice provisions contained in Federal Rule 23 involve judges supervising, reviewing and 
approving notice to be sent to the absent class members at various stages of the 
progression of a class action. These provisions considerably extend the scope of the 
court‘s involvement in the notice problem. The judicial scrutiny entails reviewing the 
content and format of the proposed notice, in order to ensure that any proposed notice 
conforms to the constitutional due process and rule requirements for adequate and fair 
notice to class members.132 It is submitted that the court‘s assessment of compliance with 
the class action certification requirements must be informed by the consideration of absent 
class members‘ interests. Effective exercise of the court‘s function in protecting absentees 
depends upon a comprehensive overview of the class and its diversity of interests.133  
 
In the Working Paper it is recommended that a court, when certifying a class action, 
should be responsible for formally appointing the class representative, that it should 
describe the class with as much particularity as is possible and that it should give 
directions as to the procedure to be followed. Further, the court should have the discretion 
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that would enable it to devise its own procedures on the issuing of its directions.134 In the 
Report, the SALC states that courts should, as a matter of fact, be more active in 
managing class actions compared to ordinary actions as a result of the complexity of class 
actions, and the fact that the rights and obligations of absent class members are being 
determined. It is accordingly recommended that ―[t]he courts should be given broad 
general management powers exercisable either on the application of a party or class 
member or on the court‘s own motion‖.135  
 
It is apparent from the SALC‘s recommendation that it did not intend to limit the court‘s 
responsibility to protect the interests of absent class members by enabling a court to only 
inquire into one of the certification requirements, namely adequacy of representation. It is 
submitted that the court‘s responsibility extends beyond this requirement and covers all the 
certification requirements provided for in Children’s Resource Centre Trust as well as any 
other issue raised by a party to the class action or by a class member or on the court‘s 
own motion. The interests of absent class members should be a prominent consideration 
in the exercise of the court‘s discretion when determining whether it should require opt-out 
notice, opt-in notice or no notice at all.  
 
For example, one would only need to go as far as the first factor listed in subsection 
(8)(2)(a) of the Draft Bill proposed by the SALC – the extent to which the members of the 
class might be prejudiced by being bound by a judgment given in an action which may not 
have come to their attention – to appreciate that the interests of absent class members are 
of crucial importance in determining whether notice should be given and, if notice is 
required, whether individual notice is required or whether general notice would suffice. 
This discretion is a judicial one; in other words, it is discretion that the court must exercise 
and it must do so inter alia with regard to the interests of absent class members.  
 
The view that our courts should follow a lenient approach by emphasising the importance 
of adequacy of representation, rather than by insisting on individual notice to all members 
of a class, is accordingly reinforced by the active managerial role that judges are expected 
to fulfil to protect the interests of absent class members. Therefore, the argument that a 
lack of (proper) notice impinges upon class members‘ right to a fair trial, should be viewed 
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against adequacy of representation as a certification requirement and, moreover, against 
the courts‘ overall role in managing the class action and protecting the interests of absent 
class members.  
 
3 3 Opt-in notice 
 
Notice of the class action to class members should always be given in the context of the 
opt-in class action regime. Notice of an opt-in class action is not simply the general point of 
departure as is the case with an opt-out class action; it is an absolute requirement. The 
reason for always, without derogation, requiring that notice of opt-in class action 
proceedings be given to putative class members is, simply stated, that if no notice is given 
to putative class members, those class members would be unaware of the class action 
and therefore unable to opt into the class action. In reality, the class would be non-existent 
should notice of the opt-in class action not be given to putative class members. For class 
actions to operate effectively, it is important that potential class members are made aware 
of the class action so that they can choose whether they want to participate in the class 
action. The importance of notice of an opt-in class action is also underlined by one of the 
objectives of the class action mechanism, namely the attainment of judicial economy. 
Failure to give notice of an opt-in class action would, in all likelihood, result in a multiplicity 
of actions and the class action would fail to contribute to the efficiency of our courts and 
the consistency of judgments rendered by it.  
 
For the same reasons it is submitted that class members should be given individual notice 
of their right to opt into the class action. In the opt-in class action, the size of the class is 
generally much smaller compared to the size of the class in an opt-out class action. The 
identities of class members are usually known or are ascertainable as, for example, was 
the case in Linkside.136 When the SALC stated that provision should be made for opt-in 
notice in limited situations, it effectively supports the giving of individual notice to ensure 
that the putative class members know of the class action and of the way in which it is 
being prosecuted.137   
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Furthermore, proponents of the opt-in regime argue that it enables class members to 
better assess138 whether they are being adequately represented in the proceedings, in that 
they are forced to show some minimal interest in the litigation in order to benefit from it. 
Individual notice of the class action to class members appears to be the only option in this 
regard. Similarly, the possible effect of the opt-in class action of reducing the costs 
associated with the litigation and increasing efficiency, which is beneficial for all interested 
parties,139 would only be optimised if all class members were individually informed of their 
right to opt into the class action.140 It also brings with it the advantage that there is certainty 
as to who the members of the class are and what the aggregate value of the claims is. The 
defendant is thus in a better position to make a well-reasoned judgment as to its liability in 
order to decide whether to make a settlement offer.141  
 
The suggested approach to be adopted in the context of notice of an opt-in class action is 
one that appears to be closely aligned with the notice requirement in terms of rule 23(c)(2) 
of the American Federal Rules, although this rule operates in the context of an opt-out 
class action. In other words, the court should direct, in the context of our opt-in class 
action, the best form of notice that would, in the circumstances, be practicable. This 
includes giving individual notice to all members who can be identified by employing 
reasonable effort. Where class members have yet to be identified but could be identified 
through reasonable effort, such class members should be identified and provided with 
individual notice. It is difficult to imagine circumstances where, in a situation where it is 
envisaged that the opt-in mechanism would be utilised,142 the identities of class members 
would be unknown and be unascertainable through employing reasonable effort. However, 
in such circumstances, by adopting a requirement akin to rule 23(c)(2), our courts could 
direct that the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances be given so that 
those class members have a reasonable prospect of receiving notice of the opt-in class 
action. Accordingly, the court retains a discretion to order that general notice of class 
members‘ right to opt into the class action be given. This should, however, be the 
exception rather than the rule for the reasons proffered above.   
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3 4 Proof of notice 
 
Although notice of the class action should generally be given to class members, there is 
still uncertainty as to how the notification requirement would practically be satisfied. Our 
courts have not yet considered whether notice of the class action would be effective when, 
for example, it is dispatched to class members, when it reaches the class members, or 
when it is conveyed to the minds of the class members.  
 
In the realm of the common law of contract, specifically in the context of notice of 
cancellation due to breach of contract, it has been suggested that notice would only be 
effective once the party in breach actually becomes aware of the decision to cancel.143 In 
other words, in terms of this subjective approach, anything less than actual notice would 
not suffice.  
 
However, statute may dictate otherwise. For example, sections 129(1) and 130 of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 essentially provide that a debtor is entitled to delivery of a 
written notice before a credit provider may effectively institute and continue with legal 
proceedings against the debtor. Until recently, uncertainty existed as to how the notice 
requirement would need to be satisfied. In Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,144 
the Constitutional Court held that, although it was insufficient for the credit provider merely 
to prove dispatch of notice, actual knowledge of the notice by the consumer was also not 
required.145 The Constitutional Court held that the most reasonable course of action would 
be to focus on whether the debtor received the notice.146  
 
Requiring proof that notice of class proceedings has been conveyed to the minds of class 
members may not be practical or feasible in the context of an opt-out class action where, 
for example, the class is numerous – it may be too costly and there may be class 
members who are unidentifiable. Proof that notice has reached class members may, for 
the same reasons, be just as problematic. It is likely that our courts would conclude in such 
circumstances that the notice requirement is satisfied where it can be shown that notice 
has been dispatched to class members. This would, for example, enable our courts to 
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order that notice be given through publication in a newspaper circulated in the area where 
the class members reside.  
 
The situation may differ in the context of an opt-in class action where it may be possible or 
feasible to require proof that class members have received notice of the class action or 
that it has been conveyed to the minds of the class members. This is because, as has 
been mentioned above, it is generally the case that the size of the class in an opt-in class 
action is smaller compared to the size of the class in an opt-out class action and the class 
members are generally identifiable. The individual claims in an opt-in class action are also 
typically much larger than the individual claims in an opt-out class action. It could therefore 
be argued that it is necessary for the class representative in an opt-in class action to show 
something more than mere proof of having dispatched notice of the class action to class 
members. 
 
It is submitted that it would be important to the proper functioning of the class action 
mechanism that any future South African class action legislation makes provision for 
showing compliance with the notification requirement insofar as notice of the class action 
to class members is concerned. Although it is an issue that falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation, it is nevertheless a crucial one as it could defeat a class action 
notwithstanding initial certification. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AND THE CLASS ACTION 
MECHANISM: DETERMINING DAMAGES IN MASS PERSONAL INJURY 
CLASS ACTIONS 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
A further potentially significant issue that has not yet been subjected to a comprehensive 
and critical analysis is the approach to be followed when determining damages in mass 
personal injury class actions. Our courts have not considered this issue, and it is unclear 
what approach they will follow, specifically what device(s), if any, they will utilise to 
determine damages in these actions. To address this problem, certain alternative methods 
to determining damages in mass personal injury class actions will be evaluated in view of 
the existing procedural framework developed by our courts, with specific reference to the 
approaches followed by the selected foreign jurisdictions. Conducting such an analysis 
may be useful to assist in developing a structure that could facilitate the adjudication of 
class actions in South Africa in regard to a number of key areas.1 
 
This chapter commences by considering whether the fact that there are certain issues 
which may need to be determined individually precludes the use of the class action 
mechanism as a means to adjudicate class members‘ claims. For example, in a mass 
personal injury class action it is generally the case that the quantum of each class 
member‘s damages is an issue that would need to be determined individually. The 
approaches of Australia, Ontario and the United States will be considered regarding their 
use of the class action mechanism where there are issues that would need to be 
determined individually and, thereafter, the position in South Africa will be analysed.   
 
This chapter further considers possible methods that could be utilised to determine 
damages in the context of mass personal injury class actions. Wallis JA in Trustees for the 
time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae)2 (―Children’s Resource Centre Trust”) listed as a 
certification requirement that the relief sought or damages claimed must be ascertainable 
                                                          
1
 See chapter one above. 
2
 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA).  
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and capable of determination.3 As mentioned, in a mass personal injury class action, the 
quantum of each class member‘s damages is typically an individual issue. The problem in 
a mass personal injury class action is that, if the class is numerous and each class 
member must give oral evidence to prove his or her damages, the trial may take years to 
conclude. In fact, some of the class members could have passed away by the time that the 
court delivers judgment in the matter. In other words, such an approach may overburden 
proceedings and cause undue delay. It may accordingly be necessary, in such 
circumstances, to utilise procedures that would enable the determination of each 
individual‘s damages. These procedures should be innovative, practical and time-efficient.4  
 
4 2 Terminology 
 
Before considering, firstly, whether the existence of certain issues that may need to be 
determined individually necessarily precludes the use of the class action mechanism to 
resolve class members‘ claims and, secondly, possible methods to determine the quantum 
of damages in the context of mass personal injury class actions, it is necessary to consider 
the meaning of the term ‗mass personal injury‘.  
 
The term ‗mass personal injury‘ is not statutorily defined nor has its meaning been 
expounded by our courts. However, it may be instructive to consider attempts made to 
define the term ‗mass tort‘ in the context of claims aggregation in the United States. In this 
regard, Chamblee states that the ―broad term mass tort can refer to anything from an 
airplane crash, to a chemical spill, to a defective product affecting a considerable number 
of people‖.5 She refers with approval to the following definition of ‗mass tort‘ by the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts: ―[m]ass tort 
litigation emerges when an event or series of related events injure a large number of 
people or damage their property‖.6 According to Hensler, ‗mass tort‘ is ―not a formal legal 
designation but a term of art that has come to describe a large number of tort claims 
                                                          
3
 Para 26. 
4
 W de Vos ―Judicial Activism Gives Recognition to a General Class Action in South Africa: Children‘s 
Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods (50/12) [2012] ZASCA 182‖ (2013) 2 TSAR 370 373-374. 
5
 L E Chamblee ―Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class 
Settlements‖ (2004) 65 La L Rev 164. 
6
 165. 
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arising out of the same factual circumstances and alleging the same or similar injuries‖.7 
More specifically, however, the term is used to describe either a mass accident that 
involves a single event8 or personal injuries sustained on a widespread basis typically 
involving defective products.9  
 
Single-accident mass torts are single incidents in which a number of people are injured, for 
example an airplane crash involving injuries sustained by many individuals. In other words, 
they involve a known number of claimants who are injured or killed in a common accident 
having a single, determinable cause.10 It is generally the case that all class members 
concerned are injured simultaneously. Other examples of single-accident mass torts 
include a hotel fire, the collapse of a structure, a bushfire,11 or an explosion.12  
 
Dispersed mass torts occur where personal injuries are incurred over an extended period, 
and these injuries have a common cause and are generally manifested at different times 
and in different ways, often over a period of months or years.13 Examples of dispersed 
mass torts include defective products or dangerous substances such as silicone gel breast 
implants, diet drugs or other medical devices, and exposure to asbestos.14 In some 
instances, the exposed victims know of their exposure and have suffered injury. In other 
instances, exposed class members may know of their exposure, but have not developed 
any injuries.15  
 
Whereas single-accident mass torts seldom involve complex legal issues, causation is 
usually an issue in the context of dispersed mass torts.16 For example, in an asbestos-
related dispersed mass tort, the variations in individual factual issues that would need to 
                                                          
7
 D R Hensler ―Has the fat lady sung? The future of mass toxic torts‖ (2007) 26 Rev Litig 883 890. 
8
 Single-accident mass torts. See M F Connor ―Taming the Tort Monster” (2000) 4 Briefly 1 3.  
9
 Dispersed mass torts. Connor (2000) Briefly 3.  
10
 3.  
11
 For example, the ‗Black Saturday‘ bushfires of 7 February 2009 ravaged large parts of Victoria, Australia, 
which gave rise to a series of class actions. 
12
 3. 
13
 I R M Panzer and T E Patton ―Utilizing the Class Action Device in Mass Tort Litigation‖ (1985-1986) 21 
Tort & Ins LJ 560 560.  
14
 R H Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell (2012) 331 723. 
15
 Such claimants are commonly referred to as ‗future claimants‘.   
16
 Connor (2000) Briefly 3.   
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be taken into account, such as smoking or pre-existing illnesses, may constitute significant 
considerations when determining whether there is a sufficient causal link between the 
conduct and the injury. There may also be different levels and timing of exposure, different 
types of injuries suffered and the gravity of those injuries among the individual claimants 
would typically vary greatly.17  Connor states as follows regarding dispersed mass torts 
and the challenges they present: 
 
―What are sometimes referred to as ‗dispersed‘ mass tort actions involve multiple occurrences, 
over an extended period of time, of personal injuries that have a common cause. They typically 
allege harms caused by unreasonably dangerous products or environmental contaminants. 
They entail an indefinite and perhaps indeterminable number of individual claims for a variety of 
injuries, ranging from trifling to fatal or, with increasing frequency, simply a concern that such 
injuries will occur in the future. Causation is always an issue: (1) whether the product or 
substance is harmful at all and, if so, what harms it may cause (general causation); (2) whether, 
given general causation, a particular claimant‘s injury is attributable to the product or substance 
(specific or individual causation).‖18 
 
Feinberg also refers to the difficulties associated with dispersed mass torts when he states 
the following:  
  
―Plaintiffs in such cases have traditionally faced extraordinary difficulties in establishing a causal 
connection between the harmful product and the particular injury. Scientific evidence that may 
provide the basis for medical diagnoses or epidemiological studies is often not transferrable to 
the legal system. Even where a plaintiff is able to establish general causation, that is, an 
accepted causal relationship between a particular product and certain types of diseases, the 
plaintiff may be unable to show that his or her disease was caused by the product at issue and 
not some other agent. The difficulty in establishing causation is magnified where there is a long 
latency period between the exposure to a product and the development of the disease. As the 
length of time between exposure and development of the disease increases, the likelihood that 
the plaintiff's exposure to other agents that might have caused the same disease also 
increases. In addition, a long latency period exacerbates problems of identifying the particular 
product that caused the injury.‖19 
 
                                                          
17
 K R Feinberg ―The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust‖ (1990) 53(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 79 89.   
18
 Connor (2000) Briefly 3.   
19
 Feinberg (1990) Law and Contemporary Problems 82.   
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The remainder of this chapter refers to a mass personal injury class action as a type of 
class action where the proceedings relate to claims arising from personal injury. It 
distinguishes between a mass personal injury class action based on a single accident20 
and a mass personal injury class action based on a dispersed incident.21 As will become 
evident throughout the remainder of this chapter, this distinction is important because of 
the risk in dispersed incident mass personal injury class actions that the individual issues 
may overwhelm the fact that class proceedings may be otherwise appropriate, thereby 
possibly rendering the claims unsuitable for class action treatment.  
  
4 3 Individual issues and the class action mechanism 
 
The following part of this chapter considers whether the fact that there are individual 
issues that may need to be decided upon by a court in mass personal injury litigation, 
should preclude the use of a class action to adjudicate class members‘ claims. To do so, it 
may be instructive to look at the position in other jurisdictions before considering the South 
African position in this regard.   
 
4 3 1 The approaches of foreign jurisdictions 
 
4 3 1 1 Australia  
 
In terms of section 33C of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (―Federal Court Act‖), 
all that is required to maintain a representative proceeding is a single, substantial, 
common issue of fact or law.22 This requirement is unlike rule 23(b)(3) of the American 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rules‖) that requires that common issues 
predominate over individual issues.23 The Australian courts have interpreted the section 
33C-requirement in a manner that makes it relatively easy to satisfy in practice. The issue 
does not have to be of special significance or likely to have a major impact on the litigation 
in order to be ‗substantial‘; all that is required is that the issue must be real or of 
substance.24   
                                                          
20
 Single-accident mass personal injury class action. 
21
 Dispersed incident mass personal injury class action. 
22
 See Appendix B. 
23
 See Appendix A.   
24
 D Grave, K Adams & J Betts Class Actions in Australia (2012) 126 165. 
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The fact that section 33C only requires a single, substantial, common issue of fact or law 
indicates that the existence of certain issues that may need to be determined individually 
by a court does not necessarily preclude use of a class action to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims. This is reinforced by section 33Q of the Federal Court Act which 
provides that, if it appears to the Federal Court that determination of the issue(s) common 
to all the class members will not finally determine the claims of all those class members, 
the court may give directions in relation to the determination of the remaining issues. This 
may include directions establishing a subgroup of members and the appointment of a 
person to be the subgroup representative party on behalf of the subgroup members. ―In 
giving directions under section 33Q, the court may permit an individual group member to 
appear in the proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue that relates only to the 
claims of that member‖.25  
 
The existence of individual issues does not necessarily mean that the court will order that 
the representative proceeding no longer continues as a representative proceeding under 
section 33N of the Federal Court Act.  In other words, the fact that the damages hearings 
would need to be undertaken on an individual basis does not prevent there being a 
substantial question of law and fact.26   
 
Although Australian courts have accepted mass tort class actions under Part IVA of the 
Federal Court Act, it is still debated by academics and the courts whether Part IVA really 
lends itself to dispersed mass torts.27 As was mentioned above, in a single-accident mass 
                                                          
25
 Section 33R. 
26
 See, for example: Marks v Gio Australia Holdings Ltd 1996 63 FCR 304 315; Nixon v Philip Morris 
(Australia) Ltd 1999 95 FCR 453 89; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (No 2) 1999 ATPR 41-679 
42-683; McBride v Monzie 2007 164 FCR 559; and, Smith v University of Ballarat 2006 229 ALR 343 30. 
27
 See, for example, B Lipp ―Mass Tort Class Actions under the Federal Court of Australia Act: Justice for All 
or Justice Denied‖ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 361 365; W Pengilley ―Class Actions Stumble: 
Tobacco Companies Win on Class Action Certification‖ (2000) 16(3) Australian and New Zealand Trade 
Practices Law Bulletin 31 32. In Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon 2000 170 ALR 487, the applicants 
claimed that each class member had contracted a smoking related disease as a result of being influenced by 
representations made by the respondent tobacco companies. Sackville, Spender and Hill JJ held that the 
application did not satisfy the requirement in section 33C(I)(a) that each group member must have a claim 
against each respondent. They also held that the requirement in section 33C(1)(b) that the claims of each 
applicant and group member arise in similar or related circumstances was not satisfied because the claims of 
each of the thousands of group members arose from disparate representations made to them over a long 
period of time, resulting in different injuries with separate defences. It appears that Sackville J was 
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tort, the claims of all group members are likely to share the common characteristics of 
time, place and cause of injury, making resolution of the common claims arising in related 
circumstances suitable for class treatment. However, in the case of dispersed mass torts, 
the extent to which class members‘ claims are individualised raises the question whether a 
class action is the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ claims. For 
example, individual class members may need to lead evidence to prove causation, not 
only the quantum of damages, on an individualised basis. The courts have accordingly 
been reluctant to deal with such actions under Part IVA.28 
 
4 3 1 2 Ontario 
 
Section 6 of the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (―Ontario Act‖), provides that: 
 
―The court shall not refuse to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding solely on any of the 
following grounds: 1. The relief claimed includes a claim for damages that would require 
individual assessment after determination of the common issues…‖
29
 
 
The Ontario Commission recommended the adoption of a lower common-issues threshold 
test compared to the common-issues predominance test of the United States.30 It believed 
that it was possible to envisage actions that would benefit from class treatment even 
though the individual issues raised by the litigation predominate over the common issues. 
The Ontario Commission was of the view that, in such cases, judicial economy could still 
be achieved by a class action, or access to court may be provided to those with claims that 
otherwise could not be asserted because they are individually non-recoverable. As an 
example, the Ontario Commission cited a mass accident involving individual damage 
assessments where, despite a lack of predominance of common issues, a class action 
may nevertheless be the preferable mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ claims. 
Even in such circumstances, savings in time and money could still be secured in having 
some or all of the common liability questions determined in a single proceeding to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
concerned by the court's capacity to manage such a complex case when he said (at 521) that ―further 
pleading and endless management issues would be raised‖ if it were to proceed.   
28
 See, for example, Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon 2000 170 ALR 487.  
29
 In this regard, see the Ontario Commission‘s recommendation made at: Ontario Law Reform Commission 
Report on Class Actions Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General (1982) 347.  
30
 See 4 3 1 1 above where it is stated that rule 23(b)(3) of the American Federal Rules, for certification, 
requires that common issues predominate over individual issues. 
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inconsistent verdicts on the common questions that may arise in multiple individual actions 
concerning the same mass accident.31 
 
Although, as mentioned above, the predominance of common issues over individual 
issues is not required by the Ontario Act, it may inform the section 5(1)(c) ‗common 
issues‘32 by assisting the court in deciding whether the determination of the common 
issues would advance the claim in a meaningful way, considering the claim as a whole. It 
may also inform the section 5(1)(d) issue of whether the class action is the ‗preferable 
procedure‘ for the resolution of the common issues.33 In other words, the relative 
importance of common issues, on the one hand, and individual damages and other 
individual issues, on the other, remain relevant factors in the common issue and preferable 
procedure tests for certification.34 Therefore, although there is no predominance test in 
Ontario, if the common issues do predominate over the individual issues, it may 
nonetheless operate against the granting of the certification application.  
 
In Cloud v Canada (Attorney General)35 the court held that the section 5(1)(c) analysis 
turns on the importance of the common issue(s), rather than on the predominance of 
common issues over individual issues.36 Goudge JA did, however, recognise that the 
weighing of common and individual issues would be important to the determination of the 
preferable procedure under section 5(1)(d) of the Ontario Act.37  
 
It is apparent from the above that the existence of certain issues that may need to be 
decided upon by the court individually in mass personal injury litigation does not 
necessarily preclude the use of the class action mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ 
                                                          
31
 T Harvey, Q C Strosberg, W V Sasso & J A Horvat ―Recovery of Individual and Aggregate Damages in 
Class Actions‖ in Special Lectures 2008: Personal Injury Law (2009) 379 398. 
32
 Section 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. provides that the court shall certify a 
class proceeding if ―the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues‖. 
33
 398. 
34
 H M Rosenberg & J Kalajdzic ―Certification‖ in J Walker & G D Watson (eds) Class Actions in Canada: 
Cases, Notes, and Materials (2014) 55 84.  
35
 2004 73 OR (3d) 401, 2004 CanLII 45444 (CA). 
36
 Paras 53, 58. 
37
 Para 65. For a succinct summary of the position in Ontario, see Singer v Schering-Plough Canada Inc 
2010 ONSC 42, 87 CPC (6
th
) 276.  
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claims. In Scott v TD Waterhouse Investment Services (Canada) Inc38 Martinson J held 
that ―[t]here will be individual inquiries needed once the common issues have been 
resolved. That does not, of itself, preclude certification. I conclude that certification will not 
create a monster of complexity‖.39  
 
It is evident from what has been set out above that the position in Ontario is similar to the 
position in Australia. In both jurisdictions, the existence of individual issues does not by 
itself necessarily mean that the matter cannot be conducted as a class proceeding. Both 
jurisdictions have adopted legislation to regulate this issue, but the Ontario Act goes even 
further than its Australian counterpart does by incorporating express wording to this effect. 
The position of these jurisdictions will now be compared to the position in the United 
States. 
 
4 3 1 3 United States  
 
The position in the United States differs slightly from the approaches of Australia and 
Ontario in the sense that, in the United States, it is more likely that the existence of certain 
issues that may need to be determined individually may indeed preclude the use of the 
class action mechanism as a means to adjudicate class members‘ claims.   
 
No area of class action law has generated more judicial and scholarly debate than mass 
tort class actions.40 The origin of the debate can be traced to the 1966 Advisory Committee 
Notes where it is stated that: 
 
―A ‗mass accident‘ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a 
class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of 
liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In 
these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in 
practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.‖41 
 
                                                          
38
 2001 BCSC 1299. 
39
 Para 132. 
40
 See, for example, Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 330; S S Clark & C 
Harris ―The Past, Present and Future of Product Liability and Other Mass Tort Class Actions in Australia‖ 
(2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal 1022 1022. 
41
 Advisory Committee‘s Notes to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure 39 FRD 69, 103 (1966). 
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Because of the above comment, the courts were initially inclined to refuse to certify mass 
tort class actions.42 In this regard, Mullenix states as follows: 
 
―In 1966 the rulemakers amending the class action rule knew about mass accident cases – the 
airplane crash, for example – but they did not and could not envision contemporary mass tort 
litigation. Hence the rulemakers wrote their now-famous Advisory Committee Note, eschewing 
class certification of mass accident cases. This singular lack of vision subsequently enabled 
their Note to take on a life of its own, fulfilling the law of unintended consequences in the realm 
of mass tort litigation.‖43  
 
The courts‘ initial reluctance to certify mass tort class actions started to change in the late 
1970‘s when a number of federal trial courts certified such actions. However, the majority 
of these cases were reversed on appeal.44 A major shift in the federal courts‘ attitude 
regarding certification of mass tort class actions occurred in mid-1980. Courts were 
suddenly more inclined to certify mass tort class actions, notwithstanding the 1966 
Advisory Committee Notes and the fact that decisions favouring certification tended to be 
overturned on appeal.45  
 
Jenkins v Raymark Industries46 (―Jenkins‖) is regarded as a landmark ruling regarding the 
certification of mass tort class actions. In Jenkins, the Fifth Circuit approved the 
certification of a mass tort class action involving asbestos-related personal injuries 
instituted in terms of rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules.47 The court referred to the fact that 
                                                          
42
 See, for example, Casey v Pan American World Airways Inc  66 FRD 392 (ED Va 1975) where the court 
denied the plaintiffs‘ application for certification of a class action of airplane crash cases.  
43
 L S Mullenix ―Practical Wisdom and Third-generation Mass Tort Litigation (1997-1998) 31 Loy L A L Rev 
551 552. 
44
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 332. Examples of cases certified but 
then reversed on appeal include: a class action involving the collapse of two skywalks at the Kansas City 
Hyatt Regency killing 114 people – certified in 1982 and reversed the same year; a nationwide class of 
persons claiming injuries from the Dalkon Shield birth control device – certified in 1981 and reversed in 1982.  
45
 See, for example, R H Transgrud ―Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent‖ (1989) U III L Rev 69 71.  
46
 782 F2d 468 (5
th
 Cir 1986). 
47
 It may be worth restating that rule 23(b)(3) provides for opt-out class actions and that, in addition to 
complying with the threshold requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy, the plaintiff 
must also show that ―the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controvercy‖. 
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the courts had been reluctant to certify mass tort cases but stated that, in light of the 5 000 
pending asbestos cases in the relevant circuit, ―necessity moves us to change and 
invent‖.48 The Fifth Circuit found that the predominance49 and superiority50 requirements 
were satisfied and accordingly held that the district court‘s decision to permit the 
consolidation of approximately 900 cases pending in its district into a class of plaintiffs 
under rule 23(b)(3) was justified.51  
 
Because of the appellate courts‘ willingness to certify mass tort class actions, various 
cases inter alia relating to toxic spills, pharmaceutical products and medical devices were 
instituted and certification was successfully sought.52 In recent years, however, courts 
have again viewed mass tort class actions with scepticism. Moreover, similar to Australia, 
courts have been more willing to certify single-accident mass torts than they have been to 
certify dispersed mass torts.53 For example, in Amchem Products Inc v Windsor54 
(―Amchem‖) the United States Supreme Court held that the proposed class did not satisfy 
the predominance requirement because it involved individuals exposed to different 
products that contained asbestos, over different time-periods and in different ways. 
Furthermore, the class members had developed a variety of symptoms because of their 
                                                          
48
 473. 
49
 The district court found that the ‗state of the art‘ defense i.e. that the dangerous nature of asbestos could 
not reasonably have been known at the time it was placed on the market, predominated over any individual 
issues. 
50
 The Fifth Circuit (at 473) noted that the district court‘s ―plan is clearly superior to the alternative of 
repeating, hundreds of times over, the litigation of the state of the art issues with, as [the] experienced 
[district court] judge says, ‗days of the same witnesses, exhibits and issues from trial to trial‘‘‘.  
51
 There were also other significant appellate court rulings upholding class certification during the mid-1980s. 
See, for example, In re School Asbestos Litigation 789 F2d 996 (3
rd
 Cir 1986) 1009, where the Third Circuit 
noted that ―the trend has been for courts to be more receptive to use of the class action in mass tort 
litigation‖ and In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation 818 F2d 145 (2
nd
 Cir 1987), where the Second 
Circuit upheld the certification of a class of former military members and their families seeking damages for 
injuries caused by exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange. 
52
 See, for example, In re AH Robins Co 880 F2d 709 (4
th
 Cir 1989). 
53
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 332. In the mid-1990s, this view 
became more prevalent following upon the issuing of several significant rulings by various federal appellate 
courts. See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc 51 F3d 1293 (7
th
 Cir 1995) and Castano v Am 
Tobacco Co 84 F3d 734 (5
th
 Cir 1996). 
54
 521 US 591 (1997). 
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exposures with some having no symptoms at all.55 Specifically, the court stated the 
following in this regard: 
 
―In contrast to mass torts involving a single accident, class members in this case were exposed 
to different asbestos containing products, in different ways, over different periods, and for 
different amounts of time; some suffered no physical injury, others suffered disabling or deadly 
diseases.‖56  
 
In Ortiz v Fibreboard Corporation57 (―Ortiz‖), the Supreme Court again ruled against 
certification of an asbestos class action.  According to Hensler: 
 
―The ultimately successful critique of mass tort class actions that culminated in the Amchem and 
Ortiz decisions was based on the belief that these class actions deprived tort claimants of their 
right to individualized process and outcomes, a belief that ignores the realities of aggregated 
non-class mass tort litigation, which offers little of either‖.58  
 
According to Klonoff, the reluctance59 of courts to certify mass tort class actions does not 
mean that the class action mechanism is no longer appropriate to be utilised in such 
cases.60 Similarly, Mullenix states that: 
 
―[L]awyers and judges have not given up on the class action as a possible means, among 
many, for resolving mass tort litigation. Quite sensibly, the practitioners understand that the 
Supreme Court‘s pronouncements in its Amchem decision have not eliminated either the 
                                                          
55
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 336-337. See also Ortiz v Fibreboard 
Corp 527 US 815 (1999); Mullenix (1997-1998) Loy L A L Rev 554-555. 
56
 609. 
57
 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
58
 D R Hensler ―Goldilocks and the Class Action‖ (2012-2013) 126 Harv L Rev 56 58.  
59
 Interestingly, according to Hensler (2007) Rev Litig 910, in a study conducted after the United States 
Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, which were widely viewed as signifying the 
end of certification of mass tort class actions, it was found that the number of annual mass tort class action 
filings declined in the year the court handed down its decision in Amchem, but increased after Ortiz was 
decided. By 2001 the number of mass tort class action filings had almost doubled, by comparison with the 
year in which Amchem was decided. It was further reported that the number of annual federal class action 
filings in mass tort cases remained the same from 2001 through 2005. 
60
 See, for example, In re Copley Pharm Inc 161 FRD 456 (D Wyo 1995). 
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litigation class or the settlement class as a means for aggregating and resolving mass tort 
litigation‖.61  
 
However, the application of the class action device to the adjudication of mass torts has 
nevertheless been fraught with difficulty and uncertainty.62 Satisfying the prerequisites for 
a class action is generally unproblematic.63 However, as mentioned, certification under rule 
23(b)(3) requires that a question of law or fact common to the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual class members and that a class action be superior to 
other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.64 ―In order 
to meet the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that ‗the 
issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the 
class as a whole,…predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized 
proof‘.‖65 In other words, when one or more of the central issues in the action 
predominates, the action can be maintained pursuant to rule 23(b)(3) even though other 
significant issues may have to be tried separately. For example, predominance may be 
found even in cases where damages have to be determined individually. However, it has 
been proposed that, if the central issues in the case require the separate adjudication of 
each class member‘s individual claim or defence, a rule 23(b)(3) class action is usually 
inappropriate.66  
 
Rule 23(b)(3) provides a list of factors that courts should consider to determine 
predominance and superiority. One such factor is the difficulties that may arise in 
managing the class action. This is often a determinative factor. A defendant‘s liability will 
ordinarily be a question common to all persons injured in an incident by the same defective 
product. Of concern are the disparate injury claims of thousands of plaintiffs who at some 
stage in the action will all be required to come to court individually and to prove their own 
injury and damages. This gives rise to serious manageability issues. However, it has been 
suggested that extraordinary pressure has been brought to bear on our courts to devise 
                                                          
61
 Mullenix (1997-1998) Loy L A L Rev 554. 
62
 Panzer & Patton (1985-1986) Tort & Ins L J 561. 
63
 M H Mintzer and Y Daley-Duncan ―Mass tort litigation: Why class action suits are not the answer‖ (1992-
1993) Brief 25 26. See also Panzer & Patton (1985-1986) Tort & Ins L J 563. 
64
 See Danvers Motor Co v Ford Motor Co 543 F3d 141, 148 (3d Cir 2008) ―[w]here an action is to proceed 
under rule 23(b)(3), the commonality requirement is subsumed by the predominance requirement‖.  
65
 Runstein v Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc,. 211 F3d 1228, 1233 (11
th
 Cir 2000). 
66
 M H Greer A Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions (2010) 85. 
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means to control the flood of mass tort litigations which some people view as threatening 
to break down the United States judicial system. Thus, the view proffered is that courts are 
coming to learn that the central issue of liability may well be considered controlling over 
the separate issues of injury and damages. Therefore, according to Panzer & Patton, the 
fact that damages may raise individualised issues should not necessarily defeat the 
maintenance of the class action as to liability.67  
 
According to Mulheron, where the existence of a number of non-common issues will result 
in the class proceedings breaking down into a long series of individual trials, it is likely that 
any potential judicial efficiency that may be brought about by the use of the class action 
mechanism will be lost. She therefore states that, in the United States, there is a close 
connection between the commonality and superiority requirements in class action 
adjudication. Mulheron states that, whilst the class action regime of the United States 
expressly refers to predominance of common issues, the regimes of Australia and Ontario 
have concluded that where the common issues are not ‗substantial‘ or ‗big‘ enough in 
relation to the individual issues, then judicial economy will not be served by the class 
action. In this event, the class action device is not likely to be the superior device because 
of the manageability problems associated with the individual issues.68 
 
Regarding the determination of damages in mass tort class actions, in Comcast 
Corporation v Behrend69 (―Comcast‖), the United States Supreme Court held that, where a 
plaintiff cannot show how it would prove damages with common proof, individual damages 
issues may predominate.70 Cailteux & Barraza state as follows regarding the Comcast 
decision:  
 
―When the Supreme Court decided Comcast two years ago, it was described as a ‗game-
changer‘ that would make it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class certification by requiring 
class-wide proof of damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) at the certification stage. Since 
Comcast, though, the federal circuit courts of appeal have, by and large, narrowly interpreted 
the decision as standing for just two propositions: (1) when moving for class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiffs‘ model for determining class-wide damages must measure damages 
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that result from the class‘s asserted theory of injury; and (2) individualized damages do not 
automatically defeat Rule 23(b)(3) certification.‖71 
 
Multiple circuit courts have subsequently interpreted and applied Comcast in the context of 
class certification. The majority of the courts that have expressed a view on the scope 
of Comcast have interpreted it as finding that a model for determining class-wide damages 
relied upon to certify a class under rule 23(b)(3) must measure damages that result from 
the class‘s asserted injury claim. Furthermore, they have made the important finding that 
Comcast is not authority for the proposition that a class cannot be certified under rule 
23(b)(3) because individual damages cannot be measured on a class-wide basis.72 
According to a recent Second Circuit decision, these views are shared by the First, 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits.73 
 
There has, however, been a tendency in the United States, when dealing with mass tort 
litigation, to consider alternative forms of aggregated litigation, other than class 
proceedings. Hensler states that, in the United States, many different large-scale litigation 
devices exist, other than the class action. These include ―multi-district litigation, formal 
consolidation, informal aggregation and bankruptcy. Some of these devices have been 
established by statute, some by court rule and some are the products of creative 
management by judges and lawyers‖.74 She further states that: 
 
―Courts have responded to the challenges posed by mass personal injury litigation by devising 
streamlined procedures to resolve individual cases, informally aggregating and formally 
consolidating cases for settlement or trial, facilitating global settlements and facilitating the 
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design and implementation of administrative processes for delivering compensation to individual 
claimants. There approaches have been used alone in some litigation, but many mass tort 
cases have involved the use of two or more of these approaches concurrently or sequentially.‖75  
 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to consider alternatives to a class action in the 
context of mass personal injury litigation. As mentioned, the purpose of this chapter is, 
firstly, to consider whether the fact that there are issues that may need to be determined 
individually necessarily precludes the use of the class action mechanism to adjudicate 
class members‘ claims and, secondly, to consider the methods our courts could utilise to 
determine damages in mass personal injury class actions. It is apparent from the above-
mentioned approaches of Australia, Ontario and the United States that the existence of 
such issues does not necessarily mean that the class action mechanism cannot be 
utilised. As will be explained in more detail below, the South African certification 
requirement that there must be issues of fact and/or law common to all the members of the 
class is more aligned to the approaches of Australia and Ontario than the United States 
where, as mentioned, predominance of the common issues over the individual issues is 
required. However, it will be argued below that manageability considerations become 
increasingly relevant when considering whether to certify a dispersed incident mass 
personal injury class action.  
 
4 3 2 South Africa  
 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA held that it is a requirement for class 
certification that there must be ―some common claim or issue that can be determined by 
way of a class action‖.76 In other words, the existence of individual issues does not 
necessarily preclude the utilisation of the class action mechanism to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims. Wallis JA commented as follows in this regard:   
  
―This does not require that every claim advanced in the class action, save possibly in relation to 
quantum, be identical. It requires that there be issues of fact, or law, or both fact and law, that 
are common to all members of the class and can appropriately be determined in one action… 
The simplest example of such a common issue would be the issue of negligence in a case 
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involving the derailment of a train. That could give rise to different claims, such as damages for 
personal injuries by passengers, dependents‘ claims for loss of support in respect of those 
killed, claims for loss of or damage to goods being carried on the train and damage to other 
property arising as a result of the derailment, but there would be sufficient commonality on the 
issue of negligence to sustain a class action. That highlights the point that the class action does 
not have to dispose of every aspect of the claim in order to obtain certification. It might in an 
appropriate case be restricted to the primary issue of liability, leaving quantum to be dealt with 
by individual claimants. Certain common issues could be certified for the entire class, and other 
subsidiary issues certified in respect of defined subclasses. But the question in respect of any 
class or subclass is always whether there are common issues that can be determined that will 
dispose of all or a significant part of the claims by the members of the class or subclass.‖77 
 
The above approach adopted by Wallis JA is in line with the recommendations of the 
South African Law Commission (―SALC‖) in its Working Paper. The SALC recommended 
that the proposed legislation should expressly provide that the resolution of individual 
issues does not preclude a court from certifying a class action. The SALC, in its Report, 
recommended that the relevant clause should simply provide that:  
 
―The court shall not be precluded from certifying an action as a class action merely by reason of 
the fact that there are issues pertaining to the claims of all or some of the members of the class 
which will require individual determination, or that different class members seek different 
relief‖.78  
 
Further, in the Working Paper, the SALC recommended that the proposed legislation 
should empower the court to recognise the existence of issues that may need to be 
determined individually and to give directions as to the procedure to be followed to 
determine such issues. According to the Working Paper, consideration would need to be 
given to the question whether more detailed provisions are necessary with regard to the 
resolution of individual issues and, if so, whether these should be contained in legislation 
or court rules.79  
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Moreover, in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA held that ―[c]lass actions are a 
particularly appropriate way in which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but 
they are equally useful in the context of mass personal injury cases or consumer 
litigation‖.80 He held that a ―class action may be certified in respect of limited issues, for 
example, negligence in a mass personal injuries claim, leaving issues personal to the 
members of the class, such as damages, to be resolved separately‖.81  
 
The position in South Africa regarding the question whether the existence of individual 
issues precludes the use of class proceedings is more in accordance with the approaches 
of Australia and Ontario than the approach in the United States. As mentioned, the 
approach in the United States is to determine whether the individual issues predominate 
over the common issues. If so, then a class action is inappropriate. There is no 
predominance requirement in respect of class actions in South Africa insofar as the 
individual issues vis-à-vis the common issues are concerned. It is also not a requirement 
in Australia and Ontario. Section 33C of the Australian Federal Court Act only requires a 
single, substantial, common issue of fact or law and section 5(1) of the Ontario 
Act requires that ―the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues‖. 
Similar to Australia and Ontario, the threshold is relatively low in South African class 
proceedings. All that is required for certification is ―some common claim or issue that can 
be determined by way of a class action‖.82 Ultimately, therefore, unlike the position in the 
United States, the existence of individual issues should not necessarily preclude 
certification of a class action as a means to adjudicate class members‘ claims. 
 
4 4 Determining damages in mass personal injury class actions 
 
Although the existence of individual issues should not necessarily preclude certification of 
a class action, our courts have not yet given proper consideration as to how the individual 
issues could be determined, specifically the devices that could be utilised when 
determining damages in mass personal injury class actions. In the following part of this 
chapter certain possible methods to determine damages in South African mass personal 
injury class actions are considered, having regard to the existing procedural framework 
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developed by our courts and the approaches followed in Australia, Ontario and the United 
States.   
 
4 4 1 Class-wide damages 
 
In assessing the quantum of delictual damages after a damage-causing event, the object 
or aim is to compensate the injured or prejudiced plaintiff(s) by placing them in the same 
financial position they were, had the damage-causing event not occurred. The plaintiff is 
inter alia burdened with the duty to prove the loss he or she has suffered, including the 
uncertain future loss that might not yet have transpired at the time the claim is lodged. In 
civil cases, the standard of proof is a balance of probability. This means that plaintiffs must 
prove that they have more likely than not suffered damage and they must also prove the 
exact amount of damages that should be awarded to compensate for their loss.83   
 
With the above in mind, one possible method to determine the quantum of damages in 
mass personal injury class actions is to replace individual damage trials with class-wide 
calculation of damages. In other words, a court determines damages payable by means of 
an aggregate award against the defendant so that the damages sustained by the class as 
a whole can be computed by class-wide proof.84 Aggregate assessment either may occur 
by a global or lump sum award against the defendant or may be achieved by the 
application of a formula to individual class members‘ claims. The individual class members 
are not required to prove their actual loss or damages in separate trial proceedings.85 
Once damages are calculated on a class-wide basis, they can be distributed individually, 
usually through a type of claims process or to the class as a whole.  
 
Although the class-wide calculation of damages avoids the burdensome approach of 
conducting individual trials for each class member, it does give rise to due process 
concerns and concerns regarding inaccuracy in the calculation of the aggregate 
assessment.86 In the United States, courts have mostly disapproved of proving 
individualised damages issues through the class-wide calculation of damages in the 
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context of mass personal injury class actions. The prevalent view is that a determination of 
the quantum of damages generally requires individual assessment.87  
 
The approach of Ontario is similar to the approach followed in the United States. Section 
24(1)(c) of the Ontario Act provides that a court may determine the aggregate or a part of 
a defendant‘s liability to class members and render judgment where the aggregate or a 
part of the defendant‘s liability to some or all class members can reasonably be 
determined without proof by individual class members. It has been held that this section is 
not appropriate in the context of a mass personal injury class action as the claims could 
not be ―reasonably determined without proof by individual class members‖.88  
 
A similar approach is adopted in Australia where the Federal Court Act provides that the 
court must not make an aggregate award ―unless a reasonably accurate assessment can 
be made of the total amount to which group members will be entitled under the 
judgment‖.89  
 
The case of Bywater v Toronto Transit Commission90 (―Bywater‖) is an example of a 
situation where the determination of class members‘ damages is necessarily entirely 
individualistic, dependent upon a number of factors unique to the class member, requiring 
individual assessment of damages.91 In Bywater, the class consisted of individuals 
exposed to smoke arising from a fire that broke out in the Toronto Transit Commission 
subway system, including their estates and all living relatives of such individuals. Winkler J 
held that the case was not appropriate for an aggregate assessment of damages. The 
action inter alia advanced claims for personal injury and these claims could not be 
―reasonably determined without proof by individual class members‖ as required by section 
24(1)(c) of the Ontario Act. Further, each individual claim required proof of the essential 
element of causation which, in the words of section 24(1)(b) was a ―question of fact or law 
other than those relating to an assessment of damages‖. In addition, the assessment of 
damages in each case had to be individual. All of the usual factors had to be considered in 
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assessing individual damage claims for personal injury, such as: the individual plaintiff‘s 
time of exposure to smoke; the extent of any resultant injury; general personal health and 
medical history; age; any unrelated illness and other individual considerations. Even if by 
class definition the members of the proposed class suffered exposure to smoke, the extent 
of such exposure and any damage flowing from it would vary on an individual basis. 
 
One way to establish class-wide proof of damages is through extrapolation.92 Extrapolation 
occurs when cases are tried after being selected randomly according to probability 
principles on the basis that it could have statistical validity for the entire field of cases.93 
The use of random sampling and probability analysis for damages calculation, by 
determining individual trials for randomly selected plaintiffs in each category of plaintiffs 
and then extrapolating the average damage award to all class members in that category, 
has for the most part been disapproved of in the United States.94 The same disapproval 
has been shown toward statistical sampling as a way to circumvent the need for individual 
hearings to determine the quantum of damages. 
 
In McLaughlin v American Tobacco Co95 (―McLaughlin‖), the plaintiffs proposed to prove 
damages on a class-wide basis and then set up a claims process for individual plaintiffs.96 
The plaintiffs – cigarette users – claimed they were deceived into believing that ‗light‘ 
cigarettes were not as dangerous as regular cigarettes.97 The plaintiffs proposed to 
estimate the percentage of defrauded class members through statistical methods and then 
to calculate damages by way of an estimate of the average loss per plaintiff.   
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The Second Circuit rejected this attempt as a ―disconnect‖ that violated both due process 
and the Rules Enabling Act,98 which provides that the Federal Rules cannot be used to 
―abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right‖.99 Numerous courts throughout the 
United States are in accord with McLaughlin.100 Cases rejecting statistical sampling often 
show a particular aversion to statistical evidence in certain types of class actions. 
Typically, courts show increased hesitancy to allow statistical sampling and extrapolation 
where the underlying cause of action is inherently particularised to each individual plaintiff. 
In this regard, several courts have emphatically rejected statistical sampling evidence in 
personal injury suits.101  
 
In re Fibreboard Corporation,102 the Fifth Circuit rejected extrapolation in the context of 
thousands of asbestos cases. Under the trial plan proposed by the district court, plaintiffs 
and defendants were each to choose fifteen illustrative plaintiffs, whose individual claims 
would be tried along with those of the eleven class representatives. Then, based upon the 
forty-one cases plus expert testimony, the jury would determine the total damages suffered 
by the remaining 2 990 class members. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the trial plan and in so 
doing indicated that such aggregated proof raised due process and Seventh Amendment 
concerns. The court rejected the plaintiffs‘ claim that statistical measures of 
representativeness and commonality would be sufficient for the jury to make informed 
judgments concerning damages.103 It also rejected the argument that this approach was 
―the only realistic way of trying these cases‖ and that ―the difficulties faced by the courts as 
well as the rights of the class members to have their cases tried [cried] powerfully for 
innovation and judicial creativity‖.104 The court noted that such arguments were compelling 
but that they are better addressed by the representative branches – congress and the 
state legislature.105 The court also stressed that the trial plan would have altered the 
substantive law of Texas by eliminating the need for each claimant to prove causation and 
damages.106 The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in a subsequent post-trial phase In 
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re Fibreboard in which the same district court again tried to determine class-wide damages 
using a sample of class members.  
 
Similarly, in Cimino v Raymark Industries Inc107 the court rejected the district court‘s 
random selection of 160 cases and five categories of disease to extrapolate damages to 
2 128 other asbestos cases on numerous grounds, including the Seventh Amendment 
right to jury trial and the Texas substantive requirement that damages be proved by 
―individuals, not groups‖.108 The main difference between the approaches of Parker J for 
the court a quo and the Fifth Circuit relates to the issue of whether leeway may be given in 
aggregated cases to allow determination of damages on a basis other than strict 
individualised examination as to each plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit was of the view that such 
leeway cannot be given inter alia for the reasons referred to above. 
 
In Arch v American Tobacco Company,109 the court also rejected the plaintiff‘s proposal to 
use statistical sampling to award class-wide damages in a tobacco lawsuit, concluding that 
the ―degree of injury‖ for each class member ―would necessarily entail an individual 
inquiry‖.   
 
It is apparent from what has been set out above that courts have generally rejected the 
use of statistical sampling or extrapolation to determine damages in personal injury cases 
on the basis that the class action device does not trump the requirement that plaintiffs 
must individually show proof of damages.110 As one court explained, proof of injury ―is in 
no way lessened by reason of being raised in the context of a class action‖.111 The class 
action mechanism ―does not alter the required elements which must be found to impose 
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liability and fix damages‖.112 In Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Dukes113 the Supreme Court held 
that it was not possible to replace individualised adjudication with extrapolation and the 
use of statistical methods in that a ―class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart 
will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims‖.114 
 
It is recommended that South African courts should follow a similar approach when 
deciding on the permissibility of class-wide proof of damages in mass personal injury 
cases insofar as class-wide proof of damages would, in a South African context, 
conceivably also raise ‗due process‘ concerns. For example, the individual class members 
could argue that they are entitled to provide the court with individualised proof of the 
damages that they have suffered. The defendants, in turn, could argue that they should be 
entitled to contest the damages claims of individual class members. A further concern is 
the questionable accuracy of methods utilised to prove damages on a class-wide basis, 
such as extrapolation or statistical sampling.115 The SALC in its Working Paper addressed 
the appropriateness of aggregate assessment of damages in the context of mass personal 
injury class actions. The SALC stated that in some cases it may be appropriate for the 
court to determine the monetary claims as a common issue and make an aggregate award 
that assesses the total liability of the defendant to the class.116 According to the SALC, 
where the class members can be identified and the amount of their individual claims can 
be easily determined without their assistance, aggregate awards are appropriate; for 
example, where individuals have been overcharged in respect of services rendered. In this 
kind of case, the court can order the defendant to produce its records to facilitate 
identification of the class members and evaluation of their claims. It would be unnecessary 
to require that class members prove their claims individually, which would be the case in a 
personal injury class action.117 According to the SALC, in a mass personal injury class 
action, the quantum of damages is regarded as an individual issue and it is generally not 
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acceptable to award damages to class members based on an aggregate assessment.118 
The view of the SALC is informed by and accords with the approaches of the above-
mentioned foreign jurisdictions. 
 
It is therefore likely that class-wide proof of damages through extrapolation, statistical 
sampling or otherwise, would be problematic in a South African context, as is the case in 
the United States. It is therefore recommended that individual proof of damages in mass 
personal injury class actions should in principle always be required by South African 
courts. There may, however, be devices that could be utilised to facilitate individual proof 
of damages in mass personal injury class actions. These devices could assist in achieving 
judicial economy without detracting from or infringing upon a party‘s right to a fair public 
hearing as enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(―Constitution‖), and will be considered in more detail below.  
 
4 4 2 Severing the common issues from the individual issues 
 
Where the damages suffered by class members have to be determined, it is generally 
necessary for individual evidence to be given by each class member. It may therefore be 
necessary to sever the common issues from the individual issues for all class members in 
multiple stages of the same litigation. This is typically referred to as bifurcation. According 
to Mulheron, the jurisdictions of Australia, Ontario and the United States all practise 
bifurcation or a similar form of splitting of the trial. It entails that the individual issues are 
resolved within the class action itself but in a phase of the litigation which is separate from 
the common-issues trial.119  
 
The most common form of bifurcation is between liability and damages. For example, in 
the United States, judges who have certified mass tort cases for trial typically tend to try 
the common issues first and then hold separate trials for individual damage claims or 
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groups of damage claims. In the first asbestos worker injury class action – Jenkins – 
Judge Robert Parker proposed to hold a single trial on the common issues of liability and 
punitive damages, followed by multiple individual trials on damages in which juries would 
hear the cases of seven to ten plaintiffs at a time and determine damages for each.120 
Similarly, in the Australian case of Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd,121 
Mason P stated that the court may decide to sever a single representative proceeding into 
separate proceedings, or groups of proceedings, if it is desirable to resolve specific issues 
that may remain after the common issues are resolved. The fact that the proceedings 
sought the recovery of specific amounts in respect of each individual was held not to 
preclude the application of the representative action rule.122  
 
Regarding the severance of the common issues from the individual issues, section 33Q of 
the Australian Federal Court Act provides that, if it appears to the Federal Court that 
determining the issue(s) ―common to all group members will not finally determine the 
claims of all group members, the court may give directions in relation to the determination 
of the remaining issues‖. This may include directions establishing a subgroup of group 
members and the appointment of a person to be the subgroup representative party on 
behalf of the subgroup members. Further, in giving directions under section 33Q, the court 
may permit an individual group member to appear in the proceeding to determine an issue 
that relates only to the claims of that group member.123  Section 33R has been invoked by 
the courts to facilitate orders dealing with the determination of the claims of individual 
group members following a decision in relation to common issues at an initial trial.124 
 
Accordingly, the Australian regime expressly allows for the determination of individual or 
‗subgroup‘ issues as part of a class action. The precise approach of the court to 
determining these issues is dependent upon the facts of each case. The court has wide 
powers to make orders to ensure that justice is done in a proceeding. It has broad powers 
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to direct how class members should establish their entitlement to share in the damages 
and the manner in which any dispute that may arise in this regard should be 
determined.125    
 
The Ontario Act also makes provision for the severance of the common issues from the 
individual issues in class proceedings. Section 24 of the Ontario Act provides as follows: 
 
―24(1) The court may determine the aggregate or a part of a defendant‘s liability to class 
members and give judgment accordingly where, 
(a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of some or all class members; 
(b) no questions of fact or law other than those relating to the assessment of monetary relief 
remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the defendant‘s monetary 
liability; and 
(c) the aggregate or a part of the defendant‘s liability to some or all class members can 
reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members. 
(2) The court may order that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be applied so that 
some or all individual class members share in the award on an average or proportional basis.  
(3) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the court shall consider whether 
it would be impractical or inefficient to identify the class members entitled to share in the award 
or to determine the exact shares that should be allocated to individual class members.  
(4) When the court orders that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be divided among 
individual class members, the court shall determine whether individual claims need to be made 
to give effect to the order.‖ 
 
Section 25(1) of the Ontario Act provides as follows: 
 
―When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that the 
participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, other than 
those that may be determined under section 24, the court may, 
(a) determine the issues in further hearings presided over by the judge who determined the 
common issues or by another judge of the court; 
(b) appoint one or more persons to conduct a reference under the rules of court and report 
back to the court; and 
(c) with the consent of the parties, direct that the issues be determined in any other manner.‖ 
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Subsections 25(2) and (3) further provide that the court shall give directions as to the 
procedure to be followed and, in doing so, shall choose the least expensive and most 
expeditious method of determining the issues that is consistent with justice to the class 
members and the parties, including dispensing with any procedural step or authorising any 
special procedural step. 
 
In considering the procedure for individual assessments under section 25, the courts have 
recognised that when deciding the manageability question, the decision of the court should 
be based on what, on the basis of experience, is likely to occur assuming good faith and 
professional competence, and considering all available forms of dispute resolution.126 
According to Winkler C.J.O., the provisions that allow for the use of modified procedures to 
conduct individual assessments are aimed at ensuring that the court is able determine the 
individual issues in a cost-effective and timely fashion. Accordingly, the fact that damages 
may not be amenable to aggregate assessment at the conclusion of a common issues trial 
is not fatal to certification of a class proceeding. He states that an action may be certified 
as a class proceeding even in cases where small amounts of damages must be 
individually assessed because, in the absence of this possibility, the purposes of the 
Ontario Act would be eroded. Therefore, what is called for in addressing the preferable 
procedure requirement is to look not just at the common issues trial, but also at the other 
procedural options for conducting the class action litigation pursuant to the Ontario Act. 
 
Winkler C.J.O. refers to section 25 that confers broad jurisdiction on the common issues 
trial judge to fashion procedures to be followed where inter alia damages cannot be 
aggregately assessed. The common issues trial judge has the authority to direct a further 
trial,127 to appoint ―one or more persons to conduct a reference‖,128 and to give directions 
on the procedures to be followed.129 He refers to section 25(3) which amplifies the broad 
jurisdiction of the common issues judge. The section provides that, in giving directions 
under section 25(2), ―the court shall choose the least expensive and most expeditious 
method of determining the issues that is consistent with justice to class members and the 
parties, and in so doing, the court may, (a) dispense with any procedural step that it 
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considers unnecessary; and (b) authorize any special procedural steps, including steps 
relating to discovery, and any special rules, including rules relating to admission of 
evidence and means of proof, that it considers appropriate‖.130 
 
Accordingly, section 25 of the CPA confers a wide discretion upon the trial judge to 
determine how individual issues are to be dealt with, including the power to dispense with 
usual procedural steps.131 Cullity J states the following in this regard:  
 
―The court at this stage [certification] of the proceeding is, of course, not equipped with sufficient 
foresight to predict with any certainty the most appropriate method, or methods, of resolving the 
individual issues that will remain after the trial of common issues. That question—and the 
details that will need to be addressed—must be considered in the light of the decisions on the 
common issues and the evidence that will be given at the trial. For this reason, Section 25 of the 
CPA confers a wide discretion on the trial judge to decide how the individual issues will be dealt 
with. The discretion includes authority to authorise or dispense with procedural steps—including 
discovery—and to prescribe rules relating to the admission of evidence and the means of proof 
that the judge considers appropriate.‖132 
 
It is apparent from the above that the class action regimes of Australia and Ontario make 
provision for severance of the common issues from the individual issues through 
bifurcation or some other form of trial-splitting. In the United States, rule 23(c)(4) of the 
Federal Rules provides that ―[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained 
as a class action with respect to particular issues‖.  
 
This provision has given rise to some controversy – it has been given both a restrictive and 
expansive interpretation and, whichever interpretation is chosen, has a significant effect on 
whether the common issues are substantial enough to justify class action treatment. In 
other words, the relationship between rule 23(c)(4) and the predominance requirement is 
unclear. An expansive reading of the provision means that the class is restricted to the 
common issues and absent class members must institute subsequent individual 
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proceedings after the class action has terminated to resolve all remaining non-class 
issues. This expansive interpretation means that, because all the particular issues will be 
common to the class, class actions satisfy the rule 23(b)(3)-predominance requirement by 
definition.133  
 
Conversely, a restrictive reading of rule 23(c)(4) authorises bifurcated class actions and 
reiterates a court‘s power to certify a class action even when some issues cannot be 
resolved commonly. Supporters of this interpretation contend that the provision is merely a 
housekeeping tool, not a mechanism to circumvent other rule 23 requirements and, in 
particular, is not intended to serve as an alternative to a rule 23(b)(3) class action or to 
alter the predominance test in any way.134 
 
It is suggested that the expansive interpretation would render the predominance 
requirement superfluous insofar as class actions would satisfy it by definition. On the other 
hand, the restrictive interpretation appears to render rule 23(c)(4) itself superfluous as it 
does not really add to or vary the other rule 23 provisions. Mulheron therefore justifiably 
states that the uncertainty and lack of uniformity with which rule 23(c)(4) has been 
interpreted suggests that the wording is best avoided in other regimes.135  
 
Bifurcation is a significant device for segmenting and ultimately disposing of aggregate 
litigation. The sequential trial lowers the expected cost of litigation compared to a unitary 
trial for both the plaintiff and defendant, because it holds out the prospect of avoiding 
litigation on subsequent issues if the defendant succeeds in respect of the current issue or 
the parties settle the remaining issues after the current one is decided.136  
 
The selected foreign jurisdictions clearly make provision for some form of bifurcated 
procedure. This in itself, however, does not necessarily address the problem, which is the 
actual method of proof of individual damages, referred to as a problem essentially 
pertaining to the manageability of class litigation. Even if the proceedings are bifurcated, 
the question remains what mechanisms or devices can be used to determine damages in 
mass personal injury class actions. 
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4 4 3 Subclassing 
 
Subclassing serves as an adjunct to bifurcation.137 Once a trial has been bifurcated, 
subclasses may be necessary for handling various damages claims. For example, in an 
action arising out of an environmental catastrophe, there may be subclasses based on the 
degree of exposure or the severity or type of physical injury.138 
 
The only reference in the American Federal Rules to subclasses is rule 23(c)(4) mentioned 
above. In this regard, in Harris v Pan Am World Airways Inc139 it was held that ―[t]he court 
may provide for the protection of separable interests by resort to Rule 23(c)(4) and direct 
that ‗a class…be divided into subclasses and each subclass be treated as a class…‘‘‘ 
Similarly, in Australia, provision is made for subclasses. For example, in McMullin v ICI 
Australia Operations Pty Ltd,140 judgment on liability was delivered, followed by the hearing 
and determination of some damages claims and the settlement of some of these claims. 
For those claims under $100 000, orders were made under section 33Q(1) of the Federal 
Court Act for 16 sub-classes and to delegate those to a judicial registrar, with the larger 
claims heard by judges. 
 
In South Africa, Wallis JA in Children’s Resource Centre Trust expressly confirmed that 
subclasses can be established to determine individual issues.141 Accordingly, where the 
matter is bifurcated, it may also be worth considering creating subclasses where issues 
common to the subclass can be determined and disposed of. 
 
4 4 4 Devices or mechanisms to determine damages 
 
In Australia, Ontario and the United States, judicial burdens have been eased by the use 
of various judicially- and legislatively-directed devices that avoid the necessity of every 
class member giving his or her evidence individually.  Mulheron suggests that some 
departures from traditional methods of proof are justifiable within the bounds of necessity. 
The necessity that Mulheron refers to is the necessity of assuring effective and timely 
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compensation to all deserving victims, which would otherwise be jeopardised by the limited 
resources of an ordinary judicial system. The aim of all such procedures is to resolve 
individual issues creatively and efficiently, while at the same time not derogating from or 
unlawfully infringing the substantive rights of the parties.142   
 
In view of the above, the drafters of the respective class action regimes of Australia, 
Ontario and the United States have sought to assist courts in the management of class 
actions, by bestowing upon the courts wide powers to enable individual issues to be 
determined expeditiously and justly,143 to prescribe measures by which to simplify proof or 
argument,144 and to dispense with or impose any procedural steps that the courts consider 
appropriate and consonant with justice to the parties.145 The drafters of the Canadian 
provincial regimes have gone even further by permitting the use of standardised proof of 
claims forms, the auditing of claims on a sampling basis where the assessment and 
distribution of monetary relief is concerned,146 as well as the possibility of statistical 
evidence.147 These powers and the exercise of the court‘s inherent jurisdiction to control its 
procedures have resulted in an array of innovative procedures and timesaving measures 
being judicially developed and implemented.148  
 
In Australia, Ontario and the United States, when deciding whether a class action should 
be certified, courts have been willing to consider alternative methods of proof that may be 
used later in the proceeding. Instances of such alternatives that have not survived judicial 
scrutiny have included: application of the market share theory,149 where there is 
uncertainty as to which of several possible defendants have been responsible for the 
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plaintiffs‘ injuries; the use of epidemiological studies,150 where there is doubt as to what 
caused the injuries;151 and the use of random sampling and probability analysis for 
damages calculation, by determining individual trials for randomly selected plaintiffs in 
each category of plaintiffs and then extrapolating the average damages award to all class 
members in that category.152 
 
As mentioned, there is a range of diverse mechanisms that have been employed across 
the foreign jurisdictions to deal with the determination of the quantum of damages as an 
individual issue.  An example of such an alternative can be found in Gagne v Silcorp Ltd153 
(―Gagne‖). In this case, the appellants were solicitors who had acted on behalf of the 
representative plaintiff in a class action against Silcorp Ltd. The action arose because the 
plaintiff and other persons had been dismissed from employment by Silcorp Ltd and had 
been offered less than the legislated minimum termination and severance pay.154 A 
wrongful dismissal class action was commenced on behalf of the former employees. After 
a motion for an injunction was adjourned, and after extensive negotiations, a settlement 
was reached and approved by the court. The settlement involved the certification of the 
action, a commitment to comply with the Employment Standards Act, a judgment against 
Silcorp Ltd and a reference to enable the determination of the quantum of damages for 
each class member. This entailed a mini-hearing process with a mediation stage and an 
arbitration stage. Class members were each permitted to be represented in the mini-
hearing process by their own legal representatives, rather than by the appellant solicitors. 
The court held that ―the settlement provided for a creative and effective mini-hearing 
process that resulted in the complete resolution of all individual claims within little more 
than a year‖.155 
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It is possible to delegate the assessment of damages to a registrar, special master or 
referee.156 In Webb v K-Mart Canada Ltd157 (―Webb‖), the court ultimately ordered that 
members of the Bar, as court officers and referees, assess individual damages. The case 
arose out of the purchase of K-Mart by HBC and the merger of the K-Mart chain with the 
Zellers and Bay chains, resulting in the closing of approximately 31 stores across the 
country and the termination of thousands of employees‘ employment. Although these 
employees received sufficient statutory notice and termination pay, the representative 
plaintiff argued that they were entitled to more and that their termination was a common 
issue ―sufficient to ground a class action for common law damages for wrongful 
dismissal‖.158 In response to concerns regarding the quantification of individual claims, the 
plaintiff proposed a ―mini-hearing mediation and determination process, under court 
supervision‖.159 The defendant, in turn, argued that the case was not appropriate for a 
class action, since the individual contracts of employment required individual 
consideration. Justice Brockenshire disagreed. He held that the issues of whether the 
class members‘ contracts of employment required the defendant to provide reasonable 
notice if dismissed without cause, and whether the class members were in fact dismissed 
without cause, were common, even if issues of quantum and mitigation were personal to 
each member. Regarding the proposed process for determining the individual claims, he 
noted that: 
 
―[T]eams of experienced mediators and referees, using expedited and simplified procedures in 
informal settings, should be able to quickly and fairly arrive at satisfactory awards that would 
exhibit some uniformity for claimants in similar circumstances across the country…In short, I 
conclude that using the Class Proceedings Act, and in particular a reference type of 
adjudication of individual claims is the preferable course…and is likely to be simple and 
expeditious, less expensive than normal litigation, and not prejudicial to anyone.‖ 
 
                                                          
156
 See also in Australia: McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (No 6) 1998 84 FCR 1, more fully 
discussed in King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd 2002 FCA 1560 6. In the United States: In re Industrial 
Diamonds Antitrust Litigation 167 FRD 374, 186 (SD NY 1996).  
157
 Webb v K-Mart Canada Ltd 1999 45 OR (3d) 425 (SCJ) 24, 1999 O.J. No. 2268, 45 O.R. (3d) 389 (Ont. 
Sup Ct).   
158
 392. 
159
 392.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
 
Another device that has been used to deal with the evidence required from absent class 
members in order to resolve their individual claims is standardised claim forms160 that are 
sworn to by the claimants and assessed by a panel of legal experts.161 In Butler v Kraft 
Foods Ltd162 (―Butler‖), claimants‘ individual claims were assessed by three barristers. 2 
500 Australians had joined suit against Kraft, claiming injuries from eating contaminated 
peanut butter. Justice Raymond Northrop of the Federal Court of Australia oversaw an opt-
in/opt-out settlement in which Kraft agreed to pay claimants between AUS$500 and 
AUS$50 000 depending on the seriousness of their illness. Accordingly, claimants who 
had consumed the affected peanut butter and experienced symptoms or suffered 
demonstrable physical injury were able to recover in the resultant settlement, 
notwithstanding the individual nature of their reaction to consumption of the product. There 
does not appear to be a published judgment regarding the Federal Court‘s approval of the 
settlement.  
 
Alternatively, class members can be required to depose to affidavits regarding individual 
issues. In Maxwell v MLG Ventures Limited163 (―Maxwell‖), the Ontario Court of Justice 
(General Division) certified a class action for misrepresentations contained in an offering 
circular, notwithstanding that some of the class members may have had actual knowledge 
of the matters alleged not to have been disclosed. The court ruled that any difficulties 
relating to the actual knowledge of undisclosed facts of each plaintiff could be addressed 
by requiring class members to depose to affidavits outlining the facts upon which they 
relied and by permitting the defendant to cross-examine on these affidavits. In other 
words, the court held that determining such individual knowledge could easily be 
established by requiring each member of the class to file an affidavit swearing to their 
actual knowledge of the undisclosed facts.   
 
In practice, most judges anticipate that parties to a mass tort class action will settle the 
individual damage claims without trial, as was the case in Jenkins where the defendants 
settled the claims of class members five weeks into the common issues trial.164  However, 
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what if the parties do not settle? As mentioned above, our courts have not properly 
considered the approach to be followed when determining damages in mass personal 
injury class actions. Conventional mechanisms for calculating damages may not be 
practicable in the context of a mass personal injury class action involving a numerous 
class. In this regard, the traditional adversarial evidentiary hearing is a precise method to 
determine each class member‘s quantum of damages but individual damage trials for all or 
even a substantial portion of the class members may place an intolerable burden on the 
courts.165 The availability and potential utility of judicial devices to assess damages should 
accordingly be a relevant matter that informs judicial discretion as to whether or not a court 
will determine a class action to be the appropriate method to adjudicate class members‘ 
claims.166 In order to determine what approach our courts should follow to determine 
damages in a mass personal injury class action, it may be worth revisiting the distinction 
between a single-accident mass personal injury class action and a dispersed incident 
mass personal injury class action. 
 
4 4 4 1 Single-accident mass personal injury class action compared to dispersed 
incident mass personal injury class action 
 
As mentioned, in mass personal injury class actions that arise from dispersed incidents, 
causation is usually an issue. For example, in an asbestos-related dispersed incident 
mass personal injury class action, the variations in individual factual issues calling to be 
considered, may constitute significant issues when determining whether a sufficient causal 
link exists between the conduct and the injury. There may also be different levels and 
timing of exposure, different types of injuries suffered and the gravity of those injuries 
among the individual claimants would typically vary greatly.  Therefore, when dealing with 
an application for certification of a dispersed incident mass personal injury class action, 
because of the non-common issues that require determination in order to dispose of class 
members‘ claims, there is a risk that the class proceedings may break down into a long 
series of individual trials, in which event any potential judicial efficiency would be lost. 
Class proceedings may therefore not be the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims. 
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As mentioned,167 it is still debated whether Part IVA of the Australian Federal Court Act 
lends itself to dispersed mass torts. In a single-accident mass tort, the claims of all group 
members are likely to share the common characteristics of time, place and cause of injury, 
making resolution of the common claims arising in related circumstances suitable for class 
treatment. However, where the exposure to a defective product or contaminant and its 
effects are dispersed, the courts have shown a reluctance to deal with such actions under 
Part IVA.168 Lawyers acting for respondents argue that where there is so much diversity 
between the claims of group members, and the non-common issues will dominate the 
proceeding, a representative proceeding under Part IVA will not be the most efficient or 
appropriate means of dealing with the claims of group members, and the court should 
exercise its discretion to terminate it under section 33N(1)(c) or (d) of the Federal Court 
Act.  
 
Similar concerns about dispersed mass torts have been expressed in the United States.169 
According to Clark and Harris, since causation would have to be considered on an 
individual basis, a class action is impractical or even impossible.170 They refer to Bright v 
Femcare Ltd,171 where Kiefel J acknowledged that proof of causation might involve a 
considerable part of the evidence and substantial argument in each individual case. This 
problem is usually the reason why certification has been denied in the United States.172 
The concern is accordingly that the degree of individualisation required to determine any 
one claim renders the class action inappropriate. For example, in Brown v Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,173 plaintiffs sought class certification for personal 
and economic injuries allegedly due to the defendants‘ handling, storage and use of 
‗PCBs‘ (polychlorinated biphenyl) at a Pennsylvania railyard. The court found that the 
causation issues were too individual to merit a class action because the plaintiffs could not 
single out one set of operative facts to establish the defendants‘ liability, because the 
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alleged injuries occurred over a ten-year period, and because the plaintiffs‘ circumstances, 
medical histories and injuries varied.  
 
Mojapelo DJP recently certified the first South African mass personal injury class action. In 
Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited174 (―Nkala‖), Bongani Nkala and 55 other 
individuals sought certification of a dispersed incident mass personal injury class action on 
behalf of mineworkers for damages arising from silicosis contracted by mineworkers 
through their employment on the mines.175 In certifying the class action, Mojapelo DJP 
held that although, for instance, class members‘ damages would need to be individually 
determined ―there are sufficient common issues of fact and law that allow for, at least at 
the first stage, a single proceeding to be held where evidence and argument common to all 
the mines is entertained‖.176  Mojapelo DJP essentially found that the second stage of the 
class action, which would probably entail determining causation and damages, would have 
―to be left to the trial court as that court would not be hamstrung by the same information 
deficit that besets this court‖.177 Mojapelo DJP accordingly confirmed that the class action 
would be bifurcated: 
 
―Hence, a certification of the class action would translate into the following: once the common 
issues are determined, and assuming they favour the mineworkers‘ case, then each mineworker 
would have to develop the rest of his case on its own facts. In other words, even after the 
common issues are dealt with and finalised there nevertheless remains the issue of each 
mineworker having to prove his own case. It follows axiomatically that the stage when each 
mineworker would have to prove any outstanding aspects of his case, particularly those aspects 
peculiar to his own case, such as for example, the amount of the damages he sustained, would 
have to be the final stage of the class action.‖178 
 
He proceeded to state that:  
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―It is also conceivable that before that stage is reached, and after the issues common to all the 
mineworkers have been dealt with, there remain certain issues common to only some 
mineworkers. This would best be described as issues pertaining to a sub-class. Depending on 
how the overall general common issues are determined there could be more than one sub-class 
that may be identified by the trial court. Whether it will be necessary to determine the issues 
pertaining to each sub-class before the final stage (of each individual mineworker proving his 
loss) are reached is a matter for the trial court. The presiding judge would be completely at 
liberty to determine how best to conduct the trial once the overall common issues had been 
determined.‖179 
 
Although, in South Africa, no predominance of the common issues over the individual 
issues is required, it is nevertheless worth questioning whether a class action would be 
appropriate to adjudicate class members‘ claims in a dispersed incident mass personal 
injury class action. As mentioned, in mass personal injury class actions that arise from 
dispersed incidents, determining causation and damages present management difficulties. 
In Nkala, Mojapelo DJP acknowledged that ―[i]t is obvious that not all the elements of the 
delictual action will be finalised once the common issues have been determined. We know 
for instance that as each mineworker‘s damages are unique to that mineworker, these will 
have to be individually determined…The mineworkers are acutely aware of this reality‖.180 
Certification of the class action in Nkala could therefore give rise to serious manageability 
concerns. However, Mojapelo DJP did not really grapple with these potential difficulties 
other than by referring to the trial court‘s powers to manage class actions.  
 
The fact that Mojapelo DJP did not really consider the manageability concerns that may 
arise from certification of the class action and deflected these concerns to the trial court, 
does not detract from the correctness of the court‘s decision to certify the class action. The 
size of the class ranged from between 17 000 to approximately 500 000 members. 
Further, ―[t]he scope and magnitude of the proposed silicosis and TB claims is 
unprecedented in South Africa. The action, if it proceeds, will entail and traverse novel and 
complex issues of fact and law‖.181 The class members are ―poor, lack the sophistication 
necessary to litigate individually, have no access to legal representatives and are 
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continually battling the effects of two extremely debilitating diseases‖.182 ―It was not 
disputed that the majority of mineworkers have little to no access to the South African 
justice system as they are all impoverished or indigent and are living in the rural areas of 
South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, and are in poor health.‖183 
These individuals are unlikely to litigate independently in the absence of certification of the 
class action.184 Accordingly, applying the criteria of the appropriateness-inquiry detailed in 
chapter two, it would appear that a class action is the appropriate method to adjudicate 
class members‘ claims. This is the case even though there may be manageability 
concerns that may arise during the second phase of the bifurcated proceeding. These 
concerns are overshadowed by the need for class members to be provided with access to 
justice. Such an approach, it is suggested, would be in the interests of justice.  
 
However, circumstances may arise where manageability concerns, along with other 
factors that form part of the appropriateness-assessment, may render class proceedings 
inappropriate. Consider, for example, where a chocolatier, plying her trade in an upmarket 
neighbourhood, has been selling a chocolate product that contains small traces of 
inorganic mercury, which is extremely poisonous, for a period of six months. The clients 
consume the chocolate in different quantities and over different periods. They also 
experience a variety of symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, extreme abdominal pain, and 
kidney failure that, in certain instances, results in death. However, some of the clients have 
pre-existing medical conditions, including kidney-related medical diseases.  
 
In the above example of personal injuries resulting from a dispersed incident, it is 
suggested that it is unlikely that the matter would be appropriate for class action treatment 
because the manageability concerns that arise from the extent of the individual issues that 
would require determination, including causation and damages, militate against 
certification of a class action. Further, the putative class members do not comprise the 
poorest portion of our society and they are, for the most part, likely to have access to the 
resources necessary to pursue their claims individually. Joinder, as an alternative to a 
class action, may also be appropriate in the circumstances.  
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It is therefore not necessarily the case that our courts should certify a dispersed incident 
mass personal injury class action, notwithstanding the existence of individual issues that 
require determination. Where there is no factor that outweighs the manageability concerns 
that may arise, such as the need to provide the putative class members with access to 
justice, courts should caution against certifying class proceedings. Because of the extent 
of the individual issues that may require determination, it is therefore more difficult to 
succeed with a certification application in the context of a dispersed incident resulting in 
personal injuries, compared to a single-accident mass personal injury class action.  
 
In single-accident mass personal injury class actions, it is generally the case that the only 
non-common issue is the quantum of damages payable to each class member.185 
―Typically, plaintiffs in a single event mass tort share the common characteristics of time, 
place, and cause of injury…issues of science are usually resolved with existing knowledge 
and with the kind of expert testimony conventionally employed in tort litigation. What is 
different from the ordinary two-or three-party tort is the number of people affected and the 
stakes involved, not the facts or the law.‖186 Single accidents therefore present courts with 
fewer variables compared to dispersed incidents, which generally makes class treatment 
more appropriate.187   
 
In view of what has been set out above, the proposal to determine damages in mass 
personal injury class actions below would therefore not resolve all the individual issues 
generally involved in dispersed incident mass personal injury class actions.  For example, 
it is not aimed at addressing problems of causality that typically arise in dispersed incident 
mass personal injury class actions. The proposal will therefore be aimed at determining 
damages in single-accident mass personal injury class actions. However, it may be that 
the proposal could also be utilised by a court in the context of dispersed incident mass 
personal injury class actions.   
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4 4 4 2 Proposal to determine damages in mass personal injury class actions 
 
As mentioned by Wallis JA in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, where a single-accident 
mass personal injury class action is certified, the proceedings are usually bifurcated in that 
there is typically a verdict on liability and the quantum of individual damages is 
subsequently individually determined, separate from the liability phase.188 In Simon v Philip 
Morris Inc189 it was held that the ―[b]ifurcation procedure has evolved to accommodate 
modern emphasis on active judicial management in complex cases, particularly in the 
realm of mass tort disputes‖. However, the problem remains that the number of claimants 
in mass personal injury litigation overwhelms traditional commitment to individual, case-by-
case, adjudication of damages claims. Cases involving thousands of injured persons 
seeking damages rule out any serious consideration of individual damages trials and 
should therefore prompt experimentation by South African courts with devices aimed at 
assessing quantum of damages without the need for individual trials. ―Courts have long 
recognized the need for special case-management practices in single incident mass torts, 
such as a hotel fire, the collapse of a structure, the crash of a commercial airliner, a major 
chemical discharge or explosion, or an oil spill.‖190 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, ―[t]he 
courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume 
of litigation and more frequent mass disasters‖.191 The challenge has been, and will be, to 
define procedures for the resolution of individual issues that achieve the fine balance of 
procedural fairness and cost effectiveness, while always having regard to the class action 
objectives of judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.192  
 
It is accordingly recommended that, to enable South African courts to experiment with 
devices aimed at assessing the quantum of damages without the need for individual trials, 
they should enjoy a broad discretion in managing class actions to facilitate the effective 
adjudication of these issues. The trial courts in the foreign jurisdictions are afforded such a 
discretion; for example, it has been held that the ―[t]rial court must be accorded the 
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flexibility ‗to adopt innovative procedures, which will be fair to the litigants and expedient in 
serving the judicial process‘‖.193  
 
Under United States federal and state rules, ―the trial judge maintains a great degree of 
control over the conduct of a class action trial‖.194  As mentioned, section 25 of the Ontario 
Act confers a wide discretion upon the trial judge to determine how individual issues are to 
be dealt with, including the power to dispense with the usual procedural steps. It is for the 
trial judge to determine how issues not determined at the common-issues trial will be 
decided.195  
 
It is proposed that our courts‘ powers in respect of damages assessment in class actions 
should be similarly wide. Such an approach has been endorsed on several grounds in the 
selected foreign jurisdictions. One such ground is that class proceedings are not a 
traditional form of litigation and that it is inappropriate to impose upon it structures derived 
from earlier times and traditional powers in litigation between individual parties. Another 
ground is that, accepting that class actions are proper procedural devices where individual 
suits are not economically feasible given the insignificant amounts involved, it follows by 
implication that individualised proof of damages of the type in traditional litigation may not 
be practical or economically feasible either.196     
 
As mentioned above, some of the methods utilised in the foreign jurisdictions to determine 
individual damages include small group trials and alternative dispute resolution 
processes.197 Courts have also made use of innovative summary judgment procedures 
and lighter burdens of proof at the individualised damages trials to make it easier to 
quantify damages without abandoning the individual trial requirement.198 However, these 
methods have not necessarily only been applied in the context of a single-accident mass 
personal injury class action. They have also, for the most part, been used in the context of 
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class action settlements where both parties agree to utilisation of the specific method to 
determine damages. For example, the cases of Gagne, Webb and Maxwell, referred to 
above, were not personal injury class actions and it is accordingly questionable whether 
the methods used therein to determine the quantum of damages could be utilised to 
determine quantum of damages in the context of a South African single-accident mass 
personal injury class action. It would have been easier to propose the incorporation into 
South African law of a method that has been successfully utilised on a consistent basis in 
any of the foreign jurisdictions discussed herein; however, such a method does not appear 
to exist – at least not one that could simply be adopted locally.  
 
It appears that the preference in mass personal injury class actions in the above-
mentioned foreign jurisdictions is to conduct individual hearings to determine the quantum 
of damages in respect of each class member. It may accordingly be worthwhile to consider 
developing a sui generis proposal that draws on the experiences of the foreign jurisdictions 
that can be utilised in the context of single-accident mass personal injury class actions in 
South Africa. Such a suggested approach is detailed below.  
 
4 4 4 2 1 Introduction 
 
There are generally two variables in single-accident mass personal injury class actions – 
the number of class members and the damage which each of the individual members has 
suffered. In most cases, one or the other, or both of these variables will be present.199 If an 
approach is followed in terms of which class members are required to opt into the second 
phase of the class action, where individual class members‘ quantum of damages is 
established, one of the aforementioned variables, namely the number of class members, is 
removed. Such an approach is similar to McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd200 
and Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)201 where orders were made 
precluding group members from maintaining claims for damages if they failed to take steps 
to identify themselves by a particular date. Once orders such as these are implemented, 
the precise number of group members who maintain a claim in the proceeding may be 
clarified.202  
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The South-Gauteng division of the High Court of South Africa followed a similar approach 
in the Nkala case.203 Mojapelo DJP referred to the bifurcated proceedings that would 
follow upon his certification of the class action and held as follows in this regard: 
 
―[T]he second stage of this bifurcated process involves the invocation of the opt-in method of 
identifying the total number of mineworkers who form part of the class action. This means that 
at the conclusion of the opt-in process the names and details of all the mineworkers who claim 
rights of membership to the classes will be known. There will be no need for them to issue 
summonses. The mining companies are already before court. All they will then need to know is 
who exactly the plaintiffs are‖.204 
 
Before detailing a proposal for determining damages in single-accident mass personal 
injury class actions, it is recommended that the judge should, as a point of departure, 
encourage participation by the parties in a negotiation process. Feinberg‘s remarks are to 
the point: ―[J]udges have increasingly taken on a more active role in encouraging 
settlement, sometimes by appointing a special master to facilitate negotiation among 
parties. In addition, the parties themselves can seek the aid of an outside party to facilitate 
negotiation.‖205 The aim of negotiation should be to facilitate settlement of the dispute or a 
part thereof. However, the failure of negotiation does not necessarily mean that the 
process was without value. For example, it could nevertheless have assisted in a 
narrowing of the issues.206   
 
4 4 4 2 2 Exchange of affidavits 
 
When a court has to determine damages in single-accident mass personal injury class 
actions, it is proposed that it could, in the absence of agreement between the parties, 
approve a protocol in terms of which the requisite standard of proof would be met by the 
submission of an affidavit deposed to by each class member who has opted into the 
second phase of the class proceedings. The affidavit should contain the facta probantia 
necessary to prove the class member‘s entitlement to the quantum of damages claimed. 
This would entail that the affidavit should have attached to it proof of the class member‘s 
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medical condition in the form of an individualised report from a medical practitioner. The 
medical report would furnish information about any injuries suffered by the class member 
because of the accident that gave rise to the mass personal injury class action.  
 
The affidavit should also have attached to it further documentary evidence required to 
prove the quantum of damages claimed, such as an actuarial report where loss of 
earnings forms part of the claim. It may also be that, for example, the hospital records of 
the trauma unit where the class member was admitted would need to be attached. The 
class member may also need to attach other medical reports, such as the expert report of 
a clinical or industrial psychologist whom the class member may have visited. This 
approach resembles the approach followed in the Butler and Maxwell cases regarding the 
determination of the quantum of damages. In Butler, as mentioned, standardised claim 
forms were used. These claims forms were sworn to and assessed by a panel of legal 
persons. In Maxwell, as mentioned, individual class members deposed to affidavits 
regarding the individual issues.  
  
It is proposed that the medical report should resemble the medical report found in the 
context of South African Road Accident Fund claims, titled Claim for Compensation and 
Medical Report.207 The latter report is comprehensive and contains sufficient detail for the 
purpose of this proposal. Section 24(2)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act No 56 of 1996 
provides that the medical report must be completed by the medical practitioner who 
treated the injured or deceased person for the bodily injuries sustained by him or her in the 
accident from which this claim arises or by the superintendent (or his or her 
representative) of the hospital in which the injured or deceased person was treated for 
such bodily injuries.  
 
A report of the above nature is sufficiently detailed to assist the court or its reference to 
assess the quantum of damages of the individual class members. Such an approach is 
similar to Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd208 where the settlement scheme made 
detailed provision for the manner in which assessment of the claims made by group 
members would occur. Each member of the group had to submit a written claim verified 
by medical reports or medical certificates. The quantum of damages to which each group 
                                                          
207
 Sections 17(1) and 24(1)(a) of Act No. 56 of 1996 and regulation 3(1) of the Regulations under the Act. 
208
 1999 FCA 104. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
171 
 
member was entitled then had to be assessed and the fund distributed pari passu, 
accordingly. 
   
4 4 4 2 3 Defendant’s affidavit 
 
It is obvious, however, that merely assessing damages with reference to the affidavit and 
accompanying evidentiary material filed by each class member, without affording the 
defendant the opportunity to dispute the quantum, could infringe the defendant‘s right to a 
fair public hearing as entrenched in section 34 of the Constitution and the audi alteram 
partem principle. The defendant should accordingly be provided the opportunity to respond 
to the individual class members‘ claims through filing an answering affidavit, which 
addresses the issues raised in each class member‘s founding affidavit. Attached to the 
answering affidavit could be annexures similar to those that are attached to the class 
member‘s founding affidavit including, for example, a medico-legal report and an actuarial 
report, where necessary. The defendant should therefore be able to call upon the class 
members concerned, through the class representative, to avail themselves for medical 
evaluations by the defendant‘s medical experts.    
 
Consider, for example, a single-accident mass personal injury class action that arose from 
a trail derailment209 where approximately 300 individuals sustained injuries and some of 
them died because of the accident. If the defendant has been found to be liable for the 
individual class members‘ damages sustained because of the accident, the second phase 
of the trial would entail determining the quantum of those damages claims. In this regard, it 
is unlikely that the defendant would dispute the claims of those individual class members 
whose claims relate to minor, superficial injuries incurred as a result of the accident if 
those individuals choose to opt into the second phase of the proceeding. This is because, 
firstly, the class members‘ claims, as mentioned, are set out on affidavit, deposed to under 
oath, supported by a medical report and other relevant documentary evidence. Secondly, it 
is unlikely that the defendant would incur the costs associated with disputing an 
individual‘s claim in such circumstances, especially where the probable difference in the 
outcome would be negligible, as it would inter alia entail subjecting the claimant to a 
further medical examination by the defendant‘s medical expert, at the defendant‘s 
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expense. Rather, it is likely that some of the damages claims would be settled or agreed to 
by the defendant upon receipt of the affidavits of the individual class members. The 
defendant‘s answering affidavit would accordingly indicate whether it agrees with the 
quantum claimed by each individual class member and, in relation to those class members 
whose amounts claimed are disputed, the defendant would, for example, require further 
medical examinations by its medical expert.  
 
It is suggested that a further opportunity to settle individual class members‘ claims 
presents itself through the filing of replying affidavits by the class members in 
circumstances where the defendant disputes their claims. The defendant may, upon 
receipt of the replying affidavit and in light of its contents, agree to the quantum of 
damages claimed by the individual class member concerned. It is accordingly a further 
opportunity to limit the number of claims that require adjudication by the court because of 
settlement between the parties.  
 
4 4 4 2 4 Panel 
 
Once the above-mentioned exchange of affidavits has taken place, the court would have 
the option to request that a court-appointed panel of experienced and suitably qualified 
medical and actuarial experts conduct evaluations on behalf of the court to consider the 
damages claims filed by the individual class members. The court would have the option to 
refer any aspect of a class member‘s claim, or all the class members‘ claims in its entirety, 
to the court-appointed panel for their consideration and evaluation. It does not happen 
automatically. For example, the panel may be required to report on the nature and extent 
of the injuries incurred or the estimated loss of earnings in the event of particularly 
conflicting medical or actuarial reports. Specifically, the medical experts would be 
responsible inter alia for conducting the relevant medical evaluations and/or referring the 
class member(s) for necessary additional examinations210 to any specialist, compiling 
medico-legal reports and providing the court with expert evidence, where necessary.211 
The actuarial experts would be responsible inter alia for the calculation of past loss of 
earnings up to the present time and the calculation of future loss of earnings. 
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The court-appointed panel would need to draft a report regarding its evaluation that is filed 
at court along with the evidentiary material of the individual class members and the 
defendant. Ultimately, when the court receives the evidentiary material, it would need to 
weigh it up to make a finding ‗on the papers‘. It is suggested that a finding on the papers is 
necessary in order to avoid individual damages trials, which approach is justifiable if 
regard is had to the approaches of the above-mentioned foreign jurisdictions. For example, 
it may be worth recalling that the Fifth Circuit in Jenkins held that ―necessity moves us to 
change and invent‖.212 Similarly, according to Mulheron, an approach has to be considered 
that would avoid the necessity of every class member giving individual evidence.213 She 
further favours some departures from traditional methods of proof within the bounds of 
necessity, i.e. the necessity of assuring effective and timely compensation to all deserving 
victims, which would otherwise be jeopardised by the limited resources of an ordinary 
judicial system. The aim of all these procedures is to resolve individual issues creatively 
and efficiently, while at the same time not to derogate from or unlawfully infringe upon the 
substantive rights of the parties.214   
 
It is proposed, however, that if the court deems it necessary to receive oral evidence on a 
particular issue, it may request that the witness concerned attends at court for this 
purpose. The report provided by the panel of court-appointed experts may accordingly be 
supplemented, where necessary, by testimony in open court. For example, it may be that 
the court requires the actuarial experts on the court-appointed panel to deliver viva voce 
evidence regarding the application and explanation of mathematical or actuarial 
calculations in respect of future loss.215 The judge should be responsible for questioning 
the witness so that the court can acquire the information that it deems necessary to make 
a finding as to the quantum of damages that should be awarded to each individual class 
member. 
 
Implementation of the above-mentioned proposal would essentially entail that our judges 
become more proactive in identifying issues and gathering evidence and also take full 
control of the proceedings and control the participation of the parties. Judges would need 
to assume a wide-ranging role from the pre- to post-hearing stage; the judge would have 
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to take charge of the case and of case management, and issue directions as to which 
particular matters and evidence require examination; the judge may also commission 
expert evidence.216 It is suggested that this is the role that the judge should assume in the 
quantification of damages in single-accident mass personal injury class actions.217  
 
Such an approach is similar to a typical civil law trial where judicial officials perform a more 
active role that is not limited to the examination of the evidence presented by the parties or 
to the execution of the parties‘ motions. The control over the process is shifted from the 
parties to the court, which enjoys greater discretion in the evaluation of the evidence and 
may guide the discovery process with bench requests. In these systems, the presiding 
judge determines the order in which evidence is taken and is free to weigh up the relative 
value of conflicting evidence, acting independently of the proposals and motions of the 
parties. The court determines the credibility and relative weight of each piece of 
information. The court is vested with a large degree of initiative to shape the course of the 
litigation. The judge contributes to ascertaining the facts and identifying potentially relevant 
evidence, and actively screens and evaluates the evidence presented by the parties.218 
 
The rationale for adopting a more inquisitorial approach in the context of the above 
proposal is that, if the court is to take decisions that best implement policy goals, then it 
should rely upon the best available information rather than just the evidence presented by 
the parties, which requires an active style of adjudication.219 According to Harms, ―[a]n 
efficient trial requires that judicial officers cease to be passive onlookers and instead 
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become actively involved in the management of the trial. To be passive is easy and not 
stressful; one does not have to concentrate; few decisions have to be made; one can 
place any blame on the lawyers; and one is safe from receiving reprimands from courts of 
appeal‖.220 It is essentially because of the manageability concerns that it is proposed that a 
more inquisitorial approach to determining the quantum of damages in single-accident 
mass personal injury class actions be adopted. Insofar as determining the quantum of 
damages in single-accident mass personal injury class actions is concerned, a typical 
inquisitorial proceeding should therefore be followed where the trial is dominated by a 
presiding judge, who determines the order in which evidence is taken and who evaluates 
the content of the gathered evidence. The court determines the credibility and relative 
weight of each piece of evidence without being constrained by strict rules in that 
respect.221  
 
De Vos states that ―as the right to an oral hearing is not a hard and fast rule, it could be 
further qualified in order to expedite the proceedings and, thus, promote effective access 
to justice‖.222 He also states that it is ―in the interest of effective access to justice to restrict 
the principle of party control by providing for a certain degree of judicial control…perhaps 
the exigencies of the present day South African society demand that the principle of case 
management be fully accepted as a necessary feature of civil litigation‖.223 It is accordingly 
suggested that, taking account of the sui generis nature of class proceedings and the 
approaches to determining quantum of damages in single-accident mass personal injury 
class actions, the approach proposed above should be aligned with the principle of 
effective access to justice. This philosophy, which has taken firm root in South Africa 
during the last decade, promotes expeditious and cost-effective proceedings, as well as 
the early settlement of disputes.224 Such a process would conceivably be less time-
consuming than individual damages trials for each class member. It would also not 
substantially derogate from the litigants‘ right to a fair public hearing and audi alteram 
partem. It could also be argued that any limitation of these rights would be justifiable, 
especially in light of the class action objectives. Such an approach would make it easier to 
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quantify damages without abandoning the requirement that claims must be proved 
individually. 
 
The identification and selection of neutral experts by the court is a critical step in ensuring 
the fairness of the proceeding.225 It is envisaged that the appointment of the panel takes 
place after the first phase of the class action litigation on the issue of liability, but before 
commencement of the second phase of the trial regarding the quantification of damages.  
This would avoid unnecessarily appointing experts to assist in the quantification exercise 
where there is no finding on liability or where the matter is settled during the first phase of 
the litigation or shortly after a finding that the defendant is indeed liable. It is also proposed 
that the parties play an inactive role in the recruitment and selection of the court-appointed 
panel. The judge would need to assume responsibility for identifying suitable candidates 
from a pre-approved list of experts, rather than simply, for example, relying on informal 
recommendations from the judge‘s friends and associates. Such unsystematic approaches 
to identifying needs and recruiting experts would raise doubts about the extent to which 
the procedure provides the timely and neutral assistance warranted by the central 
importance of the experts‘ task.226  
 
It may be worth considering, in compiling a list of pre-approved medical and actuarial 
experts, adopting a similar approach to the one provided for in the context of South African 
court-annexed mediation. A list of persons accredited as mediators in terms of rule 86(2) 
of the Court-Annexed Mediation Rules was recently published. Rule 86(1) of the rules 
provides that the ―qualification, standards and levels of mediators who will conduct 
mediation under these rules, will be determined by the Minister‖ and rule 86(2) provides 
that a ―schedule of accredited mediators, from which mediators for the purposes of this 
chapter must be selected, will be published by the Minister‖. The adoption of a court rule or 
legislative provision in this regard would accordingly be required. Ultimately, such a list 
should convey the full names of the experts, their designations and areas of speciality and 
the region where they practise.  
 
Moreover, it is recommended that the proposed legislative provision authorising the court 
to refer the claims for further assessment by a court-appointed panel should be drafted in 
                                                          
225
 J S Cecil & T E Willging ―Court-Appointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 706‖ (1993) Federal Judicial Center 1 31.  
226
 34. 
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a similar fashion to section 38 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (―Superior Courts 
Act‖). Section 38 allows a division of the High Court of South Africa, with the consent of the 
parties, to order a referee inquiry of any matter requiring extensive examination of 
documents, accounts or scientific, technical or local investigations that cannot be 
conducted by the court. The court may adopt the referee‘s report either wholly, or in part, 
either with or without modifications, and may even send the report back to the referee for 
further enquiry. Any person summoned to attend a referee inquiry would be liable for a fine 
or imprisonment of up to three months. The primary difference between the proposed 
legislation and section 38 of the Superior Courts Act would be that, in the context of the 
damages-assessment of a single-accident mass personal injury class action, the consent 
of the parties would not be required to refer the matter for investigation by the court-
appointed panel.  
 
4 4 4 2 5 Role of the judge  
 
Once again, the role of the judge in this process cannot be overstated. Judges must 
become active managers of the quantification process. As mentioned, class action law in 
Ontario and the United States generally mandates more active judicial management in 
class actions. Traditionally, in conformity with the adversarial tradition, the judicial system 
enabled parties to a dispute to control its progress. In recent times, however, the position 
has changed in the American, Australian and Canadian jurisdictions, as new case 
management rules were enacted as well as rules on pre-trial conferences and other 
judicial activism measures. Judges have become increasingly involved with parties in 
chambers, supervising case preparation and management, helping shape the litigation and 
encouraging settlement. They have become mediators, negotiators, planners as well as 
adjudicators. In the class action context, judges have revised their traditional role in 
litigation, becoming more actively involved in the prosecution of the class action, in part to 
protect absent class parties. Their new role has been motivated by the increasing size and 
complexity of class actions necessitating more hands-on management. As such, class 
action judges must become actively involved in the litigation.227  
 
It is envisaged that the judge would, at the commencement of the second phase of the 
trial, explain to the parties the process that would be followed to determine the quantum of 
                                                          
227
 C Piché ―The Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law‖ (2009) 2 J Civ L Stud 101 128-130. 
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damages. Specifically, the judge would explain to them their respective roles throughout 
the process and, in consultation with the parties, decide on the timelines that would have 
to be met throughout the process. It would also be important for the judge to provide 
instructions to the court-appointed panel. This could take place via a conference call 
involving the judge, the expert, and the parties, informal conferences in chambers, and 
written orders, sometimes with enclosed documents and exhibits. Judges‘ instructions 
could be used to establish a record of the terms and conditions of the appointment, 
including the terms of payment; to define the legal and technical issues in the case and 
identify the technical issues the expert was to address; to clarify the role of the expert in 
relation to the role of the judge; and, to establish procedures for assembling information, 
communicating with the parties, and reporting findings and opinions.228 
 
4 4 4 2 6 Compensation of experts  
 
Regarding the payment of court-appointed experts, it could be argued that the court-
appointed panel should be compensated in a similar fashion as is provided for in section 
38(6) of the Superior Courts Act that provides as follows: 
 
―Any referee is entitled to such remuneration as may be prescribed by the rules or, if no such 
remuneration has been so prescribed, as the court may determine and to any reasonable 
expenditure incurred by him or her for the purposes of the enquiry, and any such remuneration 
and expenditure must be taxed by the taxing master of the court and shall be costs in the 
cause.‖  
 
However, the parties may resist compensating experts they did not retain and who offer 
testimony that is damaging to their interests. They would also already have incurred 
expenses regarding the medical and actuarial examinations undertaken by their own 
experts – the parties would probably be reluctant to contribute further to such assessments 
conducted in respect of the individual damages claims. In addition, if the parties fail to pay, 
the judge must either enforce payment by means of a formal order and a hearing, thereby 
disrupting the litigation and possibly increasing the level of acrimony between the parties, 
or postpone payment, thereby leaving the expert uncompensated for an indefinite 
period.229  
                                                          
228
 Cecil & Willging (1993) Federal Judicial Center 35-36. 
229
 57. 
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It is accordingly proposed that the experts who constitute the court-appointed panel should 
be paid a fee similar to the prescribed fee payable in the context of rule 38 of the Uniform 
Rules of Court, which permits a party to compel the presence of a witness to testify at a 
trial by means of a subpoena issued by the registrar and served on the witness by the 
sheriff.230 In this regard, sections 37(1) and (2) of the Superior Courts Act provide that the 
witness fee is determined against a fixed tariff, but that certain considerations, such as 
distance travelled to appear at court or the profession or occupation of the witness, may 
result in payment of a higher allowance to the witness above the fixed tariff.231 It is 
therefore recommended that the proposed legislation should also make provision for 
payment of a reasonable fee according to a tariff in circumstances where the court 
exercises its discretion to use a court-appointed panel of experts to determine the 
quantum of damages in the context of a single-accident mass personal injury class action.  
 
To determine whether a fee is reasonable, it is suggested that one could consider factors 
similar to those listed in clause 9.2232 of the Colorado Interprofessional Code.233 Clause 
9.2 provides that ―an expert is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for providing 
expert testimony‖. It states that, to determine what constitutes a fair and reasonable expert 
witness fee, some or all of the following factors should be considered: 
 
―(1) The amount of time spent, including review, preparation, drafting reports, travel, or 
testimony; 
(2) The degree of knowledge, learning, or skill required; 
(3) The amount of effort expended; 
(4) The uniqueness of the expert's qualifications; 
(5) Current and reliable statistical income information of similarly situated experts; 
(6) The amounts charged by similarly situated experts for similar services; 
(7) The amount of other professional fees lost; and 
(8) The impact, if any, on the expert's practice because of scheduling difficulties, other 
commitments, or other problems.‖ 
                                                          
230
 The rule deals with ordinary subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, affidavit evidence in trial 
proceedings, and evidence on commission. See also Laskarides v German Tyre Centre (Pty) Ltd (in 
liquidation) 2010 1 SA 390 (W). 
231
 The commencement date of section 37 has yet to be proclaimed.  
232  
Expert Compensation and Expert Witness Fees. 
233
 The Interprofessional Committee Interprofessional Code 3 ed (2010) available at 
<https://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/226/CITP/Interprofessional-Code/> (accessed 08/02/2016).  
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4 5 Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the above approach to determining the quantum of damages in a single-
accident mass personal injury class action, or variations thereof, should be made possible 
through the adoption of legislation regulating class actions. This proposal echoes the view 
of the SALC insofar as it is stated in the Working Paper that, ―[a]lthough South Africa has 
no similar case history, it is suggested that the ‗newness‘ of the whole concept of a class 
action procedure requires that a matter such as this should be put beyond doubt by the 
inclusion of an express provision‖.234   
 
It is recommended that the proposed legislation should adopt, as a point of departure, the 
recommended provision of the SALC that ―[t]he court shall not be precluded from certifying 
an action as a class action merely by reason of the fact that there are issues pertaining to 
the claims of all or some of the members of the class which will require individual 
determination, or that different class members seek different relief‖.235  
 
It may further be worth adopting a legislative provision that is similar to section 33Q of the 
Australian Federal Court Act which provides that, if it appears to the Federal Court that 
determination of the issue(s) common to all group members will not finally determine the 
claims of all group members, the court may give directions in relation to the determination 
of the remaining issues. This may include directions establishing a subgroup of group 
members and the appointment of a person to be the subgroup representative party on 
behalf of the subgroup members. Such a provision would enable South African courts to 
bifurcate the class action and to establish subclasses for the purpose of assessing the 
quantum of damages. It also expressly empowers the court to determine individual issues 
and to give directions as to the procedure to be followed to determine such issues.    
 
It is, however, proposed that legislative provisions that provide for the resolution of the 
individual issues in a more detailed manner should also be adopted.236 Specifically, it is 
                                                          
234
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 
57 para 5.33.  
235
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report  92. 
236
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 
57 para 5.35. South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report 95. See also the 
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recommended that our legislature should draw on the experiences of foreign jurisdictions, 
particularly the legislative provisions that they have adopted to regulate the determination 
of the quantum of damages in mass personal injury class actions. Borrowing from the 
approaches of the foreign jurisdictions, the legislation should bestow upon the courts wide 
powers to enable individual issues to be determined expeditiously and justly,237 to 
prescribe measures to simplify proof or argument,238 and to dispense with or impose any 
procedural steps that the courts consider appropriate and consonant with justice to the 
parties.239 Regarding the Ontario regime, the SALC states that ―the conclusions of the 
Ontario Commission with regard to common and individual issues are sound and that a 
similar approach should be adopted for the purpose of drafting a class action statute for 
South Africa‖.240 It is accordingly suggested that the proposed legislation should provide 
that the court may conduct further hearings, appoint someone to conduct a reference and 
direct that the issues be determined in any other manner.241 
  
In order to relieve our overly burdened courts, the legislature, acting in a clear and precise 
manner, must provide for devices geared towards the determination of damages in single-
accident mass personal injury class actions. As mentioned above, it may be that such 
devices could also be utilised in the context of dispersed incident mass personal injury 
class actions. This would serve to promote judicial economy and be aimed at ensuring that 
certification of a class action is not denied solely on the basis that the class action is 
unmanageable. It requires trial innovation, innovative means of adjudication and workable 
solutions to dispose of claims economically and fairly.242  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
detailed discussion in Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions Toronto: Ministry of the 
Attorney General (1982) 605-624.  
237
 Sections 12 and 25(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6.; sections 33Q and 33R of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976. 
238
 Section 23 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6.; rule 23(d)(1) of the Federal Rules; but, 
no equivalent in the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976. 
239
 Section 25(3) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6.; section 33ZF(1) of the Federal Court 
of Australia Act of 1976. See also 4 4 2 and 4 4 4 above.  
240
 South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 
57 para 5.32. 
241
 Section 25(1). 
242
 Zimand (1991) Washington University Law Review 899. 
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It is suggested that the above proposal to determine damages in single-accident mass 
personal injury class actions is persuasive in terms of necessity, public policy and judicial 
economy. It is aimed at phasing the trial to encourage settlement, thereby reducing the 
court‘s time and resources.243 It takes account of the fact that the class action is aimed at 
conserving ―the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue 
potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion‖.244 For 
example, where the individual class members are geographically dispersed across South 
Africa, utilisation of the above proposal would mean that, as individual hearings regarding 
the quantum of damages claimed are not required, it would not be necessary for each 
individual claimant to take the time and to incur the costs associated with travelling to court 
for the purpose of giving viva voce evidence. From the court‘s perspective, utilisation of the 
proposal would mean that it would not need to allocate resources to enable adjudication 
over individual class member‘s damages hearings. Even the defendant would benefit from 
implementation of the proposal insofar as the costs to be incurred in preparing for 
individual damages trials of numerous class members would be avoided. Thus, although 
class members would be required to submit individual proof of injury, the procedure is 
designed to give effect to the overarching purpose of the class action mechanism.  
  
 
                                                          
243
 909. 
244
 General Tel Co v Falcon 456 US 147 155 (1982) quoting Califano v Yamasaki 442 US 682 701 (1979). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS AND 
MEDIATION AS A TOOL TO MANAGE AND RESOLVE CLASS ACTIONS 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
The manageability of class proceedings is a very important consideration when a court 
determines whether to certify a class action. Various factors could influence the application 
of this consideration and hence influence the appropriateness of class proceedings. The 
manageability of a class action was not listed by Wallis JA in Trustees for the time being of 
the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre 
as amicus curiae)1 (―Children’s Resource Centre Trust‖) as one of the factors that our 
courts should consider when deciding whether to grant a certification application.2 In 
chapter two it is contended that the manageability consideration should form part of the 
appropriateness inquiry; in other words, the manageability of class proceedings becomes 
relevant when a court needs to decide on the appropriateness of class proceedings as a 
means of adjudicating class members‘ claims.  
 
As mentioned previously,3 the manageability consideration entails taking account of ―the 
whole range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for 
a particular suit‖.4 For instance, it entails considering whether the administrative costs 
incurred in managing the class action would consume the award made in favour of the 
plaintiff class.5 A further factor to be considered in the context of manageability is the 
difficulty associated with notifying a significant percentage of the class – this may count 
against possible certification.6 Although certification generally should not be denied solely 
because class members would have to prove their damages on an individualised basis, 
                                                          
1
 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA). 
2
 However, Mojapelo DJP did consider the manageability of proceedings in Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Limited (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) 2016 ZAGPJHC 97 (13 
May 2016) paras 51-52. 
3
 See chapter two above.  
4
 Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S 156, 164 (1974). 
5
 B Anderson & A Trask Class Action Playbook (2014) 62.  
6
 See chapter three above. 
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potential difficulty in calculating damages may also be a factor in assessing 
manageability.7  
 
Because of the management difficulties generally encountered in class action litigation, 
effective judicial management is considered increasingly important for the efficient 
functioning of class actions.8 As class action litigation is traditionally more complex than 
other kinds of litigation, it requires greater administration and management of the case.9 
The importance of managing class actions effectively is evidenced by the fact that 
manageability problems could, as is the case in Ontario and the United States, result in a 
court refusing to certify a class action or,10 as is the case in Australia, in the termination of 
a class action.11  
                                                          
7
 See chapter four above regarding the determination of damages in personal injury class actions. 
8
 C Piché ―Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements‖ (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 111 121. C S 
Diver ―The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Changes in Public Institutions‖ (1979) 
65 VA L Rev 43 45 states that the ―transformation in the character of litigation necessarily transforms the 
judge‘s role as well‖. 
9
 See P G Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 44; Piché (2010) Windsor YB Access Just 117. 
10
 In the United States, a class action will not be certified if there is proof that it would indeed be 
unmanageable (due to inter alia the size of the class, the giving of notice and the distribution of damages) 
since it will then not be superior to other methods of adjudication as required by rule 23(b)(3). For example, 
in Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin 417 US 156 (1974) the enormity of the class and related issues such as 
notice to absent members and the distribution of an aggregate reward to class members caused serious 
doubt about the viability of the case. In the recent mass personal injury class action of Nkala v Harmony 
Gold Mining Company Limited (48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13) 2016 
ZAGPJHC 97 (13 May 2016), the class consisted of between 17 000 and 500 000 class members. Mojapelo 
DJP (at para 52) held that ―[w]hat we have here is that the sizes of the two classes may be very large but 
that does not make the…class action trial unmanageable‖. 
11
 In Australia, once a representative proceeding has been instituted, it will continue unless the respondent 
applies to the court for an order terminating it. Thus, unlike the class action regimes of Ontario, South Africa 
and the United States, where the party bringing the action must show that certain requirements are met 
before certification is granted, it is up to the respondent to raise non-compliance with them. Of relevance in 
the context of manageability is section 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (Cth) in terms of 
which a court may order the discontinuance of class proceedings if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of 
justice to do so for one or more of the reasons specified in section 33N(1)(a)-(d). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
 
To enable effective managerial judging12 of class actions, the selected foreign jurisdictions 
have conferred upon their trial judges extensive powers to manage these proceedings. For 
example, in Australia, a judge can discontinue a properly instituted class action and 
substitute the representative plaintiff who does not adequately represent the class 
members‘ interests. The court also needs to give its approval before a class action can be 
settled or discontinued and before settlement of the representative plaintiff‘s individual 
claim can take place.13  
 
In the United States, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure14 (―Federal Rules‖) 
contains various provisions governing the trial court‘s powers, obligations and discretion in 
managing class actions.15 Rules 23(c), (d) and (e) confer upon courts managerial authority 
over class actions.16 For example, judges play a role in certifying the class and approving 
the adequacy of the class representative and class counsel.17 Judges are also required to 
approve proposed and final settlements and to review objections by class members.18 
 
Ontario‘s Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (―Ontario Act‖), also affords to judges extensive 
managerial powers to manage class actions.19 Courts use their powers in case 
management to prevent class proceedings from becoming too cumbersome and to protect 
the interests of class members.20   
 
                                                          
12
 According to T B Wolff ―Managerial Judging and Substantive Law‖ (2013) 90 Washington University Law 
Review 1027 1027, Professor Judith Resnik coined the term ‗managerial judging‘ thirty years ago to describe 
the expanded role of federal district judges under the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
13
 V Morabito ―Australia‖ in D R Hensler C Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The Globalization of Class Actions 
(2009) 320 323. 
14
 See Appendix A. 
15
 Karlsgodt ―United States‖ in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around 
the Globe 35.  
16
 R H Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 4 ed (2012) 25. See also Appendix 
A and the discussion under 5 3 3 below. 
17
 Rule 23(c). See also J Brewster ―A Kick in the Class: Giving Class Members a Voice in Class Action 
Settlements‖ (2013) 41 W St U L Rev 1 11. 
18
 Rule 23(e).  
19
 See, for example, section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. titled ―Court may 
determine conduct of proceeding‖. 
20
 J Kalajdzic, W A Bogart & I Matthews ―Canada‖ in D R Hensler, C Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The 
Globalization of Class Actions (2009) 46.  
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The increasing size and complexity of class action lawsuits necessitate a more hands-on 
management approach than in the case of ordinary civil litigation. As such, class-action 
judges must become actively involved in the litigation.21 This chapter accordingly considers 
what the role of our courts should be in order to manage class actions effectively.  It also 
considers court-annexed mediation as a tool that our courts could utilise to assist them in 
managing, and possibly resolving, class proceedings.22 These issues have not been 
subject to critical analysis.23 It may therefore be instructive to consider the approaches of 
Australia, Ontario and the United States, to assist in conducting the analysis.   
 
5 2  The nature of courts’ judicial management role 
 
Managerial judging does have its critics. According to Elliot,24 the techniques advocated by 
judges in managing proceedings tend to vary widely. In other words, it lacks consistency 
and uniformity.25 Such discretionary management tactics that vary inordinately from judge 
to judge may threaten litigants‘ due process rights.26 It has also been argued that, because 
managerial judging is less visible and usually unreviewable, it gives trial courts more 
authority and at the same time provides litigants with fewer procedural safeguards to 
protect them from abuse of that authority. Resnik therefore suggests that managerial 
judging ―may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and 
impartial adjudication‖.27 Critics of managerial judging have also inter alia argued that 
                                                          
21
 C Piché ―The Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law‖ (2009) 2 J Civ L Stud 101 128, 130. See also the 
discussion under 5 4 4 below regarding the limits imposed on a judge when managing a class action.  
22
 Court-annexed or court-connected mediation refers to mediation that is connected to the courts. The 
connection takes various forms in various jurisdictions. See L Adrian ―The Role of Court-Connected 
Mediation and Judicial Settlement Efforts in the Preparatory Stage‖ in L Ervo & A Nylund (eds) Current 
Trends in Preparatory Proceedings: A Comparative Study of Nordic and Former Communist Countries 
(2016) 209 211. 
23
 See, for example, E Hurter ―Some Thoughts on Current Developments Relating to Class Actions in South 
African Law as Viewed Against Leading Foreign Jurisdictions‖ (2006) CILSA 39(3) 485 489, and W de Vos 
―Reflections on the Introduction of a class action in South Africa‖ (1996) 4 TSAR 639 649-650, where they 
refer to the courts‘ role in managing class actions. 
24
 D Elliot ―Managerial and the Evolution of Procedure‖ (1986) 53 U Chi L Rev 306  308-309. 
25
 According to J Resnik ―Managerial Judges‖ (1982-1983) 96 Harv L Rev 374 377, both before and after the 
trial, judges play a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.
 
 
26
 J T Molot ―An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era‖ (2003) 113 Yale L J 27 41-42. 
27
 Resnik (1982-1983) Harv L Rev 380. See also Elliot (1986) U Chi L Rev 314. 
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judicial efforts to reduce costs may have just the opposite effect and that judicial haste to 
clear dockets often renders litigation outcomes less fair or accurate.28  
 
Despite the above criticisms levelled against managerial judging, its supporters respond by 
arguing that these problems may be the lesser of two evils when compared to the 
problems that would ensue if litigation decisions were left entirely to litigants. If judges did 
not adopt an active judicial management role, it would ―clog dockets, increase litigation 
costs, and free litigants to use litigation‘s expense and delay to gain unfair tactical 
advantages over their adversaries. For every potential problem that managerial judging‘s 
critics identify, its defenders identify other cases in which judicial case management has 
facilitated efficient resolutions and saved valuable court resources‖.29 This is especially 
true in the class action context, where the sui generis nature of class proceedings clearly 
distinguishes it from ordinary civil litigation. An active judicial management approach is 
necessary to ensure that the class action does not fail due to management difficulties.  
  
Class actions have a number of distinctive features that necessitate judicial management. 
For example, class actions involve the existence of unidentified parties whose interests 
require protection. They also require making administrative arrangements for the giving of 
notice and the distribution of monetary relief as well as the establishment of procedures for 
the determination of individual issues.30 The distinctive nature of the class action 
mechanism necessitates a change in the court‘s traditional role – it essentially requires 
that our judges become more active in their management of civil litigation. It is simply not 
feasible for the parties to be solely responsible for the management of a class action. 
Rather, ―judges are required to step outside the usual passive role assigned to them by the 
traditional adversarial model of litigation and actively to take part in such management‖.31  
 
Traditionally, judges in civil litigation are ―passive arbiters of conflicting private interests 
who rule on questions of law‖.32 In accordance with the adversarial tradition, the parties 
                                                          
28
 Molot (2003) Yale L J 41-42. 
29
 42. 
30
 V Morabito ―Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada, and 
the United States‖ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 663 672. 
31
 Hurter (2006) CILSA 489. See also R Miller ―Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, 
and the ‗Class Action Problem‘‖ (1979) 92 Harv Law Review 664 667-668.  
32
 M F Connor ―Taming the Tort Monster” (2000) 4 Briefly 1 8-9. 
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control the pace and shape of the proceedings. Litigation is therefore governed by the 
principle of party control. It entails that the parties to a civil dispute investigate, prepare, 
and present evidence and arguments whilst the judge plays a passive role throughout the 
proceedings.33 According to Connor, however, class actions do not fit comfortably within 
this system because the adversarial approach to individualised justice is impractical when 
thousands of claims must be dealt with quickly and efficiently. Accordingly, courts have 
become ―active managers and watchdogs, disregarding the traditional norms of judicial 
passivity and neutrality‖.34   
 
Hensler refers to what the judicial management role of judges in damage class actions35 
practically entails: 
 
―Judges play a unique role in damage class actions: Without the judge‘s decision to grant 
certification, a class action lawsuit does not exist. Without the judge‘s approval, a lawsuit cannot 
be settled. Without a judge‘s decision to award fees, the class action attorneys cannot be paid. 
Moreover, judges have special responsibilities while the litigation is ongoing: They approve the 
form and content of notices to class members that a class action has been certified or settled; 
they determine when and where fairness hearings will be held, how long they will be, and who 
can participate; they decide whether non-class members can intervene in the litigation, and 
whether lawyers representing objectors will receive any compensation. Even after a case is 
resolved, judges may continue to play a role by overseeing the disbursement of settlement 
funds. How judges exercise these responsibilities determines the outcomes of the class actions 
that come before them. But even more important, how judges exercise these responsibilities 
determines the shape of class actions to come. Lawyers and parties learn from judges‘ actions 
what types of claims may be certified as class actions, what types of settlements will pass 
muster, and what the rewards of bringing class actions will be.‖36 
 
The American Pocket Guide for Judges issued by the Federal Judicial Center also 
contains the following description of the unique and non-traditional role that judges fulfil in 
class action litigation:  
 
                                                          
33
 See, for example, Resnik (1982-1983) Harv L Rev 380-381; F James & G Hazard Civil Procedure 2
nd 
ed 
(1977) 4-8; R W Millar ―The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure‖ (1923) I8 Ill L Rev 1 9-24. 
34
 Connor (2000) Briefly 8-9. 
35
 Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules provides for the opt-out damages class action. 
36
 D R Hensler Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (2000) 445. 
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―Class actions demand that judges play a unique role. There is no such thing as a simple class 
action. Everyone has hidden hazards that can surface without warning. Your role includes 
anticipating the consequences of poorly equipped class representatives or attorneys, 
inadequate class settlement provisions, and overly generous fee stipulations. The high stakes of 
the litigation heighten your responsibility, and what‘s more, you cannot rely on adversaries to 
shape the issues that you must resolve in the class context. Indeed, you have to decide first 
which adversaries on the plaintiff side—class representatives and class counsel—can represent 
the class adequately and whom you should appoint to do so. And, once the adversaries agree 
on a settlement, you must decide—largely without any clash of views from class counsel, class 
representatives, or the defendant—whether that settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to 
satisfy the interests of the class as a whole.‖37 
 
The above quoted passages clearly highlight the distinctive features that are inherent to 
class actions that reinforce the need for active judicial management. Piché, referring to 
class action law in Canada and the United States, reiterates that judges‘ traditional role in 
litigation has been revised insofar as they are more actively involved in the prosecution of 
class actions, in part to protect absent class parties.38 Regarding active judicial 
management of class actions, especially when comparing class action litigation to other 
types of litigation, the Manual for Complex Litigation provides that: 
 
―Because the stakes and scope of class action litigation can be great, class actions often 
require closer judicial oversight and more active judicial management than other types of 
litigation. Class action suits present many of the same problems and issues inherent in other 
types of complex litigation. The aggregation of a large number of claims and the ability to bind 
people who are not individual litigants tend to magnify those problems and issues, increase the 
stakes for the named parties, and create potential risks of prejudice or unfairness for absent 
class members. This imposes unique responsibilities on the court and counsel. Once class 
allegations are made, decisions such as whether to settle and on what terms are no longer 
wholly within the litigants‘ control. Rather, the attorneys and named plaintiffs assume 
responsibilities to represent the class. The court must protect the interests of absent class 
members, and Rule 23(d) gives the judge broad administrative powers to do so, reflecting the 
equity origins of class actions.‖39  
 
                                                          
37
 B J Rothstein & T E Willging Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (2005) 2. 
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Further, according to the Ontario Commission, this type of complex litigation can only be 
handled efficiently, and the interests of absent class members can only be protected 
against the termination of class proceedings because of manageability problems, if judges 
are expressly empowered to assume an active role.40 
 
It is apparent that the approach followed in the selected foreign jurisdictions is not only to 
encourage active judicial management of class actions, but also to mandate it. Locally, 
there have also been calls for active judicial management of class actions. The South 
African Law Commission (―SALC‖) has recommended that our courts be more active in 
managing class actions compared to ordinary litigation.41 This is because class actions are 
generally more complex and it entails the determination of the rights and obligations of 
absent class members. The SALC accordingly proposed that ―the courts should be given 
broad general management powers exercisable either on the application of a party or 
class member or on the court‘s own motion‖.42  
 
Hurter has also emphasised the need for judges to ―step outside the usual passive role 
assigned to them by the traditional adversarial model of litigation and actively to take part 
in such management‖.43 Similarly, De Vos states that ―[l]egal representatives and judges 
will have to act in innovative ways to overcome complex procedural issues relating to class 
actions, such as notice to class members, proof and distribution of damages and 
management of these proceedings‖.44 Harms agrees that the need for active judicial 
management is not limited to class actions.45  
 
It is apparent from what has been set out above that the trend has been to recognise the 
need for active judicial management of class proceedings. The question that arises is how 
this issue should be regulated in a South African context. In this regard, the foreign 
jurisdictions have largely responded to the difficulties in managing class actions by 
                                                          
40
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adopting comprehensive legislation and court rules to regulate it,46 conferring upon judges 
extensive managerial powers and accordingly enabling active judicial management of 
class proceedings. Unfortunately, and as we know by now, the South African legislature 
has ignored repeated calls for the introduction of class action legislation in South Africa.47 
According to De Vos, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Children’s Resource Centre Trust 
should be commended for adopting an active judicial approach by developing South 
African class action law to protect the masses.48 However, it is submitted that serious 
consideration would need to be given to the adoption of a legislative framework aimed at 
regulating class actions, including the courts‘ role as judicial manager of class 
proceedings.49 In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA stated as follows in this 
regard:  
 
―The South African Law Commission, in line with many other jurisdictions to which we have 
been referred, proposed that the procedures applicable to class actions be prescribed by 
statute, and to that end prepared a draft bill. However, Parliament has not yet acted on its 
recommendations or those of a judicial commission of enquiry that made a similar 
recommendation. Academic voices over many years have likewise not been heard. The utility of 
a class action in certain circumstances is clear. We are thus confronted with a situation where 
the class action is given express constitutional recognition, but nothing has been done to 
regulate it. The courts must therefore address the issue in the exercise of their inherent power 
to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common law in the interests of 
justice. This may on some occasions involve us, and courts that will follow the guidance we 
give, in having to devise ad hoc solutions to procedural complexities on a case by case basis – 
a possibility referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada – but the failure to pass appropriate 
legislation dealing with this topic leaves us little alternative in the face of the constitutional 
endorsement of class actions.‖50 
 
Ad hoc procedural activism is one of the main criticisms of managerial judging. 
Establishing a legislative framework that deals with our courts‘ management powers may 
assist in addressing possible inconsistency insofar as judges‘ approaches to managing 
                                                          
46
 W de Vos ―Is a Class Action a ‗Classy Act‘ to Implement Outside the Ambit of the Constitution?‖ (2012) 4 
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class actions are concerned. Ultimately, the situation should be avoided where the 
judiciary, through ad hoc procedural activism, implements far-reaching changes in a 
piecemeal manner and with little reflection on the cumulative implications of such changes 
for the adversarial system.51 It is accordingly submitted that it may be a particularly 
appropriate area of the law of civil procedure for development not only through a process 
of common law evolution, but also through conscious design choices made by legislators 
and rule-makers.52  
 
However, before adopting a legislative framework regulating class actions, including our 
courts‘ managerial powers in this regard, it may be worthwhile to obtain data regarding 
active judicial management of class actions in practice.  Managerial judging as the ―self-
conscious restructuring of procedural incentives by trial judges on an ad hoc basis to 
achieve certain objectives‖ is a relatively recent innovation in the history of Anglo-
American civil procedure.53  Critics of managerial judging accordingly emphasise the lack 
of sufficient data available to evaluate conclusively whether managerial judging creates net 
benefits by increasing the overall efficiency of civil litigation as a mechanism for resolving 
disputes.54 It may therefore be beneficial to the functioning of South African civil procedure 
to conduct empirical studies in respect of how managerial judging actually works in 
practice.55  
 
It is further proposed that the inherent limitations posed by the ad hoc nature of managerial 
judging be removed by developing guidelines to assist judges in making managerial 
decisions. Ideally, these guidelines would need to be based on an analysis of what 
constitutes successful managerial judging, including the data obtained from the conduct of 
the empirical studies referred to above. The Manual for Complex Litigation and the Pocket 
Guide for Judges could be considered in the drafting of the guidelines. However, it has 
been stated that the Manual for Complex Litigation is deficient in that it avoids the 
controversial and central issue of the judge's role in promoting settlement.56 Any guidelines 
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prepared for our judges would need to address this issue because, as mentioned above, it 
entails a drastic departure from their traditional, adversarial role. 
 
5 3 Judicial management of class actions in foreign jurisdictions 
 
5 3 1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the following part of this chapter is briefly to consider the managerial 
powers conferred upon judges in the selected foreign jurisdictions to assist in determining 
the potential scope of such powers in our law.  
 
5 3 2 Australia and Ontario 
 
The Federal Court of Australia has extensive powers, including under Part IVA of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (Cth) (―Federal Court Act‖), to manage the conduct 
of a representative proceeding.57 The Supreme Courts of Victoria and New South Wales 
also possess extensive powers, including under Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act of 1986 
(Vic) and Part 10 of the Civil Procedure Act of 2005 (NSW), to manage the conduct of a 
representative proceeding. In these courts, representative proceedings are managed with 
reference to an overarching purpose, promulgated by statute, to facilitate the just and 
efficient resolution of the dispute.58 Furthermore, as the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (―ALRC‖) notes, ―without active court management, the interests of 
unidentified parties may not be taken properly into account‖.59 Accordingly, the managerial 
powers are directed towards ensuring that the court is able to adopt an active role in 
protecting the interests of persons not before the court and to ensure that representative 
proceedings are appropriately utilised. According to the ALRC, court management is 
aimed at ensuring that justice is achieved for parties and group members in a quick and 
inexpensive manner.60  
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The courts‘ powers of management of representative proceedings under the Federal Court 
Act61 include the power to: 
 
 discontinue representative proceedings;62  
 in certain circumstances, substitute a representative party who is not adequately 
representing the interests of group members;63  
 establish, in the case of issues not common to all group members, a subgroup of 
group members and to appoint a person as subgroup representative;64  
 order, at any stage of the proceeding, that notice of any matter be given to group 
members;65  
 decline to approve a settlement of a representative proceeding;66 and 
 make any order it thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the 
proceeding.67  
 
Class action legislation in Ontario also confers upon provincial courts broad discretion as 
to the manner in which class actions should be conducted.68 As in Australia, the objective 
in exercising these powers is the just and efficient resolution of the dispute, provided that 
fairness to the parties and the interests of justice are appropriately balanced.69  
 
There are numerous instances in the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (―Ontario Act‖), 
where managerial powers are conferred upon judges to manage class actions. For 
example, section 12 of the Ontario Act provides that the court, on the motion of a party or 
class member, may ―make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a 
class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for the purpose, 
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may impose such terms on the parties as it considers appropriate‖.70 Furthermore, a 
proceeding commenced pursuant to the Ontario Act may not be discontinued or 
abandoned without the approval of the court.71 Similarly, a ―settlement of a class 
proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court…‖72 Once approved by the court, a 
settlement binds all class members who have not opted out.73 There is not only 
considerable flexibility in determining how common issues are to be resolved, but also 
broad latitude in deciding how individual issues are to be determined.74  
 
In Ontario, it is common for case conferences to be held in chambers to enable the case 
management judge to meet informally with class counsel before hearing motions (including 
the initial certification motion) and at other times to discuss the management of the action. 
Apparently, these conferences typically address scheduling issues, but it is not uncommon 
for the judge directly or indirectly to impart his or her views regarding the merits of the case 
and attempt to encourage settlement of the issues.75 These sessions are regarded as 
being very important for both sides, as the court will often express its general concerns or 
ideas about the case.76  
 
5 3 3 United States 
 
In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades,77 the court held that ―[i]n class actions we 
recognize, indeed insist upon, the court‘s participation as the manager of the case‖.78 
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 Section 29(1). 
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According to Shaw, ―[b]y incentivising private attorneys to identify and represent groups 
with legitimate injuries and by encouraging active judicial initiative and management of 
suits, the rule [rule 23 of the Federal Rules] aimed to enhance the litigation opportunities of 
hitherto powerless groups‖.79 Accordingly, it has been stated that federal district courts 
have both the duty and the broad authority to govern the conduct of the named parties and 
the attorneys in class action litigation because the class action mechanism presents the 
potential for abusive conduct.80 As is the case with its legislative equivalents in Australia 
and Ontario, rule 23 of the Federal Rules gives the judge broad administrative powers to 
protect the interests of absent class members.81  
 
Express authority for a court‘s active management role in class actions can be found not 
only in rule 16 (which deals with the court‘s authority to issue scheduling and case 
management orders), but also in rule 23 of the Federal Rules.82 Rule 23(c) deals with the 
courts‘ management role inter alia in respect of the certification process, the giving of 
notice and in respect of classes and subclasses, whilst rule 23(e) refers to the courts‘ role 
in approving class action settlements. Importantly, rule 23(d) affords to courts a broad 
discretion to accomplish their role as managers in the conduct of class actions.83 
According to Ball, the rule ―allows the court authority to prescribe appropriate regulations 
for the conduct of the action, so that, rather than requiring a particular procedure, it permits 
and even encourages the courts to establish appropriate procedures tailored to the facts of 
a particular case...‖84 Under the broad authority granted by rule 23(d)(1), courts can issue 
a wide-ranging variety of orders in aid of the effective management of class actions.85  
 
In the United States, courts are involved in the active management of class actions from 
the initial filing of the class action until the conclusion of post-settlement administration. For 
example, the court is empowered to issue pre-certification court orders regarding issues 
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such as communications with class members and the court may be required to decide 
whether to grant certain pre-certification motions, such as motions relating to jurisdictional 
challenges, standing and summary judgment motions.86 
 
The Pocket Guide for Judges provides the following regarding the courts‘ management 
powers in the United States: 
  
―Now that CAFA [Class Action Fairness Act] is on the books and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 has been amended, you can expect to encounter the following class action 
responsibilities…• appointing counsel who have the professional skills, legal support staff, and 
financial resources needed to provide the class with adequate representation…; • determining 
when and how to decide class certification motions…; • establishing effective standards and 
procedures for evaluating the actual value to the class of proposed settlements and for 
determining whether the settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members…; • 
assessing reasonable attorney fees for class counsel by ensuring that fee awards are 
commensurate with the value of the results to the class as a whole…; • coordinating with state 
judges the management of competing and overlapping class actions…; and • deciding when to 
use special masters and court-appointed experts to assist in managing class actions and 
reviewing settlements...‖ 
 
The Manual for Complex Litigation states, as a general principle, that ―[f]air and efficient 
resolution of complex litigation requires that the court exercise early and effective 
supervision (and, where necessary, control)…and that the judge and counsel collaborate 
to develop and carry out a comprehensive plan for the conduct of pretrial and trial 
proceedings‖.87 The Manual describes a trial judge‘s appropriate management role as 
active, substantive and continuing.88 
 
5 3 4 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, when considering judges‘ managerial powers in the context of class action 
litigation, it is necessary to consider the inherent jurisdiction enjoyed by our superior 
courts. In Chunguete v Minister of Home Affairs and Others,89 Flemming J referred to Sir 
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Jack Jacob‘s lecture delivered in the 1970‘s90 and quoted the following features of the 
court‘s inherent jurisdiction: 
 
―(1) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is exercisable as part of the process of the 
administration of justice. It is part of procedural law, both civil and criminal, and not of 
substantive law; it is invoked in relation to the process of litigation. 
(2) The distinctive and basic feature of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is that it is 
exercisable by summary process.... 
(3) Because it is part of the machinery of justice, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be 
invoked...in relation...to anyone, whether a party or not, and in respect of matters which are not 
raised as issues in the litigation between the parties. 
(4) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is a concept which must be distinguished from the 
exercise of judicial discretion.... 
(5) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding 
that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case....‖91 
 
According to Jacob, ―the exercise of these powers was derived simply from the very nature 
of the Court as a superior Court of law. It is for that reason that the jurisdiction is 
‗inherent‘‖.92 ―The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary 
to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to 
law in a regular, orderly and effective manner‖.93 Flemming J states the following regarding 
the meaning of ‗inherent jurisdiction‘: 
 
―What is appropriately called the 'inherent jurisdiction' is related to the Court's functioning 
towards securing a just and respected process of coming to a decision and is not a factor which 
determines what order the Court may make after due process has been achieved. That is a 
function of the substantive law. The Court - always - is charged with holding the scales of 
justice. It is not within its task to add weights to the scales by detracting from a right given by the 
substantive law or granting a right not given by the substantive law.‖94 
 
In the context of South African procedural law, the courts‘ inherent jurisdiction is utilised 
with a view to regulating the court‘s procedures in the interests of the proper administration 
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of justice,95 especially where there is no rule dealing with a particular matter.96 However, 
where a particular matter is provided for by the rules, the scope for the court‘s exercise of 
its inherent powers is limited.97 Compelling grounds must exist before a court may act 
outside the powers provided for specifically in the rules.98 Where the rules do not provide 
for a particular set of circumstances, the court has inherent jurisdiction to read the rules in 
a manner that facilitates the administration of justice and to handle the matter along 
practical lines.99 As there are no class action court rules, the courts‘ inherent jurisdiction is 
therefore relevant, and important, to effectively manage class actions. 
 
Section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (―Constitution‖), 
added a further dimension to the inherent jurisdiction by empowering courts to develop the 
common law, which clearly comprises not only procedural law but also substantive law.100 
It enshrines the inherent jurisdiction of our superior courts.101 In Mukaddam v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd102 (―Mukaddam CC‖), regarding the inherent jurisdiction of our superior 
courts, the Constitutional Court held as follows: 
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―Section 173 makes plain that each of the superior courts has an inherent power to protect and 
regulate its own process and to develop the common law on matters of procedure, consistently 
with the interests of justice. The language of the section suggests that each court is responsible 
and controls the process through which cases are presented to it for adjudication. The reason 
for this is that a court before which a case is brought is better placed to regulate and manage 
the procedure to be followed in each case so as to achieve a just outcome. For a proper 
adjudication to take place, it is not unusual for the facts of a particular case to require a 
procedure different from the one normally followed. When this happens it is the court in which 
the case is instituted that decides whether a specific procedure should be permitted. The 
determination to certify a class action is not different to exercising the power to allow one 
procedure instead of the other.‖103 
 
The Constitutional Court in Mukaddam CC also referred to PFE International v Industrial 
Department Corporation of South Africa Ltd104 where the principle that rules of procedure 
must be applied flexibly, was reaffirmed by the court: 
 
―Since the rules are made for courts to facilitate the adjudication of cases, the superior courts 
enjoy the power to regulate their processes, taking into account the interests of justice. It is this 
power that makes every superior court the master of its own process. It enables a superior court 
to lay down a process to be followed in particular cases, even if that process deviates from what 
its rules prescribe. Consistent with that power, this Court may in the interests of justice depart 
from its own rules.‖105 
 
Our superior courts clearly enjoy a broad discretion to manage class actions, 
notwithstanding the absence of legislation or rules that confer upon them the power to do 
so. In Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited106 (―Nkala‖), Mojapelo DJP held as 
follows regarding the trial court‘s powers to manage a class action:  
 
―The trial court will, no doubt, be tasked with managing the process once the class action is 
certified… [T]hat court, using its powers in terms of s 173 of the Constitution, the various rules 
of court and practice directives, will be able to decide on the route(s) best suited to resolve the 
manifold disputes that are bound to surface. That court has significant powers to manage the 
proceedings in the interests of justice. It is, furthermore, within the wit of that court to determine 
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whether sub-classes should be formed and for the proceedings to be arranged in such a 
manner so as to do justice between the parties.‖  
 
However, it is apparent that the selected foreign jurisdictions referred to above all confer 
upon their judges, through the adoption of legislation and rules that regulate class actions, 
broad discretionary powers to manage class proceedings. These powers entail active and 
extensive judicial involvement in, and management of, class actions. The South African 
approach should be no different. Hurter supports such an approach,107 as does De Vos108 
and the SALC.109  
 
As mentioned,110 it is preferable to regulate the courts‘ judicial management powers 
statutorily.111 Such an approach would accord with the approaches of foreign jurisdictions 
as set out earlier in this chapter.112 These jurisdictions make provision for specific 
circumstances in class proceedings where the court would need to fulfill an active judicial 
management role and provide a framework for the exercise of the courts‘ powers in this 
regard. Our courts are compelled to rely on their inherent jurisdiction without the benefit of 
legislative guidance on their role in respect of the judicial management of class actions.113  
Although such discretionary freedom may encourage creativity and innovation insofar as 
class action management is concerned, it would not necessarily assist in promoting judicial 
certainty and uniformity. In any event, a legislative framework adopted to regulate class 
actions should afford to judges sufficient room to manoeuvre to enable them to manage 
such proceedings effectively. Legislative regulation of class actions does not necessarily 
preclude judicial innovation insofar as its management is concerned.               
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A further consideration that favours legislative intervention to regulate class actions is the 
doctrine of the separation of powers. This doctrine essentially requires that courts apply 
the law and not make it. The legislature is empowered to make, amend and repeal rules of 
law. 114 The judiciary has the power, if there is a dispute, to determine what the law is and 
how it should be applied in disputes.115 According to Mojapelo DJP, in the South African 
constitutional dispensation, the doctrine of separation of powers is not fixed or rigid.116  
 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Wallis JA referred to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and the development of the common law by our courts to regulate class actions in 
South Africa. He held as follows in this regard: 
 
―I, accordingly, reject the suggestion…that we should await legislative action before determining 
the requirements for instituting a class action in our law. The Legislature will be free to make its 
own determination when it turns its attention to this matter and in doing so, it may adopt an 
approach different from ours. In the meantime, the courts must prescribe appropriate 
procedures to enable litigants to pursue claims by this means. Having said that, it is right to 
enter one caveat. It is that, within the limited ambit of a class action as described earlier in this 
judgment, we are only concerned to determine the broad parameters within which class actions 
may be pursued and to lay down procedural requirements that must be satisfied in order to do 
so. Where necessary we must develop the common law in order to achieve this, for example, by 
expanding the scope of the res judicata principle. However, as the international literature shows, 
fundamental issues of policy may arise in determining the structure of such actions and their 
consequences. The resolution of those issues involves difficult policy choices that have 
received differing answers in different jurisdictions. It is not for us, in laying down procedural 
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requirements, to make policy choices that may impinge upon, or even remove, existing rights. 
That would be to trespass upon the domain of the Legislature, which the doctrine of the 
separation of powers – fundamental to our constitutional order – does not permit us to do.‖117 
 
As Wallis JA mentions above, there will inevitably be difficult policy choices that would 
need to be made to develop a structure for the adjudication of class actions in South 
Africa. The doctrine of the separation of powers dictates that our courts cannot make these 
decisions; rather, the legislature would need to consider it when it turns its attention to the 
issue. However, the longer it remains up to our courts to develop a structure for the 
adjudication of class actions in South Africa, the more likely it becomes that our courts 
could trespass on the domain of the legislature by taking decisions regarding issues that 
are subject to legislative consideration and determination.  
 
Furthermore, it is not ideal to adopt an ad hoc approach in respect of the development of a 
class action procedural framework.118 A haphazard developmental approach to the 
regulation of class actions could potentially result in inconsistency in the approaches of the 
various divisions of the High Court of South Africa.119 Most foreign jurisdictions with some 
form of class action mechanism regulate it legislatively or through court rules.120 Locally, 
several scholars have called for the introduction of specific class action legislation in South 
Africa.121 The introduction of comprehensive legislation and court rules regulating class 
actions in South Africa could ensure that development of class action procedure is not at 
the discretion of our courts and could enable South Africa to follow in the footsteps of other 
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countries with specific class action legislation.122 Statutory regulation of class actions will 
provide more certainty and clarity regarding class actions in South African law. If the 
primary objective of class actions is to provide access to justice, it does not make sense 
that the average person on the street would need to interpret case law to acquire an 
understanding of the structure for the adjudication of class actions in South African law. A 
class action legislative framework appears to be a preferred route to facilitate the access 
to justice goal of class actions.  
 
The statutory provisions in which the courts‘ powers of management are embedded will 
inevitably vary depending on the nature of the issue in respect of which the power is to be 
exercised. Thus, there should be a variety of statutory provisions, each of which evidences 
the courts‘ power to manage class actions. For example, there may be a provision that 
enables the court to substitute a representative plaintiff who is not adequately representing 
the interests of the class members,123 and a provision that enables the court to order the 
discontinuance of a properly instituted class action.124 Insofar as the overarching 
empowering provision, expressly empowering our courts to adopt an active approach to 
managing class actions, is concerned, it may be worthwhile for our legislature to consider 
similar provisions in the Australian and Ontario class action statutes. Section 33ZF(1) of 
the Australian Federal Court Act empowers the court to make ―any order... [it] thinks 
appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceedings‖. Section 12 of 
the Ontario Act provides that ―[t]he court, on the motion of a party or class member, may 
make any order it considers appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to 
ensure its fair and expeditious determination and, for that purpose, may impose such 
terms on the parties as it considers appropriate‖. Both provisions empower the court to 
manage the class action in a way that it considers appropriate. However, section 12 of the 
Ontario Act does not enable the court to exercise its powers of management mero motu. 
To actively manage class actions, our courts should be expressly empowered to make 
certain managerial choices during the course of proceedings without having to wait for a 
party to bring an application. The SALC proposed that the courts‘ management powers 
should be exercisable either on the application of a party or class member or on the court‘s 
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own motion.125 It may therefore be preferable to adopt a provision similar to section 
33ZF(1) when designing an empowering provision in a South African class action statute.  
 
It is further submitted that, beyond the implementation of a legislative framework to 
regulate the courts‘ judicial management powers, one would also need to consider the 
specific tools our courts could utilise to manage class actions effectively. In the above-
mentioned foreign jurisdictions, tools frequently utilised by judges to manage class actions 
include, for example, the submission of trial plans, the issuing of case management 
orders, and the bifurcation of class proceedings.126 One such tool that has been 
successfully utilised in Australia and the United States to manage and possibly resolve 
class actions is court-annexed mediation. The remainder of this chapter considers the 
possible utilisation of this form of mediation as a tool to manage South African class 
actions effectively.  
 
5 4 Court-annexed mediation as a tool to manage and resolve class actions in South 
Africa 
 
5 4 1 Introduction  
 
Mediation historically operated independently of the court system. However, it is no longer 
viewed as an alternative to litigation; rather, it is seen as an integral part of it. Mediation is 
a valuable case management tool, even when it fails to lead to immediate settlement of the 
dispute.127 Where it does not result in settlement of the dispute, mediation may 
nevertheless have value from the perspective of, for example, a potential partial settlement 
of the dispute or by providing a party with valuable information of the other party‘s case.128 
Ultimately, however, mediating disputes may have the effect of relieving our superior 
courts‘ high caseload, as well as shielding the parties and the courts from the high costs 
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and delays generally involved in civil litigation.129 McGuire states the following regarding 
the success rate of mediation and the benefits that it could provide: 
 
―Mediation enjoys a high success rate. Most cases settle during or shortly after mediation, 
regardless at what point in the litigation life cycle mediation is used. It is generally 
acknowledged that in many cases, even if the mediation is not successful in settling the entire 
case, the process may help the parties to focus on the issues that are truly in dispute and 
narrow the scope of needed discovery, saving significant legal expenses.‖130 
 
There appears to be an increased tendency to utilise mediation in complex legal disputes. 
Mediation is accordingly increasingly utilised in class action litigation.131 At first, these 
cases may seem impossible to mediate, but they are increasingly resolved through 
successful mediation.132 ―Because of the complexity of class-action litigation, courts and 
litigants have frequently turned to alternative dispute resolution…for the management and 
resolution of class actions.‖133 It may accordingly be worthwhile to consider utilising 
mediation as a tool to manage and resolve class actions in South Africa, having regard to 
the approaches of foreign jurisdictions in this regard. 
 
5 4 2 Mediation in South Africa 
 
South Africa has been relatively slow to embrace alternative modes of dispute 
resolution.134  Consequently, as is the case with class actions in South Africa, there is no 
                                                          
129
  Kuhner (2005) ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 1 10, 15-16, 18. 
130
 J E McGuire ―Mediation mandate: refusing to mediate becoming more difficult on both sides of Atlantic‖ 
(2002-2003) 9 Disp Resol Mag 17 18. 
131
 See, for example, M Lee & D Bampton ―Current Issues Relating to Mediation in Shareholder 
Representative Proceedings in Australia‖ (2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal 988 988: ―In large scale litigation 
it has become unlikely a matter will proceed to trial without recourse to some form of alternative dispute 
resolution process: in a representative proceeding, when an initial trial of common issues will not resolve all 
individual issues, some form of dispute resolution at some stage of the curial process is almost inevitable.‖ 
132
 E D Green ―Re-Examining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Litigation: Lessons from 
Microsoft and Other Megacases‖ (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 1171 1175. See also 1172 where 
he states that there is ―increasing pressures on courts to deal with megacases, and regular resort to 
mediation in these cases‖. 
133
 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 667. 
134
 A Anthimos, A V Baker, G De Palo, W A Herbert, M Judin & N Tereshchenko ―International Commercial 
Mediation‖ (2011) 45.1 International Lawyers 111 119.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
single, general, South African mediation statute or court rule. A distinction is drawn 
between ‗private mediation‘, triggered by contractual agreement, and various forms of 
‗institutionalised mediation‘, that is mediation connected to the courts or required by 
statute.135 Of relevance for purposes of this chapter is what has been referred to above as 
‗institutionalised mediation‘. The proposal made at the conclusion of this chapter, which 
aims to assist our courts to manage class actions, relates to a form of institutionalised 
mediation. This proposed form of institutionalised mediation will be informed by the 
recently introduced South African court-annexed mediation rules and the mediation 
regimes of prominent foreign jurisdictions.  
 
In South Africa, limited provision is made for mediation as a means to assist our superior 
courts to manage civil litigation. Rule 37 of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the 
Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South 
Africa (―Uniform Rules‖) contains the issues that should be dealt with at a pre-trial 
conference. The rule does not require that the parties engage in mediation in an attempt to 
resolve the dispute; it merely requires that the parties consider referring the dispute for 
mediation and record their decision in this regard in the pre-trial conference minute. This is 
reflected in subrule 37(6), which provides as follows:  
 
―The minutes of the pre-trial conference shall be prepared and signed by or on behalf of every 
party and the following shall appear therefrom…(d) whether any issue has been referred by the 
parties for mediation, arbitration or decision by a third party and on what basis it has been so 
referred…‖ 
 
Apart from the reference to mediation in rule 37, it has been argued that it is now accepted 
that legal representatives are well advised to recommend mediation or they could be 
deprived of their costs, as could parties who unreasonably refuse to mediate.136 In this 
regard, in MB v NB137 (―Brownlee‖), it was held that, in divorce proceedings, the parties‘ 
legal representatives should advise them of the benefits of mediation. Each party was 
ordered by the court to bear their own costs, taxed on a party and party basis. The 
attorneys were deprived of their full attorney and client fees. Brassey AJ referred to the 
failure of the attorneys to act appropriately i.e. to advise their clients of the benefits of 
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mediation and held ―[f]or this they are to blame and they must, I believe, shoulder the 
responsibility that comes from failing properly to serve the interests of their clients‖.138  
 
It has been argued that, following the Brownlee decision and in light of other recent 
developments in South African law, parties to a dispute are obliged to consider the 
appropriateness of mediation139 and that a dispute should be referred to mediation where 
there is a reasonable possibility that it could result in the resolution of the dispute. Also, 
attorneys must advise their clients of the benefits of mediation and assist them to submit a 
dispute to mediation. Failure to do so may result in the issuing of an adverse cost order.140 
 
A further, relatively recent, development in South African law has been the publication by 
the Department of Justice and Correctional Services of court-annexed mediation rules 
(―Mediation Rules‖) and the launching of court-annexed mediation at pilot site courts 
across the country from 1 December 2014. The Mediation Rules provide the procedure for 
the voluntary submission of civil disputes to mediation in selected magistrates‘ courts.141 
The Mediation Rules were introduced in the form of amendments to the rules regulating 
the conduct of proceedings of South African magistrates‘ courts. The primary objectives of 
the Mediation Rules are to assist case-flow management in the reduction of disputes 
appearing before court and to promote access to justice.142  
 
Parties to a class action instituted in a South African superior court can generally agree to 
submit the dispute to private mediation. However, there is no form of institutionalised 
mediation that provides for voluntary or mandatory mediation of disputes in our superior 
courts, as is the case with court-annexed mediation in our lower courts and the mediation 
regimes of prominent foreign jurisdictions. Having briefly referred to the Mediation Rules, it 
may be instructive to consider the approaches of foreign jurisdictions in this regard. 
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5 4 3 Mediation regimes of the foreign jurisdictions 
 
Rules 24.1 and 75.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure143 constitute the Ontario Mandatory 
Mediation Program. The website of the Ministry of the Attorney General in Ontario 
describes the program as follows: 
 
―The Mandatory Mediation Program is a program designed to help parties involved in civil 
litigation and estates matters settle their cases early in the litigation process to save time and 
money. The Mandatory Mediation Program applies in Toronto, Ottawa and Windsor to certain 
civil actions under rule 24.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to contested estates, trusts and 
substitute decision matters under rule 75.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure…Under the 
Mandatory Mediation Program, cases are referred to a mediation session early in the litigation 
process to give parties an opportunity to discuss the issues in dispute. With the help of a trained 
mediator, the parties explore settlement options and may be able to avoid the pre-trial and trial 
process.‖144 
 
Rule 24.1 applies to class actions commenced under the Ontario Act only if certification 
has been denied.145 The Mandatory Mediation Program therefore does not permit court-
annexed mediation of class actions (voluntary or mandatory) prior to certification or where 
the class action has been certified by the court. Although limited consideration will be 
given to Ontario‘s Mandatory Mediation Program in formulating a proposal for adoption in 
South Africa, certain provisions could nevertheless be utilised in a South African class 
action context.146  
 
In 1990, in the United States, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990147 required district 
courts to ―consider…principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay 
reduction‖.148 District courts were allowed to ―refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute 
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resolution programs…including mediation‖.149 Thereafter, the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1998150 (―Dispute Resolution Act‖) was introduced. The Dispute 
Resolution Act requires federal district courts to authorise the use of alternative dispute 
resolution in civil proceedings. However, it allows each court to determine for itself what 
types of cases are covered and it enables courts to compel parties to enter mediation.151 
The Dispute Resolution Act provides that ―[e]ach United States district court shall 
authorize…the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions...Each 
United States district court shall devise and implement its own alternative dispute 
resolution program…to encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in 
its district‖.152 Each United States district court may mandate mediation through their local 
rules.153 The Dispute Resolution Act further authorises each court to exempt ―specific 
cases or categories of cases in which use of alternative dispute resolution would not be 
appropriate‖, but requires that they consult a member of the bar including the United 
States attorney for their district.154  
 
As of 1999, ―mediation programs [were] the most…frequently authorized ADR program. 
Nearly eighty district courts have authorized or established at least one court-wide ADR 
program‖.155 The degree to which mediation is mandatory therefore depends on the local 
rules in each district.156 Crowne states that the Dispute Resolution Act provides no 
guidance as to the proper role of alternative dispute resolution in the court system and 
confirms that it affords to district courts tremendous discretion to design alternative dispute 
resolution processes. She further states that thoughtful incorporation of alternative dispute 
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resolution into the United States district courts could enrich their justice system and 
provide substantial benefits.157  
 
According to Senior United States District Judge Sandra Beckwith, ―the approaches taken 
by the various district courts regarding court-annexed or court-approved ADR programs 
have varied over time, no doubt in part as a reflection of local customs and regional needs 
for different types of programs‖.158 She states that ―[t]he benefits that can be derived from 
such programs are now viewed as a positive adjunct to the district court‘s important 
considerations of open accessibility, transparency, fairness, and impartiality in the 
administration of justice. Court-annexed mediation programs can also advance the goals 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as defined by Rule 1 – to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding‖.159 According to Beckwith 
J, the prevalence of court-annexed ADR programs has supplanted ―the prior informal 
procedures for ad hoc settlement conferences that are conducted mostly by magistrate 
judges‖.160  
  
The Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program only applies to class actions in limited 
circumstances. Further, the American district courts developed their own alternative 
dispute resolution programs and rules, and these programs and rules inevitably vary from 
one court to another. It may therefore be worthwhile to consider the relatively uniform 
Australian approach to court-annexed mediation. ―Court-annexed ADR, and specifically 
court-annexed mediation, has become a well established feature of the Australian judicial 
system since the 1990s.‖161   
 
In the Australian Federal Court, the parties are obliged to negotiate with the view to settling 
the dispute prior to the commencement of proceedings and must file a genuine steps 
statement, stating that this was done, together with the application commencing 
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proceedings. This is a form of legislatively compelled alternative dispute resolution.162 
Further, section 53A of the Federal Court Act empowers a court to refer proceedings to a 
mediator, with or without the consent of the parties. Section 53A provides as follows: 
 
 ―(1) The Court may, by order, refer proceedings in the Court, or any part of them or any matter 
arising out of them: 
(a)  to an arbitrator for arbitration; or 
(b)  to a mediator for mediation; or 
(c)  to a suitable person for resolution by an alternative dispute resolution process; 
in accordance with the Rules of Court. 
(1AA) Subsection (1) is subject to the Rules of Court. 
(1A) Referrals under subsection (1) (other than to an arbitrator) may be made with or without 
the consent of the parties to the proceedings. Referrals to an arbitrator may be made only with 
the consent of the parties. 
(2) The Rules of Court may make provision for the registration of awards made in an arbitration 
carried out under an order made under subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not apply to criminal proceedings.‖ 
 
Part 28 of the Australian Federal Court Rules163 (―Australian Rules‖) supplements section 
53A of the Federal Court Act. It provides that the parties and the court must consider 
mediation as early as is reasonably practicable.164 A party may also apply to court for an 
order that the proceeding or part of the proceeding be referred to a mediator.165 Where the 
parties refer the proceeding to a mediator, the applicant must apply to the court for 
directions as to the future management and conduct of the proceeding within 14 days of 
the referral.166 Courts are empowered to make further orders including an order regarding 
the time within which the mediation must start and finish.167 Any party may apply to the 
court for an order terminating a mediation or ADR process, or terminating the appointment 
of a mediator or suitable person.168 Rules 28.21 to 28.25 deal specifically with the 
practicalities involved in the mediation process, including the process of selecting a 
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mediator,169 the conduct of the mediation,170 the mediator‘s report,171 the termination of 
mediation,172 and the mediation agreement.173  
 
The jurisdictions of Ontario and the United States, compared to the Australian approach, 
offer less value from the perspective of informing the development of the proposed 
approach to mediating class actions in South Africa as set out below. The Ontario 
Mandatory Mediation Program does not permit court-annexed mediation of class actions 
before or after (successful) certification. In the United States, the district courts‘ 
approaches to mediation, including the extent to which mediation is mandated, vary 
significantly. The relatively consistent and uniform Australian approach to mediation set 
out above accordingly informs the approach suggested in the next section to utilise 
mediation as a tool to manage and to resolve class actions in the South African superior 
courts. The suggested approach will therefore seek guidance from the Australian approach 
and it will take account of court-annexed mediation in the South African lower courts as 
evidenced by the Mediation Rules.  
 
5 4 4 Suggested approach to mediating class actions in South Africa 
 
South African law, unlike Australian law, does not provide for either voluntary or mandatory 
court-annexed mediation of class actions.174 It is submitted that, in view of the benefits of 
mediation generally, and specifically in the context of class action litigation,175 provision 
should be made for both these forms of mediation of class actions in our superior courts.   
 
With the above in mind, it may be worthwhile to consider in further detail the suggested 
approach to court-annexed mediation of class actions in South Africa. If we specifically 
take into account the approach of Australia to court-annexed mediation and our Mediation 
Rules, it is evident that any legislative framework aimed at regulating court-annexed 
mediation of class actions in the South Africa would need to address a wide range of 
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issues. These issues include the degree to which parties enter into mediation 
consensually; the timing of mediation and its duration; the appointment, qualifications, 
expertise and skills of the mediator; the payment of fees and the issue of approval by the 
court of any mediated settlement. These issues are considered in the remainder of this 
chapter. Other issues that have not been listed above would also have to be addressed by 
the legislature if it were to recognise a class action court-annexed mediation regulatory 
framework. For example, it would also have to address the ethical duties of the mediator in 
conducting the mediation and practical issues pertaining to the mediation process itself. 
Unfortunately, the scope of this dissertation does not permit a detailed exposition of all 
such issues. 
 
5 4 4 1 The degree to which parties enter into mediation consensually 
 
In South Africa, parties to a civil dispute may engage in private mediation in respect of 
disputes instituted in both the lower and the superior courts. Parties are also able to 
engage in voluntary court-annexed mediation within the context of civil disputes instituted 
in our lower courts. As mentioned, however, no provision is made for voluntary or 
mandatory court-annexed mediation of civil disputes instituted in our superior courts, which 
makes it impossible to use these mechanisms in South African class action disputes. 
However, as will be argued below, this is an unsatisfactory position, especially if we 
consider the positive experiences in Australian and American law. It will further be argued 
that the mediation should ideally take place on a consensual basis, but the courts should 
retain a discretion to mandate it in appropriate circumstances.  
 
Rule 74 of the Mediation Rules of the lower courts provides that they apply to the voluntary 
submission of civil disputes by parties to mediation prior to the commencement of litigation 
and to disputes in litigation that have already commenced, as contemplated in rules 78 
and 79.176 According to rule 75, the parties may refer a dispute to mediation prior to the 
commencement of litigation or after the commencement of litigation but prior to judgment 
provided that, where the trial has commenced, the parties must obtain the authorisation of 
the court. Further, a judicial officer may at any time after the commencement of litigation, 
but before judgment, enquire into the possibility of mediating the dispute and accord the 
parties an opportunity to refer the dispute to mediation. Importantly, mediation can clearly 
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take place in terms of the Mediation Rules on a consensual basis but the judge does not 
have a discretion to compel parties to mediate the dispute. The Mediation Rules 
accordingly apply to voluntary mediation, but do not provide for mandatory court-annexed 
mediation of civil disputes in the lower courts.  
 
The Mediation Rules are therefore insufficient to give effect to the proposal herein that 
court-annexed mediation of class actions should take place on a voluntary or mandatory 
basis. However, as mentioned,177 court-annexed mediation in the Australian Federal Court 
can be consensual or it can be court-ordered. It may therefore be instructive to consider 
the reasons why Australian law adopted this position and, if they are compelling, to 
consider incorporating appropriate parts of the Australian Federal Court Act and Australian 
Rules into South African law to give effect to the proposal. In this regard, section 53(1A) of 
the Australian Federal Court Act provides that an order ―may be made with or without the 
consent of the parties to the proceedings…‖ Section 53A(1)(b) provides that a court may 
order that proceedings (or a part thereof) be referred to mediation. Rule 28.02 reinforces 
mandatory mediation insofar as it provides that a court may refer a proceeding to 
mediation of its own motion.  
 
The Australian court-annexed mediation regime therefore clearly provides for mandatory 
mediation. Regarding the courts‘ power to order mediation, Hanks states as follows:  
  
―Courts in Australia have wide discretionary powers to order mediation without the parties‘ 
consent. Legislative provisions empowering the Supreme Court of NSW to order mandatory 
mediation first appeared in 2000. Supreme Court Practice Notes have reinforced these powers 
of judges to order unwilling parties to mediate. There has been open judicial support for this 
initiative, often in the form of court-annexed mediation where the process is carried out by a 
court officer and in some cases, a judge.‖178 
 
The issue of consensual court-annexed mediation is relatively uncontroversial; however, 
the appropriateness of mandatory court-annexed mediation has been subject to debate.179 
The arguments favouring mandatory court-annexed mediation appear to be overwhelming. 
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In Re Atlantic Pipe Corporation, Petitioner,180 the court stated ―when mediation is forced 
upon unwilling litigants, it stands to reason that the likelihood of settlement is diminished‖. 
However, the studies of mediation success suggest otherwise.181 According to McGuire, if 
the mediator is skilled, the chance of success does not vary between voluntary and court-
ordered mediations.182 Further, Clark states that ―mandating mediation may also help 
embed the process generally and lead to its increased acceptance and use‖.183 He refers 
to research conducted in respect of a mandatory court-annexed mediation regime in 
respect of which it was concluded that, ―despite initial resistance to the programme by 
lawyers, judicial compulsion of mediation led to a shift in disputing culture in which some 
lawyers and their clients began to accept and embrace the process as it became 
normalised‖.184 He refers to similar programs in the United States in respect of which it 
was concluded that mandatory mediation increases general deployment of the process, 
enhances the flow of information from lawyers to disputants about alternative dispute 
resolution processes and may also over time lead to dilution of some of the less desirable 
adversarial practices of lawyers.185 According to Clark, against a backdrop of low voluntary 
uptake of mediation but potentially high post-hoc success and the scope for efficiency 
contributions to civil court systems, mandatory mediation may represent an attractive 
prospect for policy makers.186  
 
Hanks also supports mandatory mediation and states that ―compelling parties to attempt 
mediation has the potential of reducing costs, allowing for a wider range of solutions, and 
maintaining the relationships between the parties‖.187 Further, ―[w]here the use of ADR is 
mandated by the courts, parties usually recognize that the court will expect a high degree 
of cooperation while working toward settlement‖.188 
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In view of these considerations, it is submitted that the South African court-annexed 
mediation regulatory framework should, as a first port of call, make provision for class 
actions to be mediated on a consensual basis. However, it should further provide that, in 
the absence of consent, a court retains the discretion to compel the parties to mediate. 
Our legislature could consider utilising section 53A of the Australian Federal Court Act as 
the class action court-annexed mediation authorising provision, with minor amendments.  
In this regard, the authorising provision could provide that the parties may agree to ―refer 
proceedings…or any part of them or any matter arising out of them…to a mediator for 
mediation…in accordance with the Rules‖.189 It could further provide that a referral to 
mediation ―may be made…without the consent of the parties to the proceedings‖.  
 
It is submitted that it should not be a fait accompli that the failure by parties to engage in 
consensual mediation would result in mediation being mandated. Rather, there should be 
scope for our courts only to compel mediation of class actions in certain circumstances. 
For example, where the court is of the view that mediation would not contribute to either 
the management or the resolution of the class action, it may decide against compelling 
mediation. In this regard, according to Giles QC, mediation may not be appropriate in 
certain circumstances and the courts‘ discretion should, in such circumstances, be 
exercised against compelling mediation:  
 
―[T]here are many cases where a party should never be asked to mediate. The fact is that some 
litigants have a valid claim. Some have a valid defence. There is no reason why the matter 
should be compromised in either case. Undoubtedly, mediation can be extremely valuable in 
the right case and at the right time. Every lawyer has a duty to recommend mediation in the 
right case and at the right time. Nevertheless, it also carries the danger of favouring the 
unreasonable, the dishonest and the bullies.‖190 
 
5 4 4 2 Timing of mediation and its duration 
  
A further issue that would need to be considered in respect of court-annexed mediation of 
class actions in South Africa is the timing of the mediation; in other words, whether it 
should precede or follow the class action certification decision.  It is submitted that the 
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parties should be able to agree to court-annexed mediation before the certification 
decision or after the certification decision if the certification application is successful.191 It is 
further submitted that our courts should retain a discretion to mandate mediation before 
the certification decision or after the class action has been certified.  
 
In deciding when to compel the parties to engage in mediation, a court would need to 
consider where mediation best fits in the sequence of litigation events, given the 
circumstances of the particular case. In this regard, it is possible to conceive of a number 
of factors that could operate in favour of mediating before the certification decision. For 
example, mediating the dispute prior to certification may save costs, both in delay and 
expense, insofar as settlement would mean the parties would not have to argue the 
certification application and wait for it to be decided. Further, given that class actions 
routinely take a substantial period of time, sometimes years, to reach certification, it may 
be preferable for the mediation to take place pre-certification.192 Should the parties wait for 
the certification decision, there is a change in relative bargaining power that occurs after 
the court grants a class action certification application. It may be preferable for mediation 
to take place pre-certification, because the uncertainty of whether the court will certify the 
class provides an incentive for both sides to settle.193   
 
Conversely, where a party is of the view that it is likely to prevail in respect of the class 
action certification decision, such a party may prefer to proceed immediately with the 
certification process rather than mediating. A successful certification application would 
obviously strengthen the applicant‘s hand at mediation. Similarly, the respondent to the 
certification application could argue that an unsuccessful certification application would 
render mediation unnecessary and that it is therefore preferable that no expense is 
incurred in preparing for and engaging in the mediation. These factors could accordingly 
militate against mediating before certification.  
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A further issue that would need to be considered, insofar as the implementation of a court-
annexed mediation regulatory framework is concerned, is the duration of the mediation. 
Rule 77 of the Mediation Rules provides that, if the parties agree to submit the dispute to 
mediation, the clerk or registrar of the court must assist the parties to conclude a written 
mediation agreement.194 The agreement should inter alia regulate195 ―the period of time 
that will be allocated for each mediation session;‖ and ―the time within which mediation will 
be concluded and the method by which any periods or time limits may be extended;…‖ 
The Government Notice, in terms of which the qualification, standards and levels of 
mediators are determined, provides that ―[e]very mediator must be punctual for a 
mediation session and keep to time limits, if any, set by the parties‖.196  
 
It is apparent that, in terms of the Mediation Rules, the parties decide on the duration of 
the mediation. This position is in contrast with the Australian court-annexed mediation 
regime. As mentioned,197 rule 28.03 of the Australian Federal Court Rules provides that a 
―[c]ourt may make further orders including an order for the time within which the mediation 
must start and finish‖. Rule 28.22 provides that ―[a] mediation must be conducted in 
accordance with any orders made by the Court‖. Further, rule 28.05 states as follows: 
 
―(1) Nothing in this Division prevents the parties to a proceeding referring the proceeding 
to:…(b) a mediator for mediation;…(2) However, if the parties refer the proceeding under 
subrule (1), the applicant must, within 14 days of the referral, apply to the Court for directions as 
to the future management and conduct of the proceeding.‖ 
 
It is submitted that the Australian approach, in terms of which the court decides on the 
duration of the mediation, is preferable. It is conceivable that the interests of the parties to 
a class action may differ insofar as the duration of the mediation is concerned, regardless 
of whether the mediation is mandatory or voluntary. For example, circumstances may arise 
where the applicant may want to limit the duration of the mediation to be able to proceed 
with the certification application as soon as possible, whereas the respondent may want to 
engage in an extended mediation process to delay the certification hearing for as long as 
possible. It may therefore be desirable for the court to decide on the duration of the 
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mediation. Further, if such an approach is followed in South Africa, it would be in line with 
what was stated above regarding the active management role of judges insofar as the 
mediation of class actions is concerned:198 although judges should preferably not engage 
in the mediation itself, they should nevertheless play an active role in managing the 
mediation. This management role should entail deciding on the duration of the mediation. 
A court should nevertheless be able to take into account the views of the parties and the 
mediator insofar as a decision on the duration of the mediation is concerned.  
 
5 4 4 3 Appointment, qualifications, expertise and skills of the mediator 
 
A further issue that would need to be considered when implementing court-annexed 
mediation of class actions in South Africa is the appointment, qualifications, expertise and 
skills of the mediator. The Mediation Rules, in relatively comprehensive terms, deal with 
the appointment, qualifications, expertise and skills of the mediator. It defines a ‗mediator‘ 
as a person selected by parties or by the clerk or registrar of the court from a schedule 
referred to in rule 86(2), to mediate a dispute between the parties.199 The schedule of 
persons accredited as mediators in terms of rule 86 (2) of the Mediation Rules currently 
comprises 233 individuals in total. The document contains each individual‘s full name and 
surname as well as his or her designation.200 It further indicates the individual‘s area of 
focus/speciality201 and his or her magisterial/sub district. Finally, the ‗level‘ of each 
individual is contained in the document, varying between a level one and a level two. The 
persons listed in the schedule accordingly comprise the ‗Panel of Court-Annexed 
Mediators‘202 appointed to mediate civil disputes in our lower courts where the parties have 
agreed to the mediation. Rule 86 of the Mediation Rules provides for the qualifications, 
standards and levels of mediators who will conduct mediation under the rules to be 
determined by the Minister. The schedule published in this regard203 contains detailed 
provisions on the qualifications and standards for accreditation as a mediator. It is 
submitted that the content of these provisions can equally apply to the mediation of class 
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actions instituted in our superior courts. However, the mediator training and accreditation 
requirements would need to be much more rigorous than in the case of the training 
conducted under the auspices of the Magistrate‘s Courts. Mediating class actions would 
require mediators who are sufficiently equipped to deal with the difficulties posed by such 
proceedings. Green describes the challenge of mediating complex cases as follows: 
 
―Every case is unique; megacases are uniquely unique. In their variety and particularity, they 
tend to be extremely difficult and pose special challenges for judges and mediators for several 
reasons. What these different challenges have in common is that they all demand a high level of 
expertise, and when several of these challenges are present in the same case, as they often 
are, they require a high level of expertise in multiple fields. Achieving the required level of 
expertise in any one field is difficult enough; achieving the required level of expertise in the 
multiple fields required is beyond that which seems reasonably attainable for any single 
individual, Leonardo da Vinci, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and maybe Oliver Wendell 
Holmes excepted. To the normal highly educated, respected, and experienced judge or 
mediator, megacases push one beyond known limits of competency and confidence.‖204 
 
Mediating class actions is, ultimately, far more complex and difficult than settling an 
individual claim. The stakes are much higher and the issues, procedural rules and 
substantive law are generally far more complex compared to ordinary civil litigation. The 
‗Panel of Court-Annexed Mediators‘ would accordingly need to comprise individuals who 
have received the appropriate training and accreditation to enable them to mediate class 
actions in our superior courts.  
 
It is conceivable that, given the difficulties associated with mediating class actions, it would 
be more challenging to find the required high level of expertise among members of this 
profession in South Africa that would enable them to mediate in such complex 
proceedings. However, given that class actions are still in its infancy in South African law, 
the incidence of class actions remains relatively low. It may therefore be unnecessary, as 
a first port of call, to constitute a panel consisting of a large number of mediators. A small 
group of suitably qualified mediators, ideally geographically dispersed across the 
jurisdictions in which our superior courts are situated, should therefore suffice.  
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5 4 4 4 Payment of fees  
 
A South African court-annexed class action mediation regulatory framework would also 
need to address the issue of liability for the mediator‘s fees. It is submitted that, regardless 
of whether the mediation takes place on a consensual basis or whether it is compelled by 
the court, the parties should be responsible for payment of the mediator‘s fees. Rule 84 of 
the Mediation Rules provides that liability for the fees of a mediator must be borne equally 
between opposing parties, except where the services of a mediator are provided free of 
charge and provided that any party may offer or undertake to pay in full the fees of a 
mediator. However, the parties should incur the legal costs of their own legal 
representatives in preparing for and attending the mediation.205 Such an approach also 
accords with the Ontario Regulation promulgated to regulate mediators‘ fees. The Ontario 
Regulation provides inter alia that ―[e]ach party is required to pay an equal share of the 
mediator‘s fees for the mandatory mediation session‖.206   
 
It is further submitted that our courts should, however, retain a discretion to allocate 
responsibility for the mediator‘s fees in a manner other than equal shares between the 
parties. The approach followed in the New South Wales Civil Procedure Act of 2005 could 
be considered in this regard. Section 28 confers a discretion upon courts as to the 
allocation of responsibility for the costs of the mediation. Section 28 provides as follows:  
 
―The costs of mediation, including the costs payable to the mediator, are payable:  
(a) if the court makes an order as to the payment of those costs, by one or more of the parties in 
such manner as the order may specify, or  
(b) in any other case, by the parties in such proportions as they may agree among themselves‖. 
 
The primary difference between the above proposal and the position set out in section 28 
is that, in terms of the proposal, the point of departure is that the parties share liability for 
the costs of the mediation in equal portions. Leaving it to the parties to agree to liability for 
the costs of the mediation could create a platform for unnecessary party-disagreement. In 
any event, where circumstances dictate a departure from equal liability, the court would be 
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required to assume its role as active manager of the class proceedings and would need to 
make the appropriate order as to liability for the mediation costs.  
 
The Minister has published the tariffs of fees chargeable by mediators. According to the 
tariff, a level one mediator will receive R225 per half hour spent mediating while a level two 
mediator will receive R300 per half hour. The tariff provides that a mediator‘s maximum 
daily fee is R4 500 or R6 000, depending on whether the mediator has been categorised 
as a level one or a level two mediator.207 The tariff also provides for the payment of a 
mediator‘s fees relating to the perusal of documents, preparation of a report and 
travelling.208  
 
It is submitted that the fees payable to mediators of class actions in our superior courts 
would have to be increased compared to the fees that are payable under the Mediation 
Rules. Mediating a class action dispute is potentially considerably more challenging than 
mediating civil disputes in the context of our magistrates‘ courts, with its limited jurisdiction. 
Mediators would therefore need to be compensated accordingly. In terms of the potential 
regulation of this issue, it is conceivable that a tariff of fees chargeable by mediators could 
be inserted into the Uniform Rules,209 specifically in the form of a schedule thereto.  
 
5 4 4 5 The mediated settlement 
 
Rule 80(2) of the Mediation Rules provides that ―[a] mediator must, within 5 days of the 
conclusion of mediation, submit a report to the clerk or registrar of the court informing him 
or her of the outcome of the mediation‖. Rule 82 of the Mediation Rules provides that if a 
settlement is not reached at mediation in a dispute which is the subject of litigation, the 
clerk or registrar of the court must, upon receipt of a report from the mediator, file the 
report to enable the litigation to continue, from which time all suspended time periods will 
resume. Rule 82 further provides that, in the event that the parties reach settlement, the 
mediator must assist the parties to draft the settlement agreement, which must be 
transmitted by the mediator to the clerk or registrar of the court. If a settlement is reached 
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at mediation in a dispute which is the subject of litigation,210 the clerk or registrar of the 
court must, at the request of the parties and upon receipt of the settlement agreement from 
the mediator, place the settlement agreement before a judicial officer in chambers for 
noting that the dispute has been resolved or to make the agreement an order of court.  
 
It is submitted that a similar approach could be utilised when mediating class actions in our 
superior courts, with minor amendments. For example, apart from certain obvious 
amendments,211 the time-period for the filing of a mediation report should be extended. 
Rule 24.1.15(1) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure212 provides that ―[w]ithin 10 days 
after the mediation is concluded, the mediator shall give the mediation co-ordinator and 
the parties a report on the mediation‖. The time-period of ten days213 would appear to be 
more realistic in the context of class action litigation compared to the five days referred to 
in the Mediation Rules; it may even be necessary to afford the mediator a further extension 
to ensure accurate and detailed reporting on the success or failure of the mediation.  
 
Moreover, consideration would have to be given to the issue of the court‘s role in 
approving or rejecting a mediated settlement.214 Whilst the issue of court-approval of 
settlement did not arise in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, the court held that some 
similar requirement would need to be imposed when that situation does arise.215 In Nkala v 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited216 (―Nkala‖), Mojapelo DJP held that such 
approval is required in terms of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 and that, in any 
event, settlement agreements concluded post-certification should be subject to court 
approval  to ensure that it is ―fair, reasonable, adequate and that it protects the interests of 
the class‖.217 
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5 5 Conclusion 
 
Class actions are inherently complex and they involve the interests of large numbers of 
people and, generally, significant amounts of money. They necessitate a more active 
management approach by the judges who are required to adjudicate over them. As Hurter 
states: 
 
―It should be pointed out that since class action litigation is complex litigation, the procedural 
rules required to achieve proper management are fairly complex and to this end the usual 
procedural rules regulating ordinary litigation are inadequate. The potential volume of plaintiffs 
in a class action offers a logistical challenge to the plaintiff attorney, representative plaintiff, and 
the court, requiring innovative procedural rules to ensure proper management of the litigation. 
Proper and effective management of class actions is crucial to the success of class actions.‖218 
 
Court management is aimed at facilitating the achievement of justice in a speedy and cost-
effective manner. This aim is not facilitated by unfettered party control because the legal 
representatives generally act in the interests of their own clients. For example, in some 
cases it may be in a party‘s interests to delay the proceedings or to engage in procedural 
disputes. Further, as mentioned above, unidentified parties‘ interests may not be properly 
considered without active court management.219 
 
South Africa still has some way to go insofar as its approach to the effective management 
of class actions is concerned, especially when compared to the selected foreign 
jurisdictions. All of the foreign jurisdictions referred to above have adopted comprehensive 
legislation to regulate class actions. Their legislation encourages and mandates an active 
role by courts in managing class actions. However, our courts continue to rely on their 
inherent jurisdiction, as echoed in section 173 of the Constitution, to manage class 
actions.220 Our class action system remains exposed to the inherent limitations of 
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unregulated ad hoc managerial judging in class proceedings. Further, our courts are still 
far from institutionalizing effective case management techniques.  
 
It is therefore recommended that judges should be expressly empowered by legislation to 
assume an active role to enable class actions to be managed efficiently and to ensure that 
the interests of absent class members are protected against unnecessary dismissal of 
class actions because of manageability problems. A broad discretionary management 
power is necessary, because it is impossible to anticipate all the circumstances arising in a 
class proceeding where the intervention of the court is appropriate or desirable. However, 
where such circumstances can be contemplated, it should be dealt with in legislation or 
court rules promulgated especially for this purpose. According to Hurter, ―much of the 
success of this procedural device depends on how it is viewed by the judiciary: if 
negatively, then its growth (application field) is restricted and its value as an instrument to 
facilitate better access to justice is diminished‖.221 She therefore states that the extended 
judicial role should not be left to the courts to develop.222 The proposed adoption of a 
legislative framework to regulate class actions is also premised upon the approaches of 
prominent foreign jurisdictions in this regard. For example, Brunet refers to Resnik when 
he states as follows regarding the change in the American judiciary following upon the 
introduction of the Federal Rules: 
 
―Professor Resnik first described the federal judge sitting in 1915 as a ‗solo player,‘ noting that 
there were only 120 district judges at that time who sat ‗with few shared practices.‘  The early 
twentieth century federal judge toiled in isolation. Resnik points out that the twentieth century 
growth of the American Bar Association led to procedural reforms such as passage of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the pre-Federal Rules period, the lack of uniform 
procedures undoubtedly contributed to a culture of judging that excluded pressures to settle 
rather than to try cases. Resnik sees the passage of the Federal Rules as part of a more 
significant trend toward unifying the federal judiciary.‖223 (own emphasis).  
 
Thus, it is further proposed that mediation as an effective class action management and 
resolution tool be institutionalised in our superior courts. There are many reasons why 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking 
into account the interests of justice‖. See the discussion at 5 3 4 as to why it is not desirable.  
221
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court-annexed mediation of class actions may be beneficial from the perspective of 
managing and resolving class actions in South Africa.224 For example, according to Kratz, 
complex cases generally take much longer to finalise and their costs are typically 
astronomical. Alternative dispute resolution methods such as the one proposed herein 
may accordingly be preferable.225 
 
It is therefore recommended that provision should be made for court-annexed mediation of 
class actions on consensual and mandatory grounds for the reasons set out above.226 
Ultimately, institutionalised mediation could be an extremely valuable tool to assist our 
courts in managing and resolving class actions: 
 
―Mediation's statistical evidence out-distances the other processes available. Court-annexed 
mediation is the trend of the future in court annexed dispute resolution. As attorneys, judges, 
and litigants become more educated about the mediation process, the number of cases being 
settled in mediation will continue to increase…There is little rocket science involved in the 
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence regarding court-annexed dispute resolution. The 
process that produces the most significant and permanent reductions in cases to be tried will 
become the process of choice for court-annexed dispute resolution. Mediation is that process, 
and it is the future of court-annexed dispute resolution.‖227 
 
A legislative framework regulating class actions, including the management of such 
proceedings, as well as mediation aimed at resolving the issues involved, is certainly the 
ideal solution. However, given the failure by the South African government to act on 
recommendations to this effect from various experts and bodies since the commencement 
of our constitutional democracy, it is conceivable, if not probable, that our government 
would similarly ignore the recommendations contained herein. It may therefore be 
preferable for our courts to develop guidelines, as is the case with the American Pocket 
Guide for Judges, or to implement practice directives to address the issues raised 
herein,228 or to utilise a combination of both.  
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 See, for example, 5 4 1 above. 
225
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Such guidelines or practice directives would assist in promoting judicial uniformity 
although, as mentioned, it is not the preferred method of regulating class actions. 
Implementing practice directives may generally be more suitable as they are binding and 
acquire the legal force and effect that such directives have; however, they would not seek 
to override the Uniform Rules. Although the directives would be binding upon the courts, 
they are nevertheless flexible and could be developed further as class action law 
continues to mature in South Africa.229 It should, however, be understood that, if our 
government does decide to act on the above-mentioned recommendations, the legislature 
would be well advised to take cognisance of the content of such guidelines or directives, 
as the case may be.   
 
In conclusion, a brief note on the role of the judge vis-à-vis the mediator may be 
appropriate. Mediating mega-cases230 present huge challenges for the judges who are 
required to manage them.231 Green therefore suggests that class action judges should 
play an active role by encouraging, ordering and managing the mediation. It is submitted 
that such an approach is essential for mediation to be an effective class action 
management tool. It would be contradictory to propose that our judges should become 
active managers of class actions, but that they should refrain from properly utilising the 
tools necessary to enable the effective management of the class proceedings.  However, it 
is submitted that caution should be exercised regarding Green‘s suggestion that judges 
should actively engage in the mediation itself.   
 
The propriety and desirability of judges attempting to mediate cases assigned to them for 
trial is questionable.232 Warren observes in this regard that, where judges mediate 
disputes privately, justice is closed to the community; rather, judges are supposed to 
conduct their work publicly and to be transparent in what they do.233 Brunet states that, 
where a judicial mediation process does not instill public confidence, it could result in 
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institutional distrust and, if this occurs, it would be difficult for even the most respected or 
experienced judges to mediate effectively.234 It is submitted that the role of judges should 
not be diluted.235 Further, the risk arises that the judge may be perceived as reaching a 
decision in a matter based on the evidence and arguments presented at the mediation, 
rather than at the trial itself.236 Another concern regarding judges mediating class actions 
is that it would entail the relocation of precious judicial resources (judges) away from trials 
and appeals.237  It is accordingly submitted that, although a judge should manage the class 
action mediation, the judge should not become the class action mediator.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this study was to analyse key aspects of the class action procedural framework 
developed by South African courts, with a view to assisting the development of a local 
structure for the adjudication of such actions. In furthering this aim, substantial use was 
made of comparative perspectives, which especially draw on the experiences in Australia, 
Ontario and the United States. 
 
The South African law on class actions has not yet been subjected to a comprehensive 
and critical analysis aimed at providing answers to the research questions posed in the 
preceding chapters. At present, the development of the procedural framework within which 
the class action device operates depends entirely on our courts. As mentioned,238 
however, it is not ideal to develop class action procedure on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis. The introduction of comprehensive legislation regulating class actions in South 
Africa is accordingly desirable. This dissertation aims to contribute to the future 
development of legal theory in this regard.  
 
With these considerations in mind, this chapter first sets out the findings and 
recommendations made. It then considers the relationship between, and significance of, its 
main findings and recommendations. 
  
6 2 Findings and recommendations 
 
The first question posed in the dissertation is when a class action, compared to joinder, is 
the appropriate procedural device to be utilised for the adjudication of a claim.239 It was 
found that no guidance has been provided by the legislature and our courts on the test that 
should be applied to answer this question. It is accordingly recommended that the 
appropriate approach is for the court to assess whether certification of a class action is 
necessary to achieve access to justice.  This includes considering whether there are any 
potential barriers to access to justice. Such barriers include the geographical dispersion of 
class members, the inability of class members to engage in individualised litigation and the 
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difficulties associated with litigation through joinder. The court must further determine 
whether a class action is necessary to achieve judicial economy and behaviour 
modification. 240 Finally, the court should consider any other relevant factor that may assist 
it in determining whether class proceedings are otherwise appropriate. This entails taking 
all the surrounding circumstances into account and considering any other relevant factor 
that may assist it in determining whether a class action is otherwise appropriate. Such 
factors could include: (1) the manageability of the class action;241 (2) the importance of the 
common issues in relation to the claims as a whole; and (3) whether the class members‘ 
claims are large enough to warrant being pursued separately.  
 
The above-mentioned manageability consideration in particular requires taking into 
account inter alia the identifiability242 of class members, the size of the class243 and the 
extent of the non-common issues that would require individualised adjudication. Moreover, 
determining whether it is ‗otherwise appropriate‘ to certify a class action entails taking all 
circumstances surrounding the case into account. A holistic, common sense and 
pragmatic approach needs to be adopted when the assessment is made, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case. It is further recommended that legislation should be 
adopted to regulate our courts‘ assessment of the appropriateness of class proceedings as 
set out above.  
 
Secondly, it was enquired whether scope exists for the opt-in class action regime, as 
opposed to the opt-out class action regime, in South African law.244 In Mukaddam v 
Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd245 (―Mukaddam SCA‖), Nugent JA suggested that joinder is the 
appropriate procedural device where all the claimants are identifiable. It is accordingly 
unclear whether there is scope for the opt-in class action regime in South African law. It is 
recommended that our courts should be afforded a discretion to choose, with regard to the 
circumstances of each case, whether to require opt-in notice, opt-out notice or no notice at 
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all.246 The opt-in regime would typically be utilised in circumstances where the size of the 
class247 is much more limited, compared to where an opt-out regime is followed where the 
individual class members are identifiable,248 and where each class member has a 
substantial individual claim. The identifiability of class members is not the only 
consideration - circumstances may arise where the class members are identifiable, but 
where joinder is nonetheless cumbersome and inappropriate.249 There is accordingly 
scope for the opt-in class action regime in South African law, which should afford our 
courts a discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no-notice orders.   
 
The third question was when, if ever, notice of a class action should be given to class 
members?250 Again, no legislative or judicial guidance has been provided on this issue. 
The general point of departure in the context of the opt-out class action regime is that, in 
accordance with the principle of audi alteram partem and the doctrine of res judicata, class 
members should receive notice of the proceedings in terms of which they are, amongst 
other things, informed of their right to opt out of the class action. However, circumstances 
may arise where no notice of the class action may be required. It is recommended that the 
court takes the following factors into consideration to assist it in making this determination: 
(1) the extent to which the members of the class may be prejudiced by being bound by a 
judgment given in an action which may not have come to their attention; (2) the potential 
size of the class;251 (3) the general level of education and development of the members of 
the class; (4) the ease with which members of the class can be identified;252 (5) the type of 
relief claimed; (6) where monetary relief is claimed, the amount of the claim of each 
member of the class; (7) the difficulties likely to be encountered by members of the class in 
enforcing their actions individually; and (8) any other relevant factor. 
 
In the context of the opt-in class action regime, it is recommended that notice of the class 
action to class members should always be given. It is an absolute requirement.   
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Fourthly, assuming that notice should be given to class members, it was asked whether 
individual notice to each class member is required, or whether some form of general notice 
to the class would suffice.253 Once more, legislative and judicial guidance is absent. 
Although individual notice of class actions to class members is preferable, circumstances 
may arise where such notice is simply not feasible or possible. For example, it would be 
impossible to issue individual notice where the class members are unidentifiable.254 In 
such circumstances, it is recommended that compliance with the ‗adequacy of 
representation‘ certification requirement should be regarded as sufficient protection of the 
class members‘ interests and that their right to be heard could justifiably be limited by not 
requiring that individual notice of the opt-out class action be given to them. Otherwise, if 
individual notice of the opt-out class action is to be regarded as an absolute requirement 
from which derogation is impermissible, it would undermine one of the primary objectives 
of class actions, which is to facilitate access to justice.255 
 
Where the court exercises its discretion and orders that general notice, as opposed to 
individualised notice, be given, it is recommended that reasonable notice should be 
required. In other words, a reasonable attempt should be made to ensure that the class 
members are aware of the class action and of their right to opt out. Reasonableness 
should be assessed based on the circumstances of each case. This assessment should 
take place in light of the purpose of the notice requirement, namely to bring relevant 
information about the claim and the hearing to the attention of anyone affected by it.  
 
Fifthly, it was enquired whether the fact that certain issues may need to be determined 
individually in a mass personal injury class action, precludes using it as a means to 
adjudicate class members‘ claims. If this was not the case, the further question arose as to 
what the procedural devices are that our courts could use to determine damages in mass 
personal injury class actions.256  
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All that is required to succeed with the certification application is ―some common claim or 
issue that can be determined by way of a class action‖.257 It is accordingly recommended 
that the existence of individual issues should not necessarily preclude certification of a 
mass personal injury class action as a means to adjudicate class members‘ claims. 
However, when dealing with an application for certification of a dispersed incident mass 
personal injury class action, the position may differ. Because of the extent of the non-
common issues that require determination in order to dispose of class members‘ claims, it 
is recommended that the extent of the non-common issues that require individualised 
determination should form part of the manageability enquiry during the certification 
proceedings.  
 
It is recommended that individual proof of damages in mass personal injury class actions 
should, in principle, always be required by South African courts. There may, however, be 
devices that could be utilised to facilitate individual proof of damages in a mass personal 
injury class action. One such device that could be utilised when a court has to determine 
damages in single-accident mass personal injury class actions,258 is a protocol in terms of 
which the requisite standard of proof could be met by the submission of an affidavit 
deposed to by each class member who has opted into the second phase of the class 
proceedings. The affidavit should contain facta probantia evidentiary material necessary to 
prove the class member‘s entitlement to the quantum of damages claimed. The defendant 
should be provided the opportunity to respond to the individual class members‘ claims 
through filing an answering affidavit, which addresses the issues raised in each class 
member‘s founding affidavit. A further opportunity to settle individual class members‘ 
claims presents itself through the filing of replying affidavits by the class members in 
circumstances where the defendant disputes their claims. The defendant may, upon 
receipt of the replying affidavit and in light of its contents, agree to the quantum of 
damages claimed by the individual class member concerned.  
 
The court would then have the option to request that a court-appointed panel of 
experienced and suitably qualified medical and actuarial experts conduct evaluations on 
behalf of the court to consider the damages claims filed by the individual class members. 
                                                          
257
 Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 23. 
258
 It may also be that the proposal is utilised in the context of dispersed incident mass personal injury class 
actions. Consider chapter four in this regard.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
235 
 
The court would have the option to refer any aspect of a class member‘s claim, or all the 
class members‘ claims in their entirety, to the court-appointed panel for their consideration 
and evaluation. The court-appointed panel would need to prepare a report regarding its 
evaluation that should be filed at court along with the evidentiary material of the individual 
class members and the defendant. Ultimately, when the court receives the evidentiary 
material, it would need to assess it to make a finding ‗on the papers‘. If the court deems it 
necessary to receive oral evidence on a particular issue, it may request that the witness 
concerned attends at court for this purpose. The report provided by the panel of court-
appointed experts may accordingly be supplemented, where necessary, through testimony 
in open court. 
 
It is suggested that the implementation of the above proposals would require our judges to 
become more active in managing the proceedings – i.e. to become proactive in identifying 
issues, gathering evidence and taking full control of the proceedings.259  
 
The sixth main research question was how a class action should be managed and what 
the role of the courts should be in this regard.260 It is recommended that an active judicial 
management approach is necessary to ensure that the class action does not fail due to 
management difficulties. Further, it may be preferable to regulate the courts‘ judicial 
management powers statutorily. Beyond the implementation of a legislative framework to 
regulate the courts‘ judicial management powers, it is also necessary to consider the 
specific tools our courts could utilise to manage class actions effectively. In this regard, it is 
recommended that provision should be made for court-annexed mediation of class actions 
in South Africa.  
 
6 3 Synthesis of findings 
 
The findings and recommendations made in respect of each of the above-mentioned 
research questions may at first appear to be distinct or unrelated, insofar as each set of 
findings and recommendations covers a different area of class action procedure. However, 
further reflection reveals that there are certain underlying connections, and that the 
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solutions proposed to problems at times may be more integrated or complementary in 
nature.  
 
Consider, for example, the relationship between chapters two and four of the dissertation. 
Chapter two inter alia sets out a proposed test for considering the appropriateness of a 
class action. This test is given more specific content in chapter four, where it is 
recommended that the availability and potential utility of judicial devices to assess 
damages should be a relevant matter that informs judicial discretion as to whether or not a 
court will determine a class action to be the appropriate method to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims. It is also recommended that the extent of the non-common issues that 
would require individualised adjudication should form part of the court‘s appropriateness-
inquiry. Further connections between the various problems and proposed solutions are 
also apparent when considering the prominent common issues or underlying themes in the 
following part of this chapter.  
 
Ultimately, the integrated or complementary nature of the proposed solutions referred to 
above share the aim of fostering the class action objectives mentioned in chapter one of 
this dissertation. In other words, they aim to advance access to justice, to promote judicial 
economy and to effect behaviour modification.    
 
6 3 1 Identifiability of class members and the opt-in class action regime compared to 
the opt-out class action regime 
  
The identifiability of class members is a consideration that features prominently throughout 
the dissertation.  
 
Chapter two essentially considers whether the fact that class members are identifiable 
necessarily means that a class action is not the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class 
members‘ claims. It also considers the viability of the opt-in class action regime in light of 
Nugent JA‘s suggestion in Mukaddam SCA that joinder is the appropriate procedural 
device where all the claimants are identifiable. Further, it is recommended that, to 
determine whether a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating class 
members‘ claims, the court should consider the manageability of the class action, which 
includes considering inter alia the identifiability of class members.  
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The identifiability of class members is also an important consideration in chapter three of 
the dissertation, which deals with notice of class actions. It is a relevant consideration 
when determining whether notice should be given to class members and, if so, whether 
individual notice is required or whether some kind of general notice would suffice. For 
example, it may not be possible to give individual notice where the class members are 
unidentifiable.  
 
Chapter four of the dissertation in turn contains a proposal that class members should be 
required to opt into the second phase of the class action where individual class members‘ 
quantum of damages is established. This would mean that group members would be 
precluded from maintaining claims for damages if they failed to take steps to identify 
themselves by a particular date. There is accordingly certainty as to the precise number of 
group members who maintain a claim in the proceeding.  
 
It is apparent from the above that the identifiability of class members is relevant in order to 
determine whether class proceedings are appropriate. Specifically, it forms part of the 
manageability consideration during certification. Where a court finds class proceedings to 
be the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ claims, the court would need 
to decide whether notice should be given to class members and, if so, whether individual 
notice is required or whether some kind of general notice would suffice. Class members‘ 
identifiability will essentially inform these issues. The opt-in proposal contained in chapter 
four reinforces the findings and recommendations made in chapters two and three that 
there is indeed scope in South African law for the opt-in class action regime and that it is 
coupled with the discretion of our courts to make opt-in, opt-out or no-notice orders. It 
relates to identifiability insofar as the opt-in regime is generally utilised in circumstances 
where the class members are identifiable. Broadly stated, it therefore follows that, where 
class members are identifiable, class proceedings may be manageable and ultimately 
found to be appropriate in the form of the opt-in regime coupled with individual notice of 
the class action to class members.  
  
6 3 2 Principal objectives of class actions 
 
A central underlying theme of the dissertation is the importance of the class action 
objectives in the context of class actions in South Africa and in the selected foreign 
jurisdictions. As we have seen, these objectives include access to justice, judicial economy 
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and behaviour modification. For example, in chapter two it is indicated that Australia, 
Ontario and the United States clearly emphasise the objectives of class proceedings as 
important considerations when determining the appropriateness of class proceedings, 
compared to joinder. The chapter accordingly proposes, as mentioned above, that our 
courts‘ point of departure in determining whether a class action is the appropriate 
mechanism to adjudicate claimants‘ claims should be the class action objectives. This 
entails determining, with reference to the facts of the specific case, whether a class action 
is necessary to achieve these objectives. However, it is recommended that access to 
justice should be the primary consideration when assessing the appropriateness of class 
proceedings.  The chapter also refers to potential barriers to access to justice, including 
the geographical dispersion of class members; the inability of claimants to engage in 
individualised litigation; and, the difficulties associated with requiring litigation through 
joinder. 
 
The class action objectives are also prevalent in chapter three of the dissertation, which 
indicates that section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(―Constitution‖) constitutes the point of departure to determine whether notice of a class action 
and of class members‘ right to opt out is required. This chapter also shows that, if our class 
action mechanism is to be successful – assuming that success is to be measured against 
the attainment of the class action objectives – then individual notice simply cannot be 
required in all circumstances. Although individual notice is preferable, circumstances may 
arise where it is not feasible or possible. If individual notice of the opt-out class action is an 
absolute requirement from which derogation is impermissible, it would undermine the 
primary purpose of the class action, which is to facilitate access to justice. The chapter 
also states that the importance of notice of an opt-in class action is underlined by one of 
the objectives of the class action mechanism, namely the attainment of judicial economy. 
Failure to give notice of an opt-in class action would, in all likelihood, result in a multiplicity 
of actions and the class action would fail to contribute to the efficiency of our courts and 
the consistency of judgments rendered by it.   
 
Chapter four essentially seeks to establish a procedure for the resolution of individual 
issues that achieve the fine balance of procedural fairness and cost effectiveness while 
having regard to the class action objectives. The proposed procedure is conceivably less 
time-consuming than individual damages trials for each class member. Although class 
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members would be required to submit individual proof of injury, the procedure is designed 
to give effect to, and advance, the class action objectives.  
 
Similarly, chapter five recognises the importance of the class actions objectives. For 
instance, it refers to the primary objectives of the Mediation Rules to assist case-flow 
management in the reduction of disputes appearing before court and to promote access to 
justice. The chapter also refers to Hurter who states that ―much of the success of this 
procedural device depends on how it is viewed by the judiciary: if negatively, then its 
growth (application field) is restricted and its value as an instrument to facilitate better 
access to justice is diminished‖.261 She therefore suggests that the extended judicial role 
should not be left to the courts to develop.262 
 
It is apparent from the above-mentioned that the class action objectives constitute key 
considerations throughout the dissertation, including when determining whether a class 
action is the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate class members‘ claims and when 
considering notice of class proceedings. It is also relevant when devising procedures to 
resolve individual issues in mass personal injury class actions. Ultimately, it is possible to 
argue that all decisions made by judges when managing class actions in South Africa 
should take account of the importance of the class action objectives.   
 
6 3 3 Manageability and the courts’ role in managing class actions 
 
Apart from the identifiability of class members and the class action objectives, there are 
other common issues or themes, such as the size of the class. Chapter two refers to the 
fact that it is generally the case that the size of the class in an opt-in class action is smaller 
compared to the size of the class in an opt-out class action. It also mentions that the opt-in 
procedure is typically utilised in circumstances where the size of the class is much more 
limited compared to where an opt-out procedure is typically used.263 Further, the test 
formulated to assess the appropriateness of class proceedings264 entails taking account of 
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the size of the class as part of the manageability-consideration.265 Chapter three provides 
that, when deciding whether notice should be given to class members and, if so, what 
directions are appropriate in respect thereof, the potential size of the class should be 
considered, along with other factors.  
 
Ultimately, however, the core themes of this dissertation, which culminates in chapter five, 
are the manageability of class actions and the court‘s role in managing class proceedings.  
Chapter two emphasises the importance of both these issues. Regarding manageability as 
a factor to be considered during certification, the chapter refers to rule 23(b)(3) of the 
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rules‖), which pertains to the opt-out 
damages class action, and specifically requires that courts assess whether class action 
proceedings is ―superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy‖.  Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) lists four factors that must be considered by a court in 
making the superiority assessment. One such factor is contained in rule 23(b)(3)(D) which 
entails considering ―the likely difficulties in managing a class action‖. Manageability is also 
a certification consideration in Ontario. In Hollick v Toronto (City)266 (―Hollick‖) it was held 
that the preferability criteria in section 5(1)(d) merits consideration of whether the proposed 
class action would be a fair and manageable method of advancing the plaintiffs‘ claims, 
taking into account the importance of the common issues in relation to the claims as a 
whole. The chapter accordingly recommends that our courts need to consider the 
manageability of the class action, which entails taking into account inter alia the size of the 
class,267 the identifiability of class members268 and the extent of the non-common issues 
that would require individualised adjudication. 
 
Regarding manageability as a factor to be considered during certification, chapter three 
commences by stating that the issue of notice is a rather complicated one, especially in 
circumstances where the class is substantial, and it comprises individuals who are poor, 
illiterate and often without access to the resources that are required to bring the action to 
their attention. The method employed in giving notice and the accompanying costs may 
raise complex issues that could even threaten the continuation of a class action. These 
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types of manageability concerns are relevant when a court has to consider whether to 
certify the class action. Similarly, chapter four deals with manageability as a factor to be 
considered during certification. The chapter shows that, in the context of a mass personal 
injury class action, a concern is the disparate injury claims of thousands of plaintiffs who at 
some stage in the action will all be required to come to court individually and to prove their 
own injury and damages. This gives rise to serious manageability issues. It may therefore 
result in our courts refusing to certify dispersed incident mass personal injury class 
actions.  
 
Regarding the court‘s role as judicial manager of the proceedings, chapter two states that, 
because class action litigation is traditionally more complex than other kinds of litigation, it 
requires increased judicial management. Chapter three, in turn, considers the need for our 
courts to protect absent class members. To do this, it is proposed that judges would need 
to become more actively involved in the management of the class action. Chapter four 
reinforces the need for our judges to become actively involved in the management of class 
actions. The proposal made in the chapter would essentially entail that our judges become 
more proactive in identifying issues and gathering evidence and also take full control of the 
proceedings and govern the participation of the parties.  
 
Chapter five encapsulates the above by arguing, as a point of departure, that because of 
the management difficulties generally encountered in class action litigation, effective 
judicial management is considered increasingly important for the efficient functioning of 
class actions. It is from this perspective that it becomes apparent that continuous 
emphasis in the dissertation on manageability as a consideration during certification 
essentially results in the need for active judicial management of class proceedings. The 
chapter specifically considers the nature of the court‘s role in class action litigation and it 
proposes mediation as a tool to manage and possibly resolve class actions.  
 
It is apparent from what has been set out above that the manageability of class actions, as 
a consideration during certification, and the court‘s role in managing class proceedings, 
are the overarching themes of the dissertation. They are linked to all the other issues or 
themes discussed above. For example, the identifiability of class members is a relevant 
consideration in order to decide whether the class action is manageable and whether class 
proceedings are appropriate. A court may decide in a given case that, because class 
members are unidentifiable, thus making individual notice inappropriate, because of other 
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considerations forming part of the manageability consideration, the class action is 
unmanageable and therefore inappropriate.  
 
A further example of the interrelatedness between class action manageability and the 
other issues or themes discussed above is the prevalence of the class action objectives in 
chapter four. These goals were referred to in chapter one. It provides inter alia that the 
challenge has been and will be to define procedures for the resolution of individual issues 
that achieve the fine balance of procedural fairness and cost effectiveness, while always 
having regard to the class action objectives. The chapter accordingly contains a 
recommendation that, to enable South African courts to experiment with devices aimed at 
assessing quantum of damages without the need for individual trials, they should enjoy a 
broad discretion in managing class actions. To give effect to the proposals made in 
chapter four, our courts would need to assume an active management role in respect of 
the class actions which they are required to adjudicate. 
 
Similarly, chapter three shows that our courts should follow a lenient approach by 
emphasising the importance of adequacy of representation, rather than by insisting on 
individual notice to all members of a class. This approach is reinforced by the active 
managerial role that judges are expected to fulfil to protect the interests of absent class 
members.269 Therefore, the argument that a lack of (proper) notice impinges upon class 
members‘ right to a fair trial, should be viewed against adequacy of representation as a 
certification requirement and, moreover, against the courts‘ overall role in managing the 
class action and protecting the interests of absent class members.   
 
6 4 Conclusion 
 
At present, the framework within which class actions operate is mainly based on case law. 
It might seem fitting that our courts are currently responsible for developing a class action 
framework because of their atypical role in managing class actions. In other words, 
because the courts (and not the legislature) are required to manage class actions, it could 
be argued that they should be responsible for developing the class action framework. 
However, our courts appear to be developing the procedural framework regulating class 
actions, and addressing problems that arise in class proceedings, on an ad hoc, case-by-
                                                          
269
 Chapter five considers the courts‘ role in managing class actions. See also 6 3 3 above. 
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case, basis. Such an approach is neither preferable nor desirable. It does not lend itself to 
creating legal certainty or judicial consistency and uniformity. It has been shown that 
various contradictions, inconsistencies and problems remain within our current class action 
system. It has also been demonstrated that similar contradictions, inconsistencies and 
problems have been addressed in foreign jurisdictions by adopting comprehensive 
legislation to regulate such issues. 
 
Throughout the dissertation, it has accordingly been recommended that wide-ranging 
legislation regulating class actions in South Africa should be promulgated, and certain 
proposals have been made on how this could be effected.  As Zimand states, ―[a] 
legislative solution is preferable. At a minimum, legislature must provide procedural 
legislation to bring some predictability, control and efficiency to this arena. It should be 
tailored to meet the modern crisis‖.270 In Re Fibreboard Corporation271 it was further held 
that ―[t]he arguments [for class certification] are compelling, but they are better addressed 
to the representative branches – Congress and the State Legislature‖. Wallis JA in 
Children’s Resource Centre Trust expressed similar sentiments.272 
 
However, as mentioned, although it is desirable, it is unlikely that our legislature will in the 
near future adopt legislation that regulates class actions in South Africa. Therefore, 
although it is not the preferred route, it is recommended that our courts take it upon 
themselves, where possible, to develop guidelines and/or to implement practice directives 
to address the issues raised in this dissertation, and also possibly issues not covered 
herein. It is further submitted that such guidelines or practice directives would assist in 
promoting judicial consistency and uniformity. The implementation of practice directives 
can generally be supported, as they are binding and acquire legal force and effect; 
however, they would not override the Uniform Rules of Court. Although the directives 
would be binding upon the courts, they are nevertheless flexible and could be developed 
further as class action law continues to mature in South Africa.  
 
 
 
                                                          
270
 P Zimand ―National Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Problems Must be Solved‖ (1991) 69 Washington 
University Law Review 899 917. 
271
 893 F2d 706 712 (5
th
 Cir 1990). 
272
 Para 22. 
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ADDENDUM A: AMERICAN FEDERAL RULE 23 
 
Rule 23: Class Actions 
 
(a) PREREQUISITES. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) TYPES OF CLASS ACTIONS. A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied 
and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a 
risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members 
that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical 
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
(A) the class members‘ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun 
by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and 
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(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
(c) CERTIFICATION ORDER; NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS; JUDGMENT; ISSUES CLASSES; 
SUBCLASSES. 
(1) Certification Order. 
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a 
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action 
as a class action. 
(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class Counsel. An order that certifies a class 
action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must 
appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g). 
(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An order that grants or denies class certification 
may be altered or amended before final judgment. 
(2) Notice. 
(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), 
the court may direct appropriate notice to the class. 
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood 
language: 
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the 
member so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests 
exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
(3) Judgment. Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment in a class action 
must: 
(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), include and describe those 
whom the court finds to be class members; and 
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(B) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), include and specify or describe those 
to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, 
and whom the court finds to be class members. 
(4) Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues. 
(5) Subclasses. When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that are 
each treated as a class under this rule. 
(d) CONDUCTING THE ACTION. 
(1) In General. In conducting an action under this rule, the court may issue orders that: 
(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue 
repetition or complication in presenting evidence or argument; 
(B) require—to protect class members and fairly conduct the action—giving 
appropriate notice to some or all class members of: 
(i) any step in the action; 
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or 
(iii) the members‘ opportunity to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, 
or to otherwise come into the action; 
(C) impose conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; 
(D) require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about 
representation of absent persons and that the action proceed accordingly; or 
(E) deal with similar procedural matters. 
(2) Combining and Amending Orders. An order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or 
amended from time to time and may be combined with an order under Rule 16. 
(e) SETTLEMENT, VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL, OR COMPROMISE. The claims, issues, or defenses 
of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the 
court's approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise: 
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who 
would be bound by the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a 
hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made 
in connection with the proposal. 
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(4) If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse 
to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to 
individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did 
not do so. 
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval. 
(f) APPEALS. A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying 
class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the 
circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings 
in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
(g) CLASS COUNSEL. 
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies 
a class must appoint class counsel. In appointing class counsel, the court: 
(A) must consider: 
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in 
the action; 
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and 
the types of claims asserted in the action; 
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and 
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class; 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class; 
(C) may order potential class counsel to provide information on any subject 
pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney's fees and 
nontaxable costs; 
(D) may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of attorney's 
fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and 
(E) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel. When one applicant seeks appointment as 
class counsel, the court may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate 
under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment, 
the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class. 
(3) Interim Counsel. The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a 
putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action. 
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(4) Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class. 
(h) ATTORNEY'S FEES AND NONTAXABLE COSTS. In a certified class action, the court may 
award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by 
the parties‘ agreement. The following procedures apply: 
(1) A claim for an award must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the 
provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets. Notice of the motion must be 
served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a 
reasonable manner. 
(2) A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal conclusions 
under Rule 52(a). 
(4) The court may refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or 
a magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).
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ADDENDUM B: FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT OF 1976 
 
Part IVA—Representative proceedings 
Division 1—Preliminary 
33A Interpretation 
In this Part, unless the contrary intention appears: 
group member means a member of a group of persons on whose behalf a 
representative proceeding has been commenced. 
representative party means a person who commences a representative proceeding. 
representative proceeding means a proceeding commenced under section 33C. 
respondent means a person against whom relief is sought in a representative 
proceeding. 
sub-group member means a person included in a sub-group established under 
section 33Q. 
sub-group representative party means a person appointed to be a sub-group 
representative party under section 33Q. 
33B Application 
A proceeding may only be brought under this Part in respect of a cause of action arising 
after the commencement of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991. 
Division 2—Commencement of representative proceeding 
33C Commencement of proceeding 
(1)  Subject to this Part, where: 
(a)  7 or more persons have claims against the same person; and 
(b)  the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or 
related circumstances; and 
(c)  the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common issue of law or 
fact; 
a proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those persons as representing 
some or all of them. 
(2)  A representative proceeding may be commenced: 
(a)  whether or not the relief sought: 
(i)  is, or includes, equitable relief; or 
(ii)  consists of, or includes, damages; or 
(iii) includes claims for damages that would require individual assessment; or 
(iv)  is the same for each person represented; and 
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(b)  whether or not the proceeding: 
(i)  is concerned with separate contracts or transactions between the respondent in 
the proceeding and individual group members; or 
(ii)  involves separate acts or omissions of the respondent done or omitted to be 
done in relation to individual group members. 
33D Standing 
(1)  A person referred to in paragraph 33C(1)(a) who has a sufficient interest to commence 
a proceeding on his or her own behalf against another person has a sufficient interest to 
commence a representative proceeding against that other person on behalf of other 
persons referred to in that paragraph. 
(2)  Where a person has commenced a representative proceeding, the person retains a 
sufficient interest: 
(a)  to continue that proceeding; and 
(b)  to bring an appeal from a judgment in that proceeding; 
  even though the person ceases to have a claim against the respondent. 
33E Is consent required to be a group member? 
(1)  The consent of a person to be a group member in a representative proceeding is not 
required unless subsection (2) applies to the person. 
(2)  None of the following persons is a group member in a representative proceeding 
unless the person gives written consent to being so: 
(a)  the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; 
(b)  a Minister or a Minister of a State or Territory; 
(c)  a body corporate established for a public purpose by a law of the Commonwealth, 
of a State or of a Territory, other than an incorporated company or association; or 
(d)  an officer of the Commonwealth, of a State or of a Territory, in his or her capacity 
as such an officer. 
33F Persons under disability 
(1)  It is not necessary for a person under disability to have a next friend or committee 
merely in order to be a group member. 
(2)  A group member who is under disability may only take a step in the representative 
proceeding, or conduct part of the proceeding, by his or her next friend or committee, as 
the case requires. 
33G Representative proceeding not to be commenced in certain circumstances 
A representative proceeding may not be commenced if the proceeding would be 
concerned only with claims in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction solely by virtue of 
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the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 or a corresponding law of a State or 
Territory. 
33H Originating process 
(1) An application commencing a representative proceeding, or a document filed in support 
of such an application, must, in addition to any other matters required to be included: 
(a)  describe or otherwise identify the group members to whom the proceeding relates; 
and 
(b)  specify the nature of the claims made on behalf of the group members and the 
relief claimed; and 
(c)  specify the questions of law or fact common to the claims of the group members. 
(2) In describing or otherwise identifying group members for the purposes of 
subsection (1), it is not necessary to name, or specify the number of, the group members. 
33J Right of group member to opt out 
(1) The Court must fix a date before which a group member may opt out of a 
representative proceeding. 
(2) A group member may opt out of the representative proceeding by written notice given 
under the Rules of Court before the date so fixed. 
(3) The Court, on the application of a group member, the representative party or the 
respondent in the proceeding, may fix another date so as to extend the period during 
which a group member may opt out of the representative proceeding. 
(4) Except with the leave of the Court, the hearing of a representative proceeding must not 
commence earlier than the date before which a group member may opt out of the 
proceeding. 
33K Causes of action accruing after commencement of representative proceeding 
(1) The Court may at any stage of a representative proceeding, on application made by the 
representative party, give leave to amend the application commencing the representative 
proceeding so as to alter the description of the group. 
(2) The description of the group may be altered so as to include a person: 
  (a)  whose cause of action accrued after the commencement of the representative 
proceeding but before such date as the Court fixes when giving leave; and 
(b)  who would have been included in the group, or, with the consent of the person 
would have been included in the group, if the cause of action had accrued before the 
commencement of the proceeding. 
(3)  The date mentioned in paragraph (2)(a) may be the date on which leave is given or 
another date before or after that date. 
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(4)  Where the Court gives leave under subsection (1), it may also make any other orders 
it thinks just, including an order relating to the giving of notice to persons who, as a result 
of the amendment, will be included in the group and the date before which such persons 
may opt out of the proceeding. 
33L Situation where fewer than 7 group members 
If, at any stage of a representative proceeding, it appears likely to the Court that there are 
fewer than 7 group members, the Court may, on such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit: 
(a) order that the proceeding continue under this Part; or 
(b) order that the proceeding no longer continue under this Part. 
33M Cost of distributing money etc. excessive 
Where: 
(a) the relief claimed in a representative proceeding is or includes payment of money to 
group members (otherwise than in respect of costs); and 
(b) on application by the respondent, the Court concludes that it is likely that, if 
judgment were to be given in favour of the representative party, the cost to the 
respondent of identifying the group members and distributing to them the amounts 
ordered to be paid to them would be excessive having regard to the likely total of those 
amounts; 
the Court may, by order: 
(c)  direct that the proceeding no longer continue under this Part; or 
(d) stay the proceeding so far as it relates to relief of the kind mentioned in 
paragraph (a). 
33N Order that proceeding not continue as representative proceeding where costs 
excessive etc. 
(1) The Court may, on application by the respondent or of its own motion, order that a 
proceeding no longer continue under this Part where it is satisfied that it is in the interests 
of justice to do so because: 
(a) the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a 
representative proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each 
group member conducted a separate proceeding; or 
(b) all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a 
representative proceeding under this Part; or 
(c) the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of 
dealing with the claims of group members; or 
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(d) it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a 
representative proceeding. 
(2)  If the Court dismisses an application under this section, the Court may order that no 
further application under this section be made by the respondent except with the leave of 
the Court. 
(3)  Leave for the purposes of subsection (2) may be granted subject to such conditions as 
to costs as the Court considers just. 
33P Consequences of order that proceeding not continue under this Part 
Where the Court makes an order under section 33L, 33M or 33N that a proceeding no 
longer continue under this Part: 
(a)  the proceeding may be continued as a proceeding by the representative party on 
his or her own behalf against the respondent; and 
(b)  on the application of a person who was a group member for the purposes of the 
proceeding, the Court may order that the person be joined as an applicant in the 
proceeding. 
33Q Determination of issues where not all issues are common 
(1) If it appears to the Court that determination of the issue or issues common to all group 
members will not finally determine the claims of all group members, the Court may give 
directions in relation to the determination of the remaining issues. 
(2) In the case of issues common to the claims of some only of the group members, the 
directions given by the Court may include directions establishing a sub-group consisting of 
those group members and appointing a person to be the sub-group representative party 
on behalf of the sub-group members. 
(3) Where the Court appoints a person other than the representative party to be a 
sub-group representative party, that person, and not the representative party, is liable for 
costs associated with the determination of the issue or issues common to the sub-group 
members. 
33R Individual issues 
(1) In giving directions under section 33Q, the Court may permit an individual group 
member to appear in the proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue that relates 
only to the claims of that member. 
(2) In such a case, the individual group member, and not the representative party, is liable 
for costs associated with the determination of the issue. 
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33S Directions relating to commencement of further proceedings 
Where an issue cannot properly or conveniently be dealt with under section 33Q or 33R, 
the Court may: 
(a) if the issue concerns only the claim of a particular member—give directions relating 
to the commencement and conduct of a separate proceeding by that member; or 
(b) if the issue is common to the claims of all members of a sub-group—give directions 
relating to the commencement and conduct of a representative proceeding in relation 
to the claims of those members. 
33T Adequacy of representation 
(1) If, on an application by a group member, it appears to the Court that a representative 
party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members, the Court 
may substitute another group member as representative party and may make such other 
orders as it thinks fit. 
(2) If, on an application by a sub-group member, it appears to the Court that a sub-group 
representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the sub-group 
members, the Court may substitute another person as sub-group representative party and 
may make such other orders as it thinks fit. 
33U Stay of execution in certain circumstances 
Where a respondent in a representative proceeding commences a proceeding in the Court 
against a group member, the Court may order a stay of execution in respect of any relief 
awarded to the group member in the representative proceeding until the other proceeding 
is determined. 
33V Settlement and discontinuance—representative proceeding 
(1)  A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of 
the Court. 
(2)  If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect 
to the distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court. 
33W Settlement of individual claim of representative party 
(1) A representative party may, with leave of the Court, settle his or her individual claim in 
whole or in part at any stage of the representative proceeding. 
(2) A representative party who is seeking leave to settle, or who has settled, his or her 
individual claim may, with leave of the Court, withdraw as representative party. 
(3) Where a person has sought leave to withdraw as representative party under 
subsection (2), the Court may, on the application of a group member, make an order for 
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the substitution of another group member as representative party and may make such 
other orders as it thinks fit. 
(4)  Before granting a person leave to withdraw as a representative party: 
(a) the Court must be satisfied that notice of the application has been given to group 
members in accordance with subsection 33X(1) and in sufficient time for them to apply 
to have another person substituted as the representative party; and 
(b) any application for the substitution of another group member as a representative 
party has been determined. 
(5)  The Court may grant leave to a person to withdraw as representative party subject to 
such conditions as to costs as the Court considers just. 
Division 3—Notices 
33X Notice to be given of certain matters 
(1)  Notice must be given to group members of the following matters in relation to a 
representative proceeding: 
(a) the commencement of the proceeding and the right of the group members to opt 
out of the proceeding before a specified date, being the date fixed under 
subsection 33J(1); 
(b) an application by the respondent in the proceeding for the dismissal of the 
proceeding on the ground of want of prosecution; 
(c) an application by a representative party seeking leave to withdraw under 
section 33W as representative party. 
(2)  The Court may dispense with compliance with any or all of the requirements of 
subsection (1) where the relief sought in a proceeding does not include any claim for 
damages. 
(3)  If the Court so orders, notice must be given to group members of the bringing into 
Court of money in answer to a cause of action on which a claim in the representative 
proceeding is founded. 
(4)  Unless the Court is satisfied that it is just to do so, an application for approval of a 
settlement under section 33V must not be determined unless notice has been given to 
group members. 
(5)  The Court may, at any stage, order that notice of any matter be given to a group 
member or group members. 
(6)  Notice under this section must be given as soon as practicable after the happening of 
the event to which the notice relates. 
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33Y Notices—ancillary provisions 
(1)  This section is concerned with notices under section 33X. 
(2)  The form and content of a notice must be as approved by the Court. 
(3)  The Court must, by order, specify: 
(a)  who is to give the notice; and 
(b)  the way in which the notice is to be given; 
and the order may include provision: 
(c)  directing a party to provide information relevant to the giving of the notice; and 
(d)  relating to the costs of notice. 
(4)  An order under subsection (3) may require that notice be given by means of press 
advertisement, radio or television broadcast, or by any other means. 
(5)  The Court may not order that notice be given personally to each group member unless 
it is satisfied that it is reasonably practicable, and not unduly expensive, to do so. 
(6)  A notice that concerns a matter for which the Court‘s leave or approval is required 
must specify the period within which a group member or other person may apply to the 
Court, or take some other step, in relation to the matter. 
(7)  A notice that includes or concerns conditions must specify the conditions and the 
period, if any, for compliance. 
(8)  The failure of a group member to receive or respond to a notice does not affect a step 
taken, an order made, or a judgment given, in a proceeding. 
Division 4—Judgment etc. 
33Z Judgment—powers of the Court 
(1)  The Court may, in determining a matter in a representative proceeding, do any one or 
more of the following: 
(a)  determine an issue of law; 
(b)  determine an issue of fact; 
(c)  make a declaration of liability; 
(d)  grant any equitable relief; 
(e)  make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members or individual 
group members, being damages consisting of specified amounts or amounts worked 
out in such manner as the Court specifies; 
(f)  award damages in an aggregate amount without specifying amounts awarded in 
respect of individual group members; 
(g)  make such other order as the Court thinks just. 
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(2)  In making an order for an award of damages, the Court must make provision for the 
payment or distribution of the money to the group members entitled. 
(3) Subject to section 33V, the Court is not to make an award of damages under 
paragraph (1)(f) unless a reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total 
amount to which group members will be entitled under the judgment. 
(4)  Where the Court has made an order for the award of damages, the Court may give 
such directions (if any) as it thinks just in relation to: 
(a) the manner in which a group member is to establish his or her entitlement to share 
in the damages; and 
(b) the manner in which any dispute regarding the entitlement of a group member to 
share in the damages is to be determined. 
33ZA Constitution etc. of fund  
(1)  Without limiting the operation of subsection 33Z(2), in making provision for the 
distribution of money to group members, the Court may provide for: 
(a) the constitution and administration of a fund consisting of the money to be 
distributed; and 
(b) either: 
(i)  the payment by the respondent of a fixed sum of money into the fund; or 
(ii) the payment by the respondent into the fund of such instalments, on such 
terms, as the Court directs to meet the claims of group members; and 
(c) entitlements to interest earned on the money in the fund. 
(2)  The costs of administering a fund are to be borne by the fund, or by the respondent in 
the representative proceeding, as the Court directs. 
(3)  Where the Court orders the constitution of a fund mentioned in subsection (1), the 
order must: 
(a) require notice to be given to group members in such manner as is specified in the 
order; and 
(b) specify the manner in which a group member is to make a claim for payment out of 
the fund and establish his or her entitlement to the payment; and 
(c) specify a day (which is 6 months or more after the day on which the order is made) 
on or before which the group members are to make a claim for payment out of the 
fund; and 
(d) make provision in relation to the day before which the fund is to be distributed to 
group members who have established an entitlement to be paid out of the fund. 
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(4)  The Court may allow a group member to make a claim after the day fixed under 
paragraph (3)(c) if: 
(a) the fund has not already been fully distributed; and 
(b) it is just to do so. 
(5)  On application by the respondent in the representative proceeding after the day fixed 
under paragraph (3)(d), the Court may make such orders as are just for the payment from 
the fund to the respondent of the money remaining in the fund. 
33ZB Effect of judgment 
A judgment given in a representative proceeding: 
(a) must describe or otherwise identify the group members who will be affected by it; 
and 
(b) binds all such persons other than any person who has opted out of the proceeding 
under section 33J. 
Division 5—Appeals 
33ZC Appeals to the Court 
(1)  The following appeals under Division 2 of Part III from a judgment of the Court in a 
representative proceeding may themselves be brought as representative proceedings: 
(a)  an appeal by the representative party on behalf of group members and in respect 
of the judgment to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of group 
members; 
(b)  an appeal by a sub-group representative party on behalf of sub-group members in 
respect of the judgment to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of 
sub-group members. 
(2) The parties to an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(a) are the representative party, as 
the representative of the group members, and the respondent. 
(3) The parties to an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are the sub-group 
representative party, as the representative of the sub-group members, and the 
respondent. 
(4) On an appeal by the respondent in a representative proceeding, other than an appeal 
referred to in subsection (5), the parties to the appeal are: 
(a)  in the case of an appeal in respect of the judgment generally—the respondent and 
the representative party as the representative of the group members; and 
(b)  in the case of an appeal in respect of the judgment to the extent that it relates to 
issues common to the claims of sub-group members—the respondent and the 
sub-group representative party as the representative of the sub-group members. 
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(5)  The parties to an appeal in respect of the determination of an issue that relates only to 
a claim of an individual group member are that group member and the respondent. 
(6)  If the representative party or the sub-group representative party does not bring an 
appeal within the time provided for instituting appeals, another member of the group or 
sub-group may, within a further 21 days, bring an appeal as representing the group 
members or sub-group members, as the case may be. 
(7)  Where an appeal is brought from a judgment of the Court in a representative 
proceeding, the Court may direct that notice of the appeal be given to such person or 
persons, and in such manner, as the Court thinks appropriate. 
(8)  Section 33J does not apply to an appeal proceeding. 
(9)  The notice instituting an appeal in relation to issues that are common to the claims of 
group members or sub-group members must describe or otherwise identify the group 
members or sub-group members, as the case may be, but need not specify the names or 
number of those members. 
33ZD Appeals to the High Court—extended operation of sections 33ZC and 33ZF 
(1)  Sections 33ZC and 33ZF apply in relation to appeals to the High Court from judgments 
of the Court in representative proceedings in the same way as they apply to appeals to the 
Court from such judgments. 
(2)  Nothing in subsection (1) limits the operation of section 33 whether in relation to 
appeals from judgments of the Court in representative proceedings or otherwise. 
Division 6—Miscellaneous 
33ZE Suspension of limitation periods 
(1)  Upon the commencement of a representative proceeding, the running of any limitation 
period that applies to the claim of a group member to which the proceeding relates is 
suspended. 
(2)  The limitation period does not begin to run again unless either the member opts out of 
the proceeding under section 33J or the proceeding, and any appeals arising from the 
proceeding, are determined without finally disposing of the group member‘s claim. 
33ZF General power of Court to make orders 
(1)  In any proceeding (including an appeal) conducted under this Part, the Court may, of 
its own motion or on application by a party or a group member, make any order the Court 
thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding. 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not limit the operation of section 22. 
33ZG Saving of rights, powers etc. 
Except as otherwise provided by this Part, nothing in this Part affects: 
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(a)  the commencement or continuance of any action of a representative character 
commenced otherwise than under this Part; or 
(b)  the Court‘s powers under provisions other than this Part, for example, its powers in 
relation to a proceeding in which no reasonable cause of action is disclosed or that is 
oppressive, vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of the process of the Court; or 
(c)  the operation of any law relating to: 
(i)  vexatious litigants (however described); or 
(ii)  proceedings of a representative character; or 
(iii)  joinder of parties; or 
(iv)  consolidation of proceedings; or 
(v)  security for costs. 
33ZH Special provision relating to claims under Part VI of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 etc. 
(1)  For the purposes of the following provisions, a group member in a representative 
proceeding is to be taken to be a party to the proceeding: 
(a)  subsection 87(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010; 
(b)  subsection 238(1) of Schedule 2 to that Act, as that subsection applies as a law of 
the Commonwealth. 
(2)  An application by a representative party in a representative proceeding under: 
(a)  subsection 87(1A) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010; or 
(b)  subsection 237(1) of Schedule 2 to that Act, as that subsection applies as a law of 
the Commonwealth; 
is to be taken to be an application by the representative party and all the group 
members. 
33ZJ Reimbursement of representative party’s costs 
(1)  Where the Court has made an award of damages in a representative proceeding, the 
representative party or a sub-group representative party, or a person who has been such a 
party, may apply to the Court for an order under this section. 
(2)  If, on an application under this section, the Court is satisfied that the costs reasonably 
incurred in relation to the representative proceeding by the person making the application 
are likely to exceed the costs recoverable by the person from the respondent, the Court 
may order that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to that person 
out of the damages awarded. 
(3)  On an application under this section, the Court may also make any other order it thinks 
just. 
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ADDENDUM C: CLASS PROCEEDINGS ACT, 1992 
S.O. 1992, Chapter 6 
Last amendment:  2006, c.19, Sched.C, s.1(1). 
Definitions 
1. In this Act, 
 ―common issues‖ means, 
(a) common but not necessarily identical issues of fact, or 
(b) common but not necessarily identical issues of law that arise from common but not 
necessarily identical facts; (―questions communes‖) 
 ―court‖ means the Superior Court of Justice but does not include the Small Claims 
Court; (―tribunal‖) 
 ―defendant‖ includes a respondent; (―défendeur‖) 
 ―plaintiff‖ includes an applicant. (―demandeur‖) 
Plaintiff’s class proceeding 
2.(1) One or more members of a class of persons may commence a proceeding in the 
court on behalf of the members of the class.   
Motion for certification 
(2) A person who commences a proceeding under subsection (1) shall make a motion to a 
judge of the court for an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and 
appointing the person representative plaintiff.   
(3) A motion under subsection (2) shall be made, 
(a) within ninety days after the later of, 
(i) the date on which the last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or 
notice of appearance is delivered, and 
(ii) the date on which the time prescribed by the rules of court for delivery of the 
last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or a notice of appearance 
expires without its being delivered; or 
(b) subsequently, with leave of the court.   
Defendant’s class proceeding 
3. A defendant to two or more proceedings may, at any stage of one of the proceedings, 
make a motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceedings as a class 
proceeding and appointing a representative plaintiff.   
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Classing defendants 
4.  Any party to a proceeding against two or more defendants may, at any stage of the 
proceeding, make a motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceeding as 
a class proceeding and appointing a representative defendant.   
Certification 
5.(1) The court shall certify a class proceeding on a motion under section 2, 3 or 4 if, 
(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action; 
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented 
by the representative plaintiff or defendant; 
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues; 
(d)  a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the 
common issues; and 
 (e)  there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who, 
 (i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, 
 (ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method 
of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class 
members of the proceeding, and 
 (iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict 
with the interests of other class members 
Subclass protection 
(2)  Despite subsection (1), where a class includes a subclass whose members have 
claims or defences that raise common issues not shared by all the class members, so 
that, in the opinion of the court, the protection of the interests of the subclass members 
requires that they be separately represented, the court shall not certify the class 
proceeding unless there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who, 
 (a) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the subclass; 
(b) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of 
advancing the proceeding on behalf of the subclass and of notifying subclass 
members of the proceeding; and 
(c) does not have, on the common issues for the subclass, an interest in conflict 
with the interests of other subclass members.   
Evidence as to size of class 
(3)  Each party to a motion for certification shall, in an affidavit filed for use on the 
motion, provide the party‘s best information on the number of members in the class.   
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Adjournments 
(4)  The court may adjourn the motion for certification to permit the parties to amend 
their materials or pleadings or to permit further evidence.   
Certification not a ruling on merits 
(5)  An order certifying a class proceeding is not a determination of the merits of the 
proceeding.   
Certain matters not bar to certification 
6.  The court shall not refuse to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding solely on any of 
the following grounds: 
1. The relief claimed includes a claim for damages that would require individual 
assessment after determination of the common issues. 
2. The relief claimed relates to separate contracts involving different class members. 
3. Different remedies are sought for different class members. 
4. The number of class members or the identity of each class member is not known. 
5. The class includes a subclass whose members have claims or defences that raise 
common issues not shared by all class members.   
Refusal to certify: proceeding may continue in altered form 
7.  Where the court refuses to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding, the court may 
permit the proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different parties 
and, for the purpose, the court may, 
 (a) order the addition, deletion or substitution of parties; 
 (b) order the amendment of the pleadings or notice of application; and 
 (c) make any further order that it considers appropriate.   
Contents of certification order 
8.(1) An order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding shall, 
 (a) describe the class; 
 (b) state the names of the representative parties; 
 (c) state the nature of the claims or defences asserted on behalf of the class; 
 (d) state the relief sought by or from the class; 
 (e) set out the common issues for the class; and 
 (f) specify the manner in which class members may opt out of the class proceeding 
and a date after which class members may not opt out.   
Subclass protection 
(2)  Where a class includes a subclass whose members have claims or defences that 
raise common issues not shared by all the class members, so that, in the opinion of the 
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court, the protection of the interests of the subclass members requires that they be 
separately represented, subsection (1) applies with necessary modifications in respect 
of the subclass.   
Amendment of certification order 
(3)  The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may amend an order certifying 
a proceeding as a class proceeding.   
Opting out 
9.  Any member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt out of the proceeding in 
the manner and within the time specified in the certification order.  
Where it appears conditions for certification not satisfied 
10.(1)  On the motion of a party or class member, where it appears to the court that the 
conditions mentioned in subsections 5 (1) and (2) are not satisfied with respect to a 
class proceeding, the court may amend the certification order, may decertify the 
proceeding or may make any other order it considers appropriate.   
Proceeding may continue in altered form 
(2)  Where the court makes a decertification order under subsection (1), the court may 
permit the proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different 
parties.   
Powers of court 
 (3)  For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), the court has the powers set out in 
clauses 7 (a) to (c).   
Stages of class proceedings 
11.(1) Subject to section 12, in a class proceeding, 
(a) common issues for a class shall be determined together; 
(b) common issues for a subclass shall be determined together; and 
(c) individual issues that require the participation of individual class members shall 
be determined individually in accordance with sections 24 and 25.   
Separate judgments 
(2)  The court may give judgment in respect of the common issues and separate 
judgments in respect of any other issue.   
Court may determine conduct of proceeding 
12.  The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may make any order it considers 
appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and 
expeditious determination and, for the purpose, may impose such terms on the parties 
as it considers appropriate.   
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Court may stay any other proceeding 
13.  The court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party or class member, may stay 
any proceeding related to the class proceeding before it, on such terms as it considers 
appropriate.   
Participation of class members 
14.(1)  In order to ensure the fair and adequate representation of the interests of the class 
or any subclass or for any other appropriate reason, the court may, at any time in a 
class proceeding, permit one or more class members to participate in the proceeding.   
(2)  Participation under subsection (1) shall be in whatever manner and on whatever 
terms, including terms as to costs, the court considers appropriate.  
Discovery 
Discovery of parties 
15.(1)  Parties to a class proceeding have the same rights of discovery under the rules of 
court against one another as they would have in any other proceeding.  
Discovery of class members with leave 
(2)  After discovery of the representative party, a party may move for discovery under 
the rules of court against other class members.   
(3)  In deciding whether to grant leave to discover other class members, the court shall 
consider, 
(a) the stage of the class proceeding and the issues to be determined at that 
stage; 
(b) the presence of subclasses; 
(c) whether the discovery is necessary in view of the claims or defences of the 
party seeking leave; 
(d) the approximate monetary value of individual claims, if any; 
(e) whether discovery would result in oppression or in undue annoyance, burden 
or expense for the class members sought to be discovered; and 
(f) any other matter the court considers relevant.   
(4)  A class member is subject to the same sanctions under the rules of court as a 
party for failure to submit to discovery.   
Examination of class members before a motion or application 
16.(1)  A party shall not require a class member other than a representative party to be 
examined as a witness before the hearing of a motion or application, except with leave 
of the court.   
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 (2)  Subsection 15 (3) applies with necessary modifications to a decision whether to 
grant leave under subsection (1).   
Notice of certification 
17.(1)  Notice of certification of a class proceeding shall be given by the representative 
party to the class members in accordance with this section.   
Court may dispense with notice 
(2)  The court may dispense with notice if, having regard to the factors set out in 
subsection (3), the court considers it appropriate to do so.   
Order respecting notice 
(3)  The court shall make an order setting out when and by what means notice shall be 
given under this section and in so doing shall have regard to, 
(a) the cost of giving notice; 
(b) the nature of the relief sought; 
(c) the size of the individual claims of the class members; 
(d) the number of class members; 
(e) the places of residence of class members; and 
(f)  any other relevant matter.   
 (4)  The court may order that notice be given, 
(a) personally or by mail; 
(b) by posting, advertising, publishing or leafleting; 
(c) by individual notice to a sample group within the class; or 
(d) by any means or combination of means that the court considers appropriate.   
(5)  The court may order that notice be given to different class members by different 
means.   
Contents of notice 
(6)  Notice under this section shall, unless the court orders otherwise, 
(a) describe the proceeding, including the names and addresses of the 
representative parties and the relief sought; 
(b) state the manner by which and time within which class members may opt out of 
the proceeding; 
(c) describe the possible financial consequences of the proceeding to class 
members; 
(d) summarize any agreements between representative parties and their solicitors 
respecting fees and disbursements; 
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(e) describe any counterclaim being asserted by or against the class, including the 
relief sought in the counterclaim; 
(f) state that the judgment, whether favourable or not, will bind all class members 
who do not opt out of the proceeding; 
(g) describe the right of any class member to participate in the proceeding; 
(h) give an address to which class members may direct inquiries about the 
proceeding; and 
(i) give any other information the court considers appropriate.  
Solicitations of contributions 
(7)  With leave of the court, notice under this section may include a solicitation of 
contributions from class members to assist in paying solicitor‘s fees and disbursements.   
Notice where individual participation is required 
18.(1)  When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that 
the participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, 
the representative party shall give notice to those members in accordance with this 
section.   
(2)  Subsections 17 (3) to (5) apply with necessary modifications to notice given under 
this section.   
Contents of notice 
(3)  Notice under this section shall, 
 (a) state that common issues have been determined in favour of the class; 
 (b) state that class members may be entitled to individual relief; 
 (c) describe the steps to be taken to establish an individual claim; 
(d) state that failure on the part of a class member to take those steps will result in 
the member not being entitled to assert an individual claim except with leave of the 
court; 
(e) give an address to which class members may direct inquiries about the 
proceeding; and 
 (f) give any other information that the court considers appropriate.   
Notice to protect interests of affected persons 
19.(1)  At any time in a class proceeding, the court may order any party to give such notice 
as it considers necessary to protect the interests of any class member or party or to 
ensure the fair conduct of the proceeding.   
 (2)  Subsections 17 (3) to (5) apply with necessary modifications to notice given under 
this section.   
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Approval of notice by the court 
20.  A notice under section 17, 18 or 19 shall be approved by the court before it is given.   
Delivery of notice 
21.  The court may order a party to deliver, by whatever means are available to the party, 
the notice required to be given by another party under section 17, 18 or 19, where that 
is more practical.  
Costs of notice 
22.(1)  The court may make any order it considers appropriate as to the costs of any notice 
under section 17, 18 or 19, including an order apportioning costs among parties.   
(2)  In making an order under subsection (1), the court may have regard to the different 
interests of a subclass.   
Statistical evidence 
23.(1)  For the purposes of determining issues relating to the amount or distribution of a 
monetary award under this Act, the court may admit as evidence statistical information 
that would not otherwise be admissible as evidence, including information derived from 
sampling, if the information was compiled in accordance with principles that are 
generally accepted by experts in the field of statistics.   
(2)  A record of statistical information purporting to be prepared or published under the 
authority of the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of any province or territory of 
Canada may be admitted as evidence without proof of its authenticity.   
Notice 
(3)  Statistical information shall not be admitted as evidence under this section unless 
the party seeking to introduce the information has, 
 (a) given reasonable notice of it to the party against whom it is to be used, together 
with a copy of the information; 
 (b) complied with subsections (4) and (5); and 
 (c) complied with any requirement to produce documents under subsection (7).   
Contents of notice 
(4)  Notice under this section shall specify the source of any statistical information 
sought to be introduced that, 
 (a) was prepared or published under the authority of the Parliament of Canada or 
the legislature of any province or territory of Canada; 
 (b) was derived from market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories or other 
compilations generally used and relied on by members of the public; or 
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 (c) was derived from reference material generally used and relied on by members of 
an occupational group.   
(5)  Except with respect to information referred to in subsection (4), notice under this 
section shall, 
 (a) specify the name and qualifications of each person who supervised the 
preparation of statistical information sought to be introduced; and 
 (b) describe any documents prepared or used in the course of preparing the 
statistical information sought to be introduced.   
Cross-examination 
(6)  A party against whom statistical information is sought to be introduced under this 
section may require, for the purposes of cross-examination, the attendance of any 
person who supervised the preparation of the information.   
Production of documents 
(7)  Except with respect to information referred to in subsection (4), a party against 
whom statistical information is sought to be introduced under this section may require 
the party seeking to introduce it to produce for inspection any document that was 
prepared or used in the course of preparing the information, unless the document 
discloses the identity of persons responding to a survey who have not consented in 
writing to the disclosure.   
Aggregate assessment of monetary relief 
24.(1)  The court may determine the aggregate or a part of a defendant‘s liability to class 
members and give judgment accordingly where, 
(a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of some or all class members; 
(b) no questions of fact or law other than those relating to the assessment of 
monetary relief remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the 
defendant‘s monetary liability; and 
(c) the aggregate or a part of the defendant‘s liability to some or all class members 
can reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members.  
Average or proportional application 
(2)  The court may order that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be applied 
so that some or all individual class members share in the award on an average or 
proportional basis.   
(3)  In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the court shall consider 
whether it would be impractical or inefficient to identify the class members entitled to 
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share in the award or to determine the exact shares that should be allocated to 
individual class members.   
Court to determine whether individual claims need to be made 
(4)  When the court orders that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be divided 
among individual class members, the court shall determine whether individual claims 
need to be made to give effect to the order.   
Procedures for determining claims 
(5)  Where the court determines under subsection (4) that individual claims need to be 
made, the court shall specify procedures for determining the claims.   
(6)  In specifying procedures under subsection (5), the court shall minimize the burden 
on class members and, for the purpose, the court may authorize, 
 (a) the use of standardized proof of claim forms; 
 (b) the receipt of affidavit or other documentary evidence; and 
 (c) the auditing of claims on a sampling or other basis.   
Time limits for making claims 
(7)  When specifying procedures under subsection (5), the court shall set a reasonable 
time within which individual class members may make claims under this section.   
(8)  A class member who fails to make a claim within the time set under subsection (7) 
may not later make a claim under this section except with leave of the court.   
Extension of time 
 (9)  The court may give leave under subsection (8) if it is satisfied that, 
 (a) there are apparent grounds for relief; 
 (b) the delay was not caused by any fault of the person seeking the relief; and 
 (c) the defendant would not suffer substantial prejudice if leave were given.   
Court may amend subs. (1) judgment 
(10)  The court may amend a judgment given under subsection (1) to give effect to a 
claim made with leave under subsection (8) if the court considers it appropriate to do so.  
Individual issues 
25.(1)  When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that 
the participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, 
other than those that may be determined under section 24, the court may, 
(a) determine the issues in further hearings presided over by the judge who 
determined the common issues or by another judge of the court; 
(b) appoint one or more persons to conduct a reference under the rules of court and 
report back to the court; and 
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(c) with the consent of the parties, direct that the issues be determined in any other 
manner.   
Directions as to procedure 
(2)  The court shall give any necessary directions relating to the procedures to be 
followed in conducting hearings, inquiries and determinations under subsection (1), 
including directions for the purpose of achieving procedural conformity.   
(3)  In giving directions under subsection (2), the court shall choose the least 
expensive and most expeditious method of determining the issues that is consistent 
with justice to class members and the parties and, in so doing, the court may, 
 (a) dispense with any procedural step that it considers unnecessary; and 
 (b) authorize any special procedural steps, including steps relating to discovery, and 
any special rules, including rules relating to admission of evidence and means of 
proof, that it considers appropriate.   
Time limits for making claims 
(4)  The court shall set a reasonable time within which individual class members may 
make claims under this section.  
(5)  A class member who fails to make a claim within the time set under subsection (4) 
may not later make a claim under this section except with leave of the court.  
Extension of time 
(6)  Subsection 24 (9) applies with necessary modifications to a decision whether to 
give leave under subsection (5).   
Determination under cl. (1) (c) deemed court order 
(7)  A determination under clause (1) (c) is deemed to be an order of the court.   
Judgment distribution 
26.(1)  The court may direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded under section 
24 or 25 that it considers appropriate.   
(2)  In giving directions under subsection (1), the court may order that, 
(a) the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary 
relief to which each class member is entitled by any means authorized by the 
court, including abatement and credit; 
(b) the defendant pay into court or some other appropriate depository the total 
amount of the defendant‘s liability to the class until further order of the court; and 
(c) any person other than the defendant distribute directly to class members the 
amount of monetary relief to which each member is entitled by any means 
authorized by the court.   
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(3)  In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (a), the court shall consider 
whether distribution by the defendant is the most practical way of distributing the award 
for any reason, including the fact that the amount of monetary relief to which each class 
member is entitled can be determined from the records of the defendant.   
(4)  The court may order that all or a part of an award under section 24 that has not 
been distributed within a time set by the court be applied in any manner that may 
reasonably be expected to benefit class members, even though the order does not 
provide for monetary relief to individual class members, if the court is satisfied that a 
reasonable number of class members who would not otherwise receive monetary relief 
would benefit from the order.   
(5)  The court may make an order under subsection (4) whether or not all class 
members can be identified or all of their shares can be exactly determined.   
(6)  The court may make an order under subsection (4) even if the order would benefit, 
 (a) persons who are not class members; or 
 (b) persons who may otherwise receive monetary relief as a result of the class 
proceeding.   
Supervisory role of the court 
(7)  The court shall supervise the execution of judgments and the distribution of awards 
under section 24 or 25 and may stay the whole or any part of an execution or 
distribution for a reasonable period on such terms as it considers appropriate.  
Payment of awards 
(8)  The court may order that an award made under section 24 or 25 be paid, 
 (a) in a lump sum, forthwith or within a time set by the court; or 
 (b) in instalments, on such terms as the court considers appropriate.  
Costs of distribution 
(9)  The court may order that the costs of distribution of an award under section 24 or 
25, including the costs of notice associated with the distribution and the fees payable to 
a person administering the distribution, be paid out of the proceeds of the judgment or 
may make such other order as it considers appropriate.   
Return of unclaimed amounts 
(10)  Any part of an award for division among individual class members that remains 
unclaimed or otherwise undistributed after a time set by the court shall be returned to 
the party against whom the award was made, without further order of the court.   
Judgment on common issues 
27.(1)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass shall, 
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 (a) set out the common issues; 
 (b) name or describe the class or subclass members; 
(c) state the nature of the claims or defences asserted on behalf of the class or 
subclass; and 
 (d) specify the relief granted.   
Effect of judgment on common issues 
(2)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass does not bind, 
 (a) a person who has opted out of the class proceeding; or 
 (b) a party to the class proceeding in any subsequent proceeding between the party 
and a person mentioned in clause (a).  
(3)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass binds every class member 
who has not opted out of the class proceeding, but only to the extent that the judgment 
determines common issues that, 
 (a) are set out in the certification order; 
 (b) relate to claims or defences described in the certification order; and 
 (c) relate to relief sought by or from the class or subclass as stated in the 
certification order.   
Limitations 
28.(1)  Subject to subsection (2), any limitation period applicable to a cause of action 
asserted in a class proceeding is suspended in favour of a class member on the 
commencement of the class proceeding and resumes running against the class 
member when, 
 (a) the member opts out of the class proceeding; 
 (b) an amendment that has the effect of excluding the member from the class is 
made to the certification order; 
 (c) a decertification order is made under section 10; 
 (d) the class proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits; 
 (e) the class proceeding is abandoned or discontinued with the approval of the 
court; or 
 (f) the class proceeding is settled with the approval of the court, unless the 
settlement provides otherwise.   
(2)  Where there is a right of appeal in respect of an event described in clauses (1) (a) 
to (f), the limitation period resumes running as soon as the time for appeal has expired 
without an appeal being commenced or as soon as any appeal has been finally 
disposed of.   
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Discontinuance, abandonment and settlement 
29.(1)  A proceeding commenced under this Act and a proceeding certified as a class 
proceeding under this Act may be discontinued or abandoned only with the approval of 
the court, on such terms as the court considers appropriate.   
Settlement without court approval not binding 
(2)  A settlement of a class proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court.   
Effect of settlement 
(3)  A settlement of a class proceeding that is approved by the court binds all class 
members.   
Notice: dismissal, discontinuance, abandonment or settlement 
(4)  In dismissing a proceeding for delay or in approving a discontinuance, 
abandonment or settlement, the court shall consider whether notice should be given 
under section 19 and whether any notice should include, 
 (a) an account of the conduct of the proceeding; 
 (b) a statement of the result of the proceeding; and 
 (c) a description of any plan for distributing settlement funds.   
Appeals 
Appeals: refusals to certify and decertification orders 
30.(1)  A party may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order refusing to certify a 
proceeding as a class proceeding and from an order decertifying a proceeding.   
Appeals: certification orders 
 (2)  A party may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order certifying a proceeding as 
a class proceeding, with leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules 
of court.   
Appeals: judgments on common issues and aggregate awards 
 (3)  A party may appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment on common issues and 
from an order under section 24, other than an order that determines individual claims 
made by class members.  
Appeals by class members on behalf of the class 
(4)  If a representative party does not appeal or seek leave to appeal as permitted by 
subsection (1) or (2), or if a representative party abandons an appeal under subsection 
(1) or (2), any class member may make a motion to the court for leave to act as the 
representative party for the purposes of the relevant subsection.   
(5)  If a representative party does not appeal as permitted by subsection (3), or if a 
representative party abandons an appeal under subsection (3), any class member may 
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make a motion to the Court of Appeal for leave to act as the representative party for the 
purposes of subsection (3).   
Appeals: individual awards 
 (6)  A class member may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24 
or 25 determining an individual claim made by the member and awarding more than 
$3,000 to the member.  
 (7)  A representative plaintiff may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under 
section 24 determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding more 
than $3,000 to the member.   
 (8)  A defendant may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 25 
determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding more than 
$3,000 to the member.   
(9)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a class 
member may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24 or 25, 
 (a) determining an individual claim made by the member and awarding $3,000 or 
less to the member; or 
 (b) dismissing an individual claim made by the member for monetary relief.   
(10)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a 
representative plaintiff may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 
24, 
 (a) determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding $3,000 
or less to the member; or 
 (b) dismissing an individual claim made by a class member for monetary relief.   
(11)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a 
defendant may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 25, 
 (a) determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding $3,000 
or less to the member; or 
 (b) dismissing an individual claim made by a class member for monetary relief.   
Costs 
31.(1)  In exercising its discretion with respect to costs under subsection 131 (1) of the 
Courts of Justice Act, the court may consider whether the class proceeding was a test 
case, raised a novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest.   
Liability of class members for costs 
(2)  Class members, other than the representative party, are not liable for costs except 
with respect to the determination of their own individual claims.   
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Small claims 
(3)  Where an individual claim under section 24 or 25 is within the monetary jurisdiction 
of the Small Claims Court where the class proceeding was commenced, costs related 
to the claim shall be assessed as if the claim had been determined by the Small 
Claims Court.   
Fees and disbursements 
32.(1)  An agreement respecting fees and disbursements between a solicitor and a 
representative party shall be in writing and shall, 
(a) state the terms under which fees and disbursements shall be paid; 
(b) give an estimate of the expected fee, whether contingent on success in the 
class proceeding or not; and 
(c) state the method by which payment is to be made, whether by lump sum, 
salary or otherwise.   
Court to approve agreements 
(2)  An agreement respecting fees and disbursements between a solicitor and a 
representative party is not enforceable unless approved by the court, on the motion of 
the solicitor.   
Priority of amounts owed under approved agreement 
(3)  Amounts owing under an enforceable agreement are a first charge on any 
settlement funds or monetary award.   
Determination of fees where agreement not approved 
 (4)  If an agreement is not approved by the court, the court may, 
(a) determine the amount owing to the solicitor in respect of fees and 
disbursements; 
(b) direct a reference under the rules of court to determine the amount owing; or 
(c) direct that the amount owing be determined in any other manner.   
Agreements for payment only in the event of success 
33.(1)  Despite the Solicitors Act and An Act Respecting Champerty, being chapter 327 of 
Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1897, a solicitor and a representative party may enter into 
a written agreement providing for payment of fees and disbursements only in the event 
of success in a class proceeding.   
Interpretation: success in a proceeding 
(2)  For the purpose of subsection (1), success in a class proceeding includes, 
 (a) a judgment on common issues in favour of some or all class members; and 
 (b) a settlement that benefits one or more class members.   
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Definitions 
(3)  For the purposes of subsections (4) to (7), 
―base fee‖ means the result of multiplying the total number of hours worked by an hourly 
rate; (―honoraires de base‖) 
―multiplier‖ means a multiple to be applied to a base fee. (―multiplicateur‖)   
Agreements to increase fees by a multiplier 
(4)  An agreement under subsection (1) may permit the solicitor to make a motion to the 
court to have his or her fees increased by a multiplier.   
Motion to increase fee by a multiplier 
(5)  A motion under subsection (4) shall be heard by a judge who has, 
 (a) given judgment on common issues in favour of some or all class members; or 
 (b) approved a settlement that benefits any class member.   
(6)  Where the judge referred to in subsection (5) is unavailable for any reason, the 
regional senior judge shall assign another judge of the court for the purpose.  
(7)  On the motion of a solicitor who has entered into an agreement under subsection 
(4), the court, 
 (a) shall determine the amount of the solicitor‘s base fee; 
 (b) may apply a multiplier to the base fee that results in fair and reasonable 
compensation to the solicitor for the risk incurred in undertaking and continuing the 
proceeding under an agreement for payment only in the event of success; and 
 (c) shall determine the amount of disbursements to which the solicitor is entitled, 
including interest calculated on the disbursements incurred, as totalled at the end of 
each six-month period following the date of the agreement.   
(8)  In making a determination under clause (7) (a), the court shall allow only a 
reasonable fee.   
(9)  In making a determination under clause (7) (b), the court may consider the manner 
in which the solicitor conducted the proceeding.   
Motions 
34.(1) The same judge shall hear all motions before the trial of the common issues.   
(2)  Where a judge who has heard motions under subsection (1) becomes unavailable 
for any reason, the regional senior judge shall assign another judge of the court for the 
purpose.   
(3)  Unless the parties agree otherwise, a judge who hears motions under subsection 
(1) or (2) shall not preside at the trial of the common issues.   
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Rules of court 
35.  The rules of court apply to class proceedings.   
Crown bound 
36.  This Act binds the Crown.   
Application of Act 
37.  This Act does not apply to, 
(a) a proceeding that may be brought in a representative capacity under another Act; 
(b) a proceeding required by law to be brought in a representative capacity; and 
(c) a proceeding commenced before this Act comes into force.   
38.  OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT).   
39.  OMITTED (ENACTS SHORT TITLE OF THIS ACT).   
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